| |
Liberation Tigers are not Liberation fighters Friday, 25 July 2008 - 9:13 AM SL Time |  | |
Why the Liberation Tigers are not Liberation Fighters
by Dayan Jayatilleka
At its worst, a little learning can indeed be a dangerous thing, but at any time it can be exceedingly annoying. As Marx once expostulated `ignorance never helped anyone yet`. In recent days the Sri Lankan press has seen the most careless flinging about of analogies, with the LTTE being written of in the same paragraphs as the IRA, the ANC, Hezbollah, Hamas and Nepal`s Maoists. Either the Sri Lankan state or the LTTE is urged to adopt these situations/movements as a model. This is simply ridiculous because one cannot profitably compare apples and oranges, chalk and cheese. The LTTE, while certainly not unique, does not belong to the any of the categories that the earlier mentioned movements or struggles belong to.
The relationship between the UK and Ireland was a colonial one, with the UK being a metropolitan imperialist power, and Ireland being Britain`s first and oldest colony. Britain invaded, occupied and settled Ireland with Scottish Presbyterians. Sri Lanka is a former colony, not a former colonial power, and its relationship with the largely Tamil North, though arguably iniquitous, is certainly not - and could not have been-a colonial one. The IRA`s struggle was therefore a residual national liberation struggle, complicated by the demographics (the Protestant minority of the North whose elected MPs were vital to the balance of power in Westminster).
After three decades, the Provisional IRA realized that a military victory over the British presence was impossible to achieve. The LTTE has not realized that. The LTTE murdered or attempted to murder those it negotiated with ( Premadasa, CBK), moderate ethnic politicians (Amirthalingam), foreign intermediaries (Rajiv Gandhi) and its own negotiators (Mahattaya). The equivalent conduct would have been the IRA murdering Tony Blair, John Hume, George Mitchell and Martin MacGuinness. The IRA had a powerful political arm, the Sinn Fein, which had been in existence for decades. It contested elections in Northern Ireland since the early 1980s, though it refused to take its seats in the Stormont parliament. The LTTE registered a political party as late as 1990, dissolved it in short order, arresting and murdering its chairman, Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah alias Mahattaya. The IRA did no such thing, because the IRA was no such monstrosity.
Rajiv Gandhi 9th Prime Minister of India. He was assassinated by LTTE while campaigning for the Sriperumbudur Lok Sabha Congress candidate on May 21, 1991 at the age of 46.
The IRA agreed to a settlement which entailed the de-commissioning of weapons under international auspices. The political contours of the settlement fell well short of what the IRA had fought for: troops out of Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland out of the UK. Northern Ireland remains very much part of the UK, the IRA shares power with their Protestant foes and Britain remains a unitary state, unconverted to federalism but with devolution of power. The LTTE has done no such thing because it is no such creature.
Contrary to the nonsensical nattering of some columnists, it is not the case that the Tigers were not offered a reasonable alternative to Tamil Eelam. India did so, with the Indo-Lanka Accord. Though Sinhala chauvinist limited the scope of devolution, Prabhakaran did not go to war against the Sinhala Army - which was `gated` by the IPKF-but against the Indian peacekeeping force, proceeding to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi on Indian soil in 1991. Premadasa was willing to give Prabhakaran `the North east on a silver platter` according to Anita Pratap (Island of Blood), but that wasn`t good enough. Nor was Chandrika`s offer of a restructuring of the Sri Lankan polity into a union of regions. True, Sinhala opinion was opposed to it, but it is not as if Prabhakaran sat down and concurred. He had broken off contacts by blowing up two naval gunboats in Trincomalee harbour-and for his pains, lost Jaffna at the end of that year, never to regain it. Contrary to the lie that federalism was never on the horizon, it is the Tigers that pulled back from and disowned the Oslo understanding to `explore a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka`. Anton Balasingham wrote a tract disclaiming any such understanding and provoked even the Norwegians into releasing the minutes of the talks containing that understanding. Lastly, we have the example of the LTTE`s sabotage of former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesingthe`s Presidential campaign, which, had it been successful, would have resulted in a discussion - though not inevitably an acceptance - of the ISGA and/or PTOMS.
