The rumblings in Tamilnadu may seem rather distant in the hopeful South, now that Killinochchi seems so near. But the road to Killinochchi can turn into an impasse if the storm clouds over Tamilnadu are allowed to grow until they darken the Delhi skies. The rulers of India can afford to be somewhat impervious to the political weather in Tamilnadu in between elections but acute sensitivity and a desire to please would replace polite indifference whenever an election draws near. And in India, 2009 is an election year with the Congress and the BJP jostling for electoral and political primacy, the Tamilnadu factor cannot but assume increasing importance in Delhi.

Forewarned are forearmed, if warnings are heeded. After the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi on Tamilnadu soil, state`s interest in Sri Lanka went into abeyance. This indifference began to ebb with the outbreak of the Fourth Eelam War. In the last few months Tamilnadu`s interest in Sri Lanka has accelerated at a dizzy pace, driven primarily by the conflict between the Lankan Navy and Indian fishermen. The consequent demand for the return of Katchchativu to India would have seemed surreal just a month ago. It is no longer so, given its espousal by top regional politicians (including Ms. Jayalalitha who has declared her intention of taking the issue to the Indian Supreme Court). Sri Lanka`s meteoric rise to the heights of Tamilnadu`s political concerns is too portentous to be regarded unconcernedly or dismissed airily by Colombo.

A recent survey of Tamilnadu public opinion on the Lankan crisis assumes added significance in this context. The survey is by `Ananda Vikatan, an `influential` Tamil language weekly in existence for 80 years. Perhaps the most critical finding of the survey is that 62.59% of the respondents believe India must intervene to seek a solution to the Lankan problem while 24.81% think intervention would be needed only if the situation gets much worse only 12.58% want India to stay out of Sri Lanka. This overwhelming demand for Indian intervention in Sri Lanka can become irresistible to the powers in Delhi, if the election season in India coincides with a worsening of the plight of Lankan Tamils (manifested by increased civilian casualties and an escalation in the flow of refugees to Tamilnadu). In the resultant conjuncture the demand for `Mother India` to save Lankan Tamils will reach a crescendo in Tamilnadu and Delhi will find itself lending an ear (willingly or unwillingly). As a pre-eminent Calcutta paper pointed out, `If Sri Lanka continues to ignore the civilian casualties of its war on terrorists, southern India, which bears the brunt of that war, may increasingly push for a more pro-active role for the Centre in ending that war. In an election year, no major party, at the Centre or in Tamil Nadu, can ignore that change of the mood in the electorate` (The Telegraph - 6.8.2008). In an election year Tamilnadu would supersede Sri Lanka, effortlessly, inevitably. After all, how many Sinhala voters does India have?

A REVIVAL OF INTERVENTIONISM?

According to the Ananda Vikatan survey 54.25% of respondents support the LTTE, while only 17.4% oppose it and 28.34% say they supported the LTTE before the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. In addition 46.24% are proud that the Tigers possess a standing army, navy and air force (only 18.59% feel this is a danger to India). Despite this support and sense of identification, a majority do not want the ban on the LTTE to be lifted immediately. Only 47.65% want a de-proscription while 27.43% are opposed to it and 24.91% want to `wait and see`. Equally interestingly a large minority of 43.02% want Vellupillai Pirapaharan to be arrested for Rajiv Gandhi assassination while 40.07% feel that could be pardoned. It is also significant that a large minority of 43.14% disagree with LTTE`s habit of killing dissenting Tamil politicians, another indicator that the support for the LTTE is far from unconditional.

Recently, the website, Tamilweek, carried an image which was symbolic of the plight of tens of thousands of civilian Tamils rendered homeless and defenceless by the war. The picture is of a family of refugees moving away from the war zone in a fruitless search for a safe haven an elderly man, a teenage girl, a glimpse of a woman, a young child, with the expressionless faces of the hopeless, sitting atop their pitiful belongings, holding their brown mongrel dog. The tragedy of these people should not be ignored because they are Sri Lankan citizens. If the Lankan regime and the state ignore the agony of these innocents, it will give outside entities, from Tamilnadu to Washington, from Delhi to Brussels, a good enough reason to interfere in the country`s affairs.

