The war between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres has been conventional as well as unconventional.

A significant feature of the unconventional war fought by the GOSL is the deployment of deep penetration assassinationn squads known as Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols or LRRP.

Tamil National Alliance (TNA) Parliamentarian Kittinan Sivanesan (51) was killed in a claymore mine last week in the Kanagrayankulam region of the Northern mainland known as the Wanni. The area was under the control of the LTTE.


[6th March, after the explosion that killed the TNA Parliamentarian-pic TN]

The LTTE accused the army`s deep penetration unit (DPU) of being responsible. This was promptly denied. Interestingly the LTTE refers to the LRRP squads as DPU for some reason.

Instrument of war

The assassination of Sivanesan has once again focused the spotlight on the LRRP/DPU phenomenon that is becoming a crucial factor in the current war.

The LRRP became an instrument of war by the armed forces since the turn of this century. Basic modus operandi of the LRRP is for small groups to clandestinely infiltrate territory controlled by the LTTE and target senior tiger leaders and key operatives. This is done in two ways.

One is to infiltrate tiger territory through jungle routes, conduct an operation and return. Sometimes the operatives stay in safe houses within LTTE controlled areas for days to do this. On other occasions they camp in the jungles and lie in wait for several hours to take on their target.

The usual method is to explode claymore mines with remote devices. In some instances timers have been used. Pressure mines too have been used on a few occasions. It is presumed that these attacks are planned and executed on the strength of precise intelligence .

The other method has been to co-opt civilians living in the Wanni to plant mines and target tiger leaders. This is done through bribery and coercion. In some cases some LTTE oppressed civilians nursing a grudge against the tigers have become willing tools.

The usage of hit squads to assassinate the enemy has been practised by different states and different armies in different situations. Despite the heroic glamour surrounding these teams they are in essence glorified assassination squads .

`Legitimately` sanctioned `illegitimate` operatives

So legitimate states and governments do not like to claim credit for these operations. Those involved in such operations are legitimately sanctioned illegitimate operatives.

Since they are usually controlled by intelligence officials these operatives are like spies in enemy territory.If successful they are rewarded quietly within the organizational structure. If they fail or are caught in the act they are disowned. They are heroes who cannot be honoured publicly.

Propagandists may try and project these operations as romantic adventures but by their intrinsic nature these fall under the covert warfare category. So officially these acts are not publicised and are usually unacknowledged or denied.

There are other reasons too for keeping these operations and particulars of those involved under wraps.Those engaged in such operations do not want to publicise them because of concern that they or their loved ones may be victimised if identities are exposed.

The other is that those residents in enemy territory who were collaborating with the hit squads may be rendered vulnerable if more details were publicised. Also there is the danger of the enemy gaining insight into the methods used if too much publicity is given.

All these reasons necessitate an environment of secrecy around such clandestine operations. Globally , this is the usual practice .

This was how Sri Lanka too conducted these operations in the beginning during the Chandrika Kumaratunga regime. When tiger leaders were being targeted and the LTTE began accusing state backed deep penetration units the Govt officially denied responsibility. Instead state propaganda blamed internal squabbles within the LTTE.

It was the ceasefire agreement of 2002 which first admitted officially to the existence of LRRP`s by stating in the CFA that all such activity would cease.

Then came the bizarre drama where a so called `safe house of the LRRP was raided in millennium city, Athurugiriya and five occupants arrested. After protracted wrangling they were released.

Then came the bizarre drama where a so called `safe house of the LRRP was raided in millennium city and five occupants arrested. It was alleged then that these men were linked to one of the sons of Anuruddha Ratwatte and were plotting to assassinate Ranil Wickremasinghe.

After protracted wrangling these men were released but in a peculiar twist some of them rushed to the media with their story. They also threatened legal action against the government. This was perhaps the only instance where so called members of a clandestine outfit like an LRRP squad owned up that they were part of a covert operation and threatened to sue the Government.

It also transpired that the so called safe house belonged to the wife of a senior LRRP team leader and that rent was being paid.This was another first in the annals of covert operations where a clandestine squad was paying rent to the spouse of a fellow - operative to use a house as a secret safe house.