Given that both the structural situation and the actors are very different from Sri Lanka and the LTTE, the Northern Ireland model is no model at all.
Things turn even more irksome for the informed reader when encountering references to the ANC, Hezbollah, Hamas and Nepal`s Maoists as recommended models for the Tigers.
Ranasinghe Premadasa (June 23, 1924 - May 1, 1993) was the 3rd President of Sri Lanka from
January 2, 1989 to May 1, 1993. He was assassinated in Colombo in a suicide bombing by the LTTE.
The ANC fought for majority rule against apartheid which was a form of entrenched minority rule. Sri Lanka`s only experience with minority rule was under colonialism. A democracy however flawed, Sri Lanka`s system is one of majority rule and its problems arguably are in balancing majority rule with minority rights. The LTTE`s struggle is for a separate state in which the country`s minority would be the majority. The ANC was a multiracial organization while the LTTE is mono-ethnic. The ANC was scrupulous in its exercise of violence, carefully targeting its attacks and eschewing violence against civilians or which could affect them. For the mono-ethnic Tigers, terrorism is a major mode of struggle, in a cause which is the direct opposite of majority rule.
Hezbollah, which as a guerrilla army stands in the same relation to the Tigers as the Jimi Hendrix Experience does to Abba, was formed in 1982 with the support of Iran`s Pasdaran, as a direct result of and response to a cross-border invasion and partial occupation by a foreign power, Israel. With a solid political base and Parliamentary representation, it is a classic resistance movement against external invasion. The Sri Lankan armed forces have not invaded any other country (not for a millennium anyway), so an armed movement against it cannot be resistance movement against the foreign invaders of a sovereign country, nor can it be compared with such a movement. Furthermore the Hezbollah did not wage war against Iran or Syria and proceed to murder either an Iranian or Syrian leader, as the Tigers did to the IPKF and India`s Rajiv Gandhi.
Hamas, though much less successful than the Hezbollah, is also a resistance movement against foreign occupation and annexation, in violation of four decades of UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions.
Nepal`s Maoists waged a revolutionary war against an entrenched hereditary monarchy. Sri Lanka is a democracy. In any case Nepal`s Maoists have been the first to make the point, on the record to the Hindu, that the Tigers are nothing like them whatsoever, and that the LTTE has no political program or ideology other than that of separatism pure and simple.
I am not splitting hairs. My fundamental points are these:
Former Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga`s first public address after the assassination attempt, allegedly by the LTTE suicide bombers, at her final election rally at Colombo Town Hall premises on 18 December 1999. As a result of that suicide attack she lost Vision in her right eye
Firstly, given the character of their causes and the enemies they fought against, the intrinsic nature of their struggles and the absence of serious reform options, every one of these movements, the ANC, IRA, Hamas, Hezbollah, Nepal`s Maoists were/are waging legitimate armed struggles which fall into the category of Just Wars, although their methods have not always been just or legitimate, unlike those of the Cuban, Nicaraguan, Vietnamese and Chinese liberation struggles. Neither in its content nor in its conduct is the armed struggle of the LTTE just and legitimate.
Secondly, in analytical terms, the LTTE has to be compared with other armed separatist or secessionist movements, and more specifically, with separatist movements waging war against sovereign democratic states (Chechnya, Kashmir, Nagaland, the Moros, Kurds, the Basque ETA) rather than autocracies (Eritrea). The corollary is that the Sri Lankan conflict has to be compared with situations of independent national states with electoral democratic systems, facing separatist insurgencies.
Thirdly, since the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 the main obstacle to peace in Sri Lanka is not that Tamil nationalism has not been offered a reasonable alternative to separatism. It is that the LTTE has an inflated self-image of what it can and should hold out for, which does not correspond to its performance as an armed movement. That is a subset of the larger problem, namely that Tamil nationalism has a sense of superiority which is mirrored neither by the military achievement of its armed spearhead the LTTE nor by collective arithmetical strength within the polity. It is a problem of the false consciousness of Tamil nationalism - may I say Jaffna Tamil nationalism - and its selected or self selected vanguard, the Tigers.
