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Nearly 10 per cent of State vehicles missing - Gotabhaya

The difference between the present phase of the war and the previous ones is that unlike earlier, the security forces are not restricted to a single operation like, say Riviresa. They are working to a plan and simultaneously directing their firepower in Batticaloa, Toppigala, Vavunativu, Kokokodicholai, Amparai, Vavuniya and Muhamalai in Jaffna.

Firing on all fronts, the military believes, unsettles the Tigers, who were accustomed to facing one operation at a time and therefore, were free to tactically withdraw, to fight another day. In Eelam War IV, the military is calling the shots, deciding when and where to take on the Tigers, often with an element of surprise.

The SLAF special squadron and the SLAF Intelligence have been deployed in the Katunayake area, with further restrictions on visits to the hangars of the Kfirs and Migs being imposed. Other than pilots and technicians, even other SLAF personnel cannot visit these areas, while special identification for those allowed entry, are being issued by the SLAF police.

General Chandasiri who received a delegation of Catholic Bishops said that the civilians were cooperating with the military, informing it of any attempts by the LTTE to create chaos.

Besides the North hotting up, as the week drew to a close, it began with heavy fighting in the East. The military is pushing the Tigers into a situation where it would be deprived of food, medicine and ammunition. The Navy is patrolling the Eastern seas, to prevent supplies, while the army attempts to surround the Tiger strongholds by infiltrating in small numbers, as it did previously.
Infantry and elite troops, including commandos and special forces, are infiltrating the Thoppigala jungles in small groups. Their purpose is to seek and eliminate the Tigers in small numbers. The same is happening in Taravikulam, Kokodicholai and Vavunativu, the last Tiger bastions in the East.

For a considerable period of time, the LTTE made a serious effort to play down the ?Karuna? factor. However, in a recent article, the pro Tiger Tamil Guardian in London, has dwelt on the implications of Karuna?s defection, at length.
Marking the third anniversary of the defection, the Guardian article has logically argued that Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Col. Karuna, LTTE?s Eastern province leader, has lost influence in all quarters, including the very Eastern Tamils he had wanted to represent.

Observers feel that the purpose of the article was to bring down Karuna?s image on the eve of a possible election in the East, which the Wanni Tigers are paranoid about.
The fact that the LTTE organ has devoted so much time and space on this defection, is proof to the military that the Wanni Tigers were adversely affected by Karuna?s breakaway on March 2, 2004.
Karuna?s biggest contribution to the military was sharing secrets of the Tigers? military strength, thinking, plans and terrain. He plays the role of a devil?s advocate, in exchange for protection and security.
To the LTTE, Karuna is one more informant to be eliminated, according to the concluding lines of the March 7, Guardian article.

To dismiss Karuna as a mere informant is wishful thinking. However, that is to be expected, given the efforts by the Tigers to dismiss his role as being insignificant.
In fact, of all Prabhakaran?s enemies, Karuna ranks No. 1, and the Wanni faction has spent millions of rupees to track him down here and overseas or, just eliminate him but, to no avail. It is reported that Ramesh, who succeeded Karuna in the East, offered a gratification of Rs. 15 million to a senior military official, to track down Karuna. The official had, however, declined the offer.