Later one of these so called LRRP operatives was sent abroad as defence attache in one of our embassies abroad. At the end of his term there was an orchestrated hue and cry about the man and family disappearing. As usual the LTTE was blamed. It was later discovered that the family was safe and sound as refugee claimants in a western country.

These jocular antics by certain elements should not obscure the fact that the usage of LRRP squads has become a powerful weapon in the security force arsenal. Recent events indicate that these squads have developed into killing machines of devastating efficiency.

Balagalle`s brainchild

It is said that the LRRP was a brainchild of former army commander Lionel Balagalle who had conceived the project earlier as head of military intelligence. The green light was given during Chandrika Kumaratunga`s second Presidential term.

When the LRRP teams came into existence three different agencies were involved in setting them up and running them.

Fundamentally the LRRP teams were a combination of disgruntled ex-tigers, members of anti-tiger Tamil groups, Muslim militants and carefully selected Sinhala personnel. They were given highly specialised commando type training here and abroad.

The first phase of LRRP operations commenced in 2001 in both the northern and eastern tiger controlled regions.

Among those killed in the East were Lt. Col Nizam LTTE intelligence head for Batticaloa district, Major Mano LTTE comminications chief for Batticaloa - Amparai and two artillery specialists Major Sathiyaseelan and Capt Thevathasan. Among those killed in the North were Col Shankar head of the LTTE air wing and Lt. Col Kangai Amaran the sea tiger commander.

Of those who narrowly escaped death at the hands of the LRRP in the North then were former political commissar Brig. Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan (twice) , his deputy Major S. Thangan, Vavuniya special commander Col Jeyam and Deputy military chief Col Balraj. Of those who escaped death in the East were former regional chief Col Karuna, Eastern political commissar Karikalan, Jeyanthan regiment chief Jim Kelly Thatha and regional intelligence chief Lt. Col Ramaan.

LTTE out for blood

LRRP activity was shelved after the ceasefire.Most of the Tamil LRRP operatives had been absorbed into army ranks. The LTTE was out for their blood.Some of these men were allegedly betrayed to the LTTE by influential persons for large amounts of money.

On 16th January 2002 V. Vidyarathan, alias Mike , head of the paramilitary intelligence unit of the Army s Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was seized by the LTTE and executed four days later . On 10th February 2002 Lance Corporal Clarry was abducted and killed by the tigers.

On 3rd July 2002, Lance Cpl Saundrarajan was captured by the LTTE and later killed. On December 11, 2002, Cpl. Ganeshamoorthi alias Thilakaraj was killed. Lance Cpl Pulendrarasa was killed on 3rd January 2003. Cpl.Kadirgamathamby Ragupathi alias Ragu was shot dead in Colombo on 18th March 2003.

On April 26 2003, Lance Cpl Kalirasa Devarasa was killed by the LTTE at Dehiwela, just 45 minites after leaving the Army Transition Camp at Kohuwela.Lance Cpl Paramanathan Ravindrakumar was shot on 15th July 2003 but survived the attack.

Apart from these Tamil LRRP operatives the tigers also targeted important members of the Tamil armed groups collaborating with the army and described by the LTTE as para - military.

Sinnathambi Ranjan alias Varadan who led a breakaway TELO group working with the army was shot dead at Aaraiyampathy.

More importantly PLOTE Mohan who led the PLOTE faction working with the security forces was shot dead in Colombo.

Razeek the chief of the EPRLF faction working with the army was killed by the LTTE during the war itself when a suicide bomber targeted him Batticaloa town. .

LRRP renaissance

It appeared that the LRRP was now toothless as the key Tamil operatives who knew tiger terrain and acted as guides, pathfinders, safehouse providers and information gatherers were either eliminated or had fled abroad.But the LRRP concept experienced a renaissance when the ceasefire unravelled.

The election of Mahinda Rajapakse as President and the appointment of Sarath Fonseka as Army chief and Gotabhaya Rajapakse as defence secretary brought about a qualitative change in the security situation. With the LTTE playing into Colombo`s hands a determined no holds barred war effort was underway.

The revival o...