(The views expressed here are the personal ones of the writer).
courtesy: The Island
|
Source(s)
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20080724_03 |
magha
Senior Member
Joined: Feb 2005
Posts: 5593
Member Profile
|
 25 Jul 2008 02:23:30 GMT Report for Abuse
|
| Posted this not knowing it is already on the news |
ajan
Senior Member
Joined: Apr 2005
Posts: 4940
Member Profile
|
 25 Jul 2008 13:40:25 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Dont worry magha , read this
DISSECTING DAYAN JAYATILLEKA'S PAST AND PRESENT
'Dayan must be familiar with the phrase A rose by any other name would smell as sweet . By the same token, rubbish, even if covered by a layer of Marx and Gramsci would still stink. Premadasa remains a tyrant.'
Currently, I m reading Charlton Heston s invigorating autobiography In the Arena (1995). After 300 pages, I m half-way through. Still another 275 pages to go. While describing his troubles in shooting the movie, 55 Days at Peking (1962) that retold the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 for the movie screen, Charlton Heston had the following appreciative words for his co-star David Niven. I quote the short paragraph verbatim:
David Niven is my happiest memory of that whole shoot. He was that increasingly rara avis, a true gentleman, funny as only Brits can be, a flawless professional and best of all, a superb actor. When he d won his Best Acor Oscar for Separate Tables, he stumbled going up the steps to the stage. Improvising a thin gag about falling because he was loaded with so many good luck pieces he was top-heavy, he said, The reason I fell is that I was loaded and was drowned in the largest laugh in the history of Academy acceptances (admittedly not a rich mine of wit). pp. 292-293
After reading this paragraph, my thoughts drifted to the recent scribblings of the Sinhalese political analyst-actor, now performing in Geneva. Unlike the debonair and witty David Niven on that Oscar Awards night, this political opportunist Dayan Jayatilleka - currently performing as the Goebbelsian Gong of President Mahinda Rajapakse appears to be top-heavy with sycophantic grub and maldigested Marxian chaff. Having positioned himself as the Sri Lanka s head barker in Geneva since last year, the bottom line in all the scribblings of this soothsayer amounts to The LTTE not the Tamils, not Tamil nationalism, not Sinhala nationalism- is The Absolute Enemy. It poses no less than an existential threat to us Sri Lankans. We cannot coexist with it. It must be fought and defeated. Island, Colombo, Jan.31, 2008 .
As a Tamil observer, should one be silent? The past flip-flops of this Goebbelsian Gong needs some exposure if not, for the sole reason of rebuking his weathervane drivel, now splattering the electronic media ad nauseam. To do this without any rancor, first I provide two published evaluations on Jayatilleka s intellectual credentials by his fellow Sinhalese peers, who have no love either for Tamil nationalism or for Pirabhakaran. This strategy, while smacking at the political opportunism of Dayan Jayatilleka, somewhat eliminates the pro-Tamil bias which I may be accused of.
The thoughts of Rajpal Abeynayake in 1997
The following excerpts, appeared in an opinion piece with the caption, What has Laurent Kabila got to do with the Lanka Guardian? Sunday Times, Colombo, June 1, 1997 .
Dayan is currently the Editor of the Lanka Guardian, founded by his father, senior journalist Mervyn de Silva. For those with short memories, Jayatilleke was better known as Anuruddha Tilakasiri during the Premadasa era, when he wrote a regular column for the Observer, taking on most of Premadasa s many pugnacious detractors. Now, Jayatilleke has metamorphosed into Editor, turning the Lanka Guardian into a magazine that is largely a reflection of the Editor s convictions.
Abeynayake continued further:
If the Lanka Guardian is a reflection of Dayan s ideology, then it's not surprising that the Guardian has also carried various tracts and analysis intermittently on Marxist doctrinal affairs. But, compared to the force of the pro-Premadasist, fiercely anti-PA stance note: PA refers to the People s Alliance headed by Chandrika Kumaratunga, the then President that the magazine now regularly adopts, the little nod at dialectical Marxism is a quaint aberration it appears.
To me, Jayatileke embodies the noveau capitalist ideologue, and since capitalist ideologues did not exist in the same sense that Marxist ideologues existed, I see Jayatilleke as one among a new breed of ideologues who have emerged in the vacuum created by the death of Marxist ideologues in the post-Cold War political discourse.
