The Army had reiterated that its Northern operations are on track despite the recent `setbacks` on the Vanni front. In the last week the Tiger resistance seems to have stiffened that and the inclement weather seem to have slowed down the momentum of the Lankan offensive. Whether the LTTE`s resistance is strong and durable enough to create a situation of stalemate on the Northern Front or whether these are the last attempts of a dying Tiger (as the government would have us believe) remains to be seen. Though the LTTE is weak it is safe to assume that Vellupillai Pirapaharan still has a couple of aces up his sleeve, such as Air Tigers, Black Tigers and a combination thereof, Black Air Tigers (yet to be experienced). None of these can enable the LTTE to win the war but by acting as force multipliers they can help the Tigers to avert a defeat by grinding the Lankan offensive to a halt.

The other factor which can push the war back into a state of stalemate is India. Delhi`s Sri Lanka policy is shifting, against Sri Lanka. The recent bonhomie towards the TNA and the failure of Indian leaders to unveil the specially built IPKF memorial during their SAARC visit are symbolic of this new direction. The continuing conflict between the Lankan Navy and Indian (Tamil Nadu) fishermen is not helping matters even though the main cause for friction is the Rajapakse regime`s persistent refusal to fulfill its promises concerning a political solution. India has waited, for almost three years, for the Rajapakse administration to produce a political solution. Without it Delhi cannot remain `neutral` once the war moves into the Tiger heartland, endangering the lives of civilian Tamils holed up there. A reasonable political solution will enable Delhi to pacify Tamil Nadu without such a solution the pressure from Tamil Nadu can become irresistible, especially in an election year.

According to the JHU, President Rajapakse will shortly summon the JHU in order to discuss a political solution. Whether this will be a genuine attempt to create a Southern consensus on devolution or yet another attempt at hoodwinking the Tamils, appeasing the Indians and silencing the West is uncertain. If the APC is summoned without any serious intent, just to win over international critics and to regain the GSP+ facility, the ruse is unlikely to work this time around. The Rajapakse administration has very little credibility with the Tamils, India and the West, since it has tried to dissemble on too many issues on too many occasions. But if the President is sincerely committed to a political solution, a revitalized APC can function as the political corollary of the Northern offensive.

Is a Political Solution Possible?

All Lankan attempts to address Tamil grievances, notably the B-C Pact and the D-C Pact, were stillborn, due to Southern opposition. The provincial council system happened as a result of the Indo Lanka Accord, imposed on the Jayewardene administration by India, which in turn imposed it on the South. Devolution was thus not a home-grown product nor was it something that the government and the people of Sri Lanka accepted willingly. If the will of a majority of the majority prevailed in 1987 there would have been no 13th Amendment, no provincial councils, no language parity and no recognition of the pluralist nature of Sri Lanka.

The PC system was implemented amidst unprecedented chaos and bloodshed. It need not have been so, because the uprising was not spontaneous but engineered by the JVP with the backing of the SLFP. In their ignorance of devolution (an ignorance fostered by Sinhala extremists) a majority Sinhalese may have distrusted the PC system. But if the SLFP and the JVP acted with responsibility and restraint, the South would not have erupted. SLFPers and JVPers opposed the 13th Amendment for the same reason UNPers supported it because the respective party leaders willed them to do so.

Most Sinhalese are either UNPer or SLFPers, loyal party men and women who will swallow whatever policy imposed on them by their leaders. When the SLFP leadership opposed devolution and the PC system, ordinary members did likewise. When SLFP adopted a pro-devolution stance under the leadership of Chandrika Bandaranaike, the rank and file fell in line. It was a gigantic shift for the party of Sinhala Only, a party which had been opposed to even mild decentralization since the abrogation of the B-C Pact. But there was no internal rebellion, no defections at grass-roots level. The transition of the SLFP from a party viscerally opposed to decentralization to a party backing federalism happened smoothly, because the leader of the time willed it.

11 years later the SLFP changed tracks yet again, with equal placidity. During the Presidential election campaign of 2005, the SLFP abandoned its pro-federal stance and reverted to a unitary state policy this shift away from devolution accelerated under the new Rajapakse leadership. Still the SLFP rank and file fell in line with nary a murmur. The situation is no different in the UNP. There too party loyalty has taken and will take precedence over ideological issues. Rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, what matters in Sri Lanka is party loyalty and not ideology or principles.

Therein can be charted the way out of the Lankan quagmire. If the two main parties come to an agreement, a political solution to the ethnic problem is possible. This is especially so, given the weakening of the JVP if the performance of the JVP in the recent PC polls is reflective of the national mood, Sri Lanka is back to being a two party democracy. This makes a moderate bi-partisan consensus between the SLFP and the UNP even more feasible. Not a national government but a single issue convergence, with both parties backing a political solution which goes beyond the 13th Amendment and is closer to the Indian model. If the two parties can agree to support such a solution in parliament, and at a referendum and to refrain from using it to attack each other at any future election, the Gordian knot can be untied without destabilizing the South. Since the JVP is not banned, it is unlikely to take up arms against such a deal. The JVP will protest and the monks will fast, but if the two main parties hold firm to their moderate line, the storm could be withstood.