No one knows this better than Vellupillai Pirapaharan. That is why the LTTE would do whatever it takes to provoke the Lankan Army to commit atrocities against civilian Tamils. The Tigers have already ordered people on the outskirts of Killinochchi to move to the heartland. Their obvious purpose is to have a large captive civilian populace which will slow down the advance of the Lankan Forces and increase the possibility of non-combatant casualties. The Tigers will also redouble efforts to ignite clashes between the Lankan Navy and Indian fishermen.

Thus the imperative for the Rajapakse administration to adopt a zero-tolerance policy on human rights abuses by the Lanka Forces and to impose it strictly. If the Lankan political and military leaders make a conscious and consistent effort to minimise civilian casualties and to provide adequate shelter and protection to civilians fleeing the war zone, Tamilnadu opinion can be neutralised. Since the Lankan Army is to all intents and purposes a Sinhala army and the civilians in the war zone are Tamils, abuses cannot be minimised without a clear signal from the very top, stating the non-existence of impunity for crimes against civilians. Unfortunately such a clear message may not be possible with the Army Commander openly espousing a Sinhala rather than a Sri Lankan approach to war/ethnic conflict.

The danger of some sort of Indian intervention would be enhanced in the absence of a sincere effort by the Lankan administration to come up with a political solution to the ethnic problem. According to Ananda Vikatan survey a majority of 55.4% support Tamil Eelam as a solution a large minority of 34.63% back a federal solution while only 9.91% think that Eelam is not needed. Clearly if Sri Lanka continues to cling to the unitary state, the Tigers will find it easy to drum up support in Tamilnadu. Though President Rajapakse is said to have promised the Indian Prime Minister the full implementation of the 13th Amendment the signs are that this pledge, like many previous ones, will be observed in the breach. Already the JHU has announced that it will leave the government if the President tries to give police and land powers to the provincial councils as per the 13th Amendment and past experiences indicate that what the JHU demands today the President concedes tomorrow. Therefore the likeliest outcome is that the administration will try to buy time in Delhi using the `threat` to its survival as the excuse. But such arguments may fall on surprisingly deaf ears if the Congress Party`s chance of winning the election hangs in balance.

As long as Tamilnadu exists, with its millions of voters, Delhi cannot countenance a Sinhala victory or a Sinhala peace this is as true for today as it was for 1987. If the Tigers are to be defeated and the Tigers must be defeated the Fourth Eelam War needs to become a clear cut contestation between a pluralist democratic Sri Lanka and a fascist LTTE. This shift cannot happen so long as the Rajapakse regime refuses to move an inch away from the unitary state. If the Lankan state is fighting not just to defeat separatism but also to prevent federalism and quasi-federalism, its opponents will not be limited to the LTTE but will include most Lankan Tamils, most Tamilnadu Tamils and even India and the West. In such a situation the Fourth Eelam War will continue to be perceived and waged as a Sinhala vs. Tamil contest, an attempt by the Sinhalese to turn Sri Lanka into a Sinhala country. But if the regime is for a substantial degree of devolution, it can win the support of a majority of the Tamil populace, both in Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu. The LTTE can thus be marginalised, nationally and made friendless internationally.

The War and Devolution

The Fourth Eelam War has entered what can well be its most critical and bloodiest phase. Much will depend on the Tigers` capacity to resist the multi-pronged assault of the Lankan Forces. Though the LTTE`s will to resist cannot be undermined as long as Vellupillai Pirapaharan is alive its capacity to resist can be diminished due to an inadequacy of experienced fighters. The insufficiency of human resources has been the LTTE`s Achilles Heel for sometime. The Tigers are said to be conscripting anyone capable of holding a weapon, but most of these under/over-aged raw conscripts will become cannon-fodder rather than effective fighters. Still the LTTE has a veritable gift for making a relatively small number of seasoned fighters go a long way the Tigers and their leader also have a record of fighting hardest (and best) when their backs are to the wall. Whether the war has entered its final phase will depend not just on the events in the battlefield but also on economic developments in Sri Lanka, her financial capacities and political developments in Tamilnadu.

The Rajapakse administration is intent on defeating the LTTE. This is certainly a point in its favour. Unfortunately its Sinhala supremacist agenda is discrediting that worthy goal, making it seem increasingly like an attempt not only to defeat the LTTE but also to cow Tamils into submission, to compel them to join a `Sri Lankan nation` as unequal, second-class ci...