For example, one cannot accuse the Guardian these days of not taking a stand. This is not to say the magazine is devoid of its intellectual flavour, but since Dayan took over the day-to-day operation of the Guardian, the magazine has become a pro-active political organ as opposed to a purely journalistic device which it used to be when Dayan s father Mr Mervyn de Silva ran operations.
The thoughts of Malinda Seneviratne in 2000
The following excerpts, appeared in a rebuttal to Dayan Jayatilleka with the caption, Some mild thoughts on Dayan Jayatilleka Island, Colombo, Oct.9, 2000 .
Take away all the spurious linguistic theatrics in Dayan s article and a couple of issues emerge. First. He does talk about the alleged Sinhala Buddhist hegemonism and what he chooses to call the new global reality
Dayan complains that my howl against globalization is insincere because I have failed to acknowledge the positive Sri Lankan experience of 1989/90 1993 . Being a sycophant of Ranasinghe Premadasa, I suppose Dayan is obliged to say nice things about the man. Premadasa was the architect of the most violent period of our post-independence history. True the JVP is not as innocent as their spokesmen claim. I don t know from which piece of Marxist literature Dayan found solace (if he was a sincere Marxist) during those times of defending Premadasa, but 60,000 people being tortured and killed during a person s tenure as head of state is a far cry from a positive experience
About Dayan s history, let me say it all in one line: it includes a particularly funny way of handing over nomination papers, a funny way of popping in and out of the country, offering an abject public apology to J.R. Jayewardene, not to mention defending the party lines of the various groups in power (nationally and regionally). It would suffice to say Danno Danithi at this point.
Dayan must be familiar with the phrase A rose by any other name would smell as sweet . By the same token, rubbish, even if covered by a layer of Marx and Gramsci would still stink. Premadasa remains a tyrant.
What Dayan Jayatilleka wrote in 1982
The Lanka Guardian magazine of Feb.1, 1982, featured a three page commentary by a 25 year-old Dayan Jayatilleka, who then portrayed himself as a Sinhalese contra carrying a flag of a pro-Tamil agitator. It was entitled, Jaffna: Individual terrorism or guerilla war? Here are excerpts from that commentary. The words or phrases in bold font are as in the original.
The steady, selective liquidation of Tamil militants is accompanied by the parallel process of a deliberate attempt to de-legitimize and criminalize the political-military struggle in the North. Both are the work of the bourgeois state, using the repressive apparatus for the physical action and the ideological apparatus for the physical action and the ideological apparatus, the mass media, for the psychological exercise. One seeks to destroy the physical being the other his identity.
Thus the bourgeois state has succeeded in organizing a consensus to support the most repressive legislation that the State now employs against its main enemy the Tamil terrorists .
That the Sri Lanka Freedom Party this faction or that should support this consensus is no surprise to anyone. There s no greater Sinhala chauvinist than Sirimavo Bandaranaike and neither the Maoists nor the Trotskyists, her present supporters, can erase that fact just as her past partners, the LSSP and CP could not wash her away the guilt of 1971. But what does surprise one is that the Left movement, succumbing to the ideological psychological warfare of the bourgeois state should also join this consensus and denounce Tamil terrorism or individual terrorism .
This unfortunately has drawn significant layers of the proletariat into the reactionary consensus. My purpose then is to make two points:
(a) The armed actions in the North are not terroristic and alien to Marxism-Leninism but are in fact typical of an early stage of a protracted peoples war of national liberation.
(b) These actions are very much in the authentic tradition of the Bolsheviks under Lenin.
Dayan Jayatilleka continued to propound his thoughts as follows:
The Tamil guerillas, while being in the phase of Strategic Defensive , are accumulating strength through a series of relatively minor tactical offensives. The massive retaliation by the State reveals to the Tamil people their enemy in all its bestial ferocity. But this is not all. The repression which, making no distinction between the armed combatants and unarmed youth, encompasses in its scale and scope, the entire Tamil nation in the North. Every Tamil there, by the very fact of his or her Tamilness, is deemed an enemy and treated as such in practice. This forces the Tamil people to see themselves as the State sees them at the very time it tries to deny it, i.e., as a separate nation! Thus, the inexorable dialectic of vanguard violence and state repression enables the Tamil people to know themselves and know their enemy. It raises their political consciousness from the level of a nation un sich to that of a nation fur sich. The dialectic also forces sectors like the TULF and the Sinhala Left to take up positions on either side of the fence. Trying to straddle the barbed wire proving uncomfortable to their lower extremities.
The sudden, spectacular and successful military actions by the urban guerillas against definable sources of repression and visible institutions of the State, begin to convince broader and broader layers of the populace that armed struggle is possible as well as morally justifiable and absolutely necessary to break free from oppression. As this happens, the masses themselves begin to enter the struggle. A Peoples Army of national liberation will, in the obvious conception of the Tamil militants, emerge through a gradual accretion of guerilla fighters as the struggle proceeds from hit-and-run attacks (low intensity/small unit operations) via skirmishes, on to confrontations of wider scope. Right now what the guerillas are trying to do is to offer practical proof to the masses of the effectiveness and feasibility of an armed struggle strategy for the achievement of Eelam, in the face of the manifest failure of the TULF s parliamentary strategy and the continuation/escalation of military repression. This is known as the tactic of armed propaganda.
What have the armed Tamil youth achieved so far?
(1) According to Habash, the inability of the enemy to destroy the movement in embryo is in itself a victory for the movement. The Tamil militants have achieved this victory.
(2) They have prevented the State from normalizing the situation.
(3) They have withstood the shift in counter-guerilla operations from the hands of the police to that of the regular Army. The Tupamaros could not survive this qualitative shift. (Admittedly they were operating in a different context that of class warfare.)
(4) They have eliminated the information gathering capacity of the special (political) police in the North. (Learning to combat the political police is a necessary attribute of a revolutionary cadre according to Lenin s What Is To Be Done? )
(5) They have accumulated a sufficient minimum of fire-power as well as considerable financial strength.
(6) They have re-introduced the problematique of revolutionary violence, first posed by the JVP (its great historic merit) into the debate within the Left movement, while providing a necessary critique (in practice, by weapon) of the JVP s strategy then and now (parliamentarism).
Hyping the mule-brained EPRLF
Many, including Dayan Jayatilleka himself, may find it difficult to gulp what the current lead barker for annihilation of LTTE, wrote in his salad days in 1982. The vehicle Dayan Jayatilleka boarded in early 1980s was EPRLF and its hodge-podge mix of Marxist rhetoric and Tamil nationalism. While I have read Dayan s homages to the EPRLF and its leader K.Padmanabha in the Lanka Guardian magazine and other mouthpieces of Sinhalese majoritarianism, I have not seen any mention or rebuke from Dayan on the issue of that demented 1984 kidnapping of newly-wed Ohio couple (Stanley and Mary Allen) in Jaffna and ransom demand made by his EPRLF pals, among whom Douglas Devananda was one, who now parades as a virtuous democrat in President Mahinda Rajapakse Cabinet. I refrain from repeating here, what I had already written on the abysmal failure of EPRLF leadership and the reasons for its dismal performance among Eelam Tamils for recognition, in my Pirabhakaran Phenomenon (2005) book.
While re-reading in 2008, what Dayan Jayatilleka had written in 1982, check again the phrases such as, tactical offensives , vanguard violence and state repression , manifest failure of the TULF s parliamentary strategy , sufficient minimum fire-power as well as considerable financial strength , all of which have come to characterize the LTTE imprints, and not the EPRLF that danced to Indian puppeteers strings.
Hyping Karuna
Since March 2004, when Karuna was evicted from the LTTE, one of Karunas s voluble cheer-leaders was Dayan, a tawdry von Clausewitz impostor, who never saw field action in a battle field. Here are four excerpts from what he had written hyping Karuna, between 2004 and 2007.:
Item 1:
Karuna s great strength is that he has a cause, an idea: he has raised the standard of revolt and liberty against a brutal tyranny. He has wisely refrained from unveiling a detailed programme which could narrow his appeal and options or prove divisive among potential allies, and narrowed the target to Prabhakaran s dictatorship and the domination of the East.
His great achievements are fourfold: (i) Staying alive (ii) weathering the storms of the April retreat/dispersion, the Kottawa killings and Reggie s death (iii) becoming internationally known, recognisable and (iv) expeditiously achieving a politico-military capacity by combining the classic armed propaganda of selective attacks with the formation of a political front .Karuna s great underlying strength is that his struggle is in keeping with the spirit of the times, the strongest force in human history: the search for a wider freedom, for liberty. In defence of Karuna , Asian Tribune website, Oct. 19, 2004
Item 2
We can be certain of winning the war even in the largely mono-ethnic Jaffna and Wanni theatres if (a) Karuna has been involved in drawing up the battle plans and (b) the opposing LTTE cadres know that in addition to the Sri Lankan armed forces, their legendary former commander has taken the field, leading a well-trained, equipped and formidable Tamil formation. The Morning After Muhamalai , Asian Tribune website, Oct.14, 2006.
Item 3
A Karuna dominated Eastern council would achieve two positive results: (1). It would enable Karuna to strengthen himself and expand his base, which in turn would mean that we could hand over many security functions to the Eastern council (the law and order function is devolved and there is provision to raise a police force, hence the earlier North east Provincial Council s CVF militia) draw down our forces from the East and commit them to defeating the Tigers in the North. (2). With the patronage he is able to extend through the Council, Karuna would be able to raise an army in the East which can work in parallel with the Sri Lankan armed forces in any offensive in the North and the Wanni. De-merger: Give Karuna the Eastern Council , Lanka Academic Forum website, Oct.28, 2006
Item 4
Sun Tzu says the target of all strategy is the mind of the enemy commander. Col. Karuna should be asked to war-game, anticipate Prabhakaran's moves, while bearing in mind that Prabhakaran will anticipate this and strive to use new, post-Karuna tactics.
Karuna, given his impressive performance against Jayasikuru and at Elephant Pass, and Douglas Devananda, given his knowledge of the North and its people, should be intimately and organically involved in designing the campaign, and invited to make operational, problem-solving inputs as the process unfurls. Pushing 60: Independence Day Manifesto , Sunday Observer, Colombo, Feb.4, 2007
That Karuna s stars didn t glitter either in the East Eelam or in the North Eelam as Dayan Jayatilleka had naively hoped and that Karuna - the great hype of Dayan - is now literally counting bars in a London slammer, should have been an utter disappointment for this anti-LTTE scribe. For obvious reasons, during the past two months, Karuna name-droppings have disappeared from Dayan s scribblings. The reasons Dayan attributed as Karuna s great achievements in his defence of Karuna polemic in late 2004, have been proved right in a perverse sense in 2008 becoming internationally known, recognisable and staying alive in a London slammer! not for any liberation-related cause for which Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela had gone to prison, but for illegal entry with a forged diplomatic passport under the Sinhalese name Kokila Gunawardana purported Director General of Wildlife Conservation.. Huh! Anyone for Hubris?
Coda
There is one plausible reason for Dayan Jayatilleka s crankiness and continuing drivel against the LTTE. And Charlton Heston has noted it, in his autobiography. We re all sensitive to other actors assaults on great roles we ve played too. Dayan in his salad days of 1980s dreamt himself as a Sri Lankan militant revolutionary a la Fidel Castro, leading his raggedy bunch of companeros under the banner Vikalpa Kandayama only to fail miserably, kneel on his knees and negotiate an amnesty deal with his then adversary (J.R.Jayewardene) in 1988, and then launch his career as a political opportunist.
The successes of Pirabhakaran as a militant revolutionary probably make Dayan puke, day in and day out. The bottom line is, unlike Dayan Jayatilleka, the LTTE leader never allowed his battle-field adversaries to gain an upper hand on him, and did send Jayewardene and his three successors who posed as Commander in Chiefs into permanent political retirement. As the title of Charlton Heston s autobiography is tagged, Pirabhakaran is still active In the Arena , decades after the likes of Dayan the phony von Clausewitzs - have settled for a diplomatic cover, while praying for a wounded and wilting Sarath Fonseka (GOSL s current Army Chief, the 12th man in the job since mid 1970s!) to work a miracle.
Edited By - ajan - 25 Jul 2008 13:40:46 GMT |
KURAL
Senior Member
Joined: Jul 2005
Posts: 8536
Member Profile
|
 25 Jul 2008 14:07:34 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Magha,
What is your definition of a liberation movement ??
You know my dear 'Doc' , that strictly everything is RELATIVE. :-)) |
magha
Senior Member
Joined: Feb 2005
Posts: 5593
Member Profile
|
26 Jul 2008 01:05:36 GMT Report for Abuse
|
The successes of Pirabhakaran as a militant revolutionary probably make Dayan puke, day in and day out. The bottom line is, unlike Dayan Jayatilleka, the LTTE leader never allowed his battle-field adversaries to gain an upper hand on him, and did send Jayewardene and his three successors who posed as Commander in Chiefs into permanent political retirement.
ajan
Who ever wrote is first of all has forgotten that in Democratic politics the president of Sri Lanka has only two terms be as the president. JRJ Jaywradena retired at the end of his second term, Ransingha Premadasa was killed by LTTE and Chndrika Bandaranayake also stayed for two terms.
In contrast Prabhakaran stays as the supreme commander of LTTE and had killed many of it's leaders. Is that some thing great about Prabhakaran?
Secondly success of Prabhakaran as a militant revolutionary had changed him to a terrorist and he would die like a Terrorist soon when Dayan Jayathilake will still be successful with what ever he is doing.
What is happening with Prabhakaran and LTTE today after 30 yrs of an armed struggle?
1)They are unable to come even for negotiations without giving up arms.
2) They are being driven from the East and now being beaten up in the North.
3) After 30 yrs of world wide propaganda for a Tamil Eelam , LTTE still considered a Terrorist organization by every body other than the Tamil Diaspora.
while praying for a wounded and wilting Sarath Fonseka (GOSL s current Army Chief, the 12th man in the job since mid 1970s!) to work a miracle.
Who ever wrote that passage must be regretting that Army Commander Sarath Fonseka didn't succumbed to the injuries , recovered and is well, and kicking Prabhakaran and LTTE as..ses form East to North.
ajan you found some bits and pieces from here and there and posted without even reading what they say.
What matters is not what who Dayan Jayathilake is but what he said in this article comparing LTTE to other movements.
Dayan Jayathilaka had shown how IRA is different from LTTE.
Take a point from the article and attack that particular point rather than posting rubbish some one had written about Dayan Jayathilake. |
magha
Senior Member
Joined: Feb 2005
Posts: 5593
Member Profile
|
26 Jul 2008 01:07:23 GMT Report for Abuse
|
What is your definition of a liberation movement
Any movement which would liberate Tamils from Prabhakaran/LTTE Terrorist clutches is a liberation movement: |
magha
Senior Member
Joined: Feb 2005
Posts: 5593
Member Profile
|
26 Jul 2008 21:57:09 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Kural ,
The heading is Liberation Tigers are not liberators.
What had proven so far is that LTTE had brought nothing but destruction to Tamils. In that context they are not liberators but had become Terrorists not only to Singhalese majority of Sri Lanka but to the minority communities including the very Tamil minority they are supposed to be fighting for.
Prabhakaran had gone to the extent of Inflicting damages to the Indian society even killing their former Prime minister in order to achieve an Eelam dream. This is where terrorism lived under the guise of liberators exposed their true nature.
Tamil Diaspora had done a grave mistake of not demanding the LTTE to change their leadership appropriate for the 21st century. The very reason was that Prabhakaran is insane and his insanity was supported by another terrorist who gain repute among the Diaspora called Anton Balasingham who had continued to white wash LTTE terrorism in the western world allowing the cancerous terrorist element of LTTE to grow with all it's tentacles around the Tamil community of the North and East sucking the blood out of them.
If Tamil Diaspora use their brains they should ask Prabhakaran to surrender leadership to a non militant, give up arms and enter political main stream of Sri Lanka. LTTE will obviously in that case be the most powerful Tamil political party with it's very strong organization capabilities across the world. It will not however happen as long as Prabhakaran is alive. Therefore somebody in LTTE has to eliminate Prabhakaran in order to save LTTE as a strong political organization as well as save the lives of the Tamil youth unfortunately getting killed in the front before SLDF completely annihilate LTTE very soon. LTTE will be a useless back broken organization there after.
When the SLDF encroach Killinochchi Nadesan will do it.
Edited By - magha - 26 Jul 2008 21:58:17 GMT |
|
