WILL PRABHAKARAN SWALLOW CYANIDE?
By Kumar Rupesinghe
Introduction
In the days leading up to the elections for the North Central Provincial Council and the Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council, the Prime Minister and Government Ministers boasted that the armed forces were marching towards Kilinochchi and it would be a matter of weeks when Kilinochchi would be captured. Ministers promised that the leader of the LTTE, Prabhakaran would be captured dead or alive and that Prabhakaran s only option would be to swallow Cyanide. The President in some of his speeches called for the body of Prabhakaran to be brought before his feet. This is unprecedented language and no President or Prime Minister has used such rhetoric in their public discourse hitherto. Previous Presidents never dared to say the unthinkable i.e. the total annihilation of the LTTE they merely wanted to weaken the LTTE, to resume negotiations. Sure enough Prabhakaran is wanted and a reward has been offered for his capture. The Sri Lankan courts have sentenced him to over two hundred years in prison. There have been many attempts on his life and he has survived most of the Presidents and continues to lead his formidable organization. So far, he has evaded all efforts to kill him and has avoided arrest. It is yet to be seen if he will swallow a cyanide pill. Unlike with the Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, where the leadership decided to leave their territory and seek sanctuary in the vast Muslim Diaspora, the LTTE leadership cannot seek sanctuary in India and does not have a hinterland within Sri Lanka to hide therefore, theoretically there is a possibility of killing some of the leaders. Even if this does happen, the LTTE would have made contingency plans for a virtual organisation to remain intact. Therefore, my argument is that we have to settle for a long and protracted war.
Everybody would agree that the Government has penetrated deep into LTTE territory towards the headquarters of the LTTE with a three pronged attack consisting of air, naval and ground attacks by the Sri Lankan armed forces. On the other hand, the LTTE has retreated with its commandos intact, with the intention of incurring maximum damage to the troops on the ground. The monsoon has started in earnest and the conditions of fighting will be harsh on both sides. To everybody s surprise, the LTTE recently demonstrated its air and ground commando capacity by inflicting heavy damage to the most formidable and impregnable fortress of the Sri Lankan armed forces in Vavuniya..
Let me at the outset, less I excite the patriotic sentiments of cheer leaders on the government side, make my position clear. It has been my view that a political problem cannot be resolved by military means and winning territory is not end of the war, if war it must be, winning the psychological war, which is winning the hearts and minds of the people. In this sense and providing for a constitutional solution which goes beyond the 13th Amendment is the only way to deny secessionist claims. The LTTE may not be winning the territorial war whilst the Government has miserably failed to impress upon the Tamil or the international community that they are serious about a constitutional solution to this prolonged and tragic conflict.
Winning the war with the LTTE
Compared to previous periods of the war, there are significant differences and a paradigm shift in the military doctrine and strategy adopted by the Sri Lankan government this time. The changes in military doctrine and strategy can be summarized as follows.
The use of heavy artillery fire in unlimited numbers against LTTE positions throughout the war.
The use of sustained air attacks and precision bombings against LTTE targets, both military and naval, over the entire phase of the war.
The denial of continuous recruitment of cadres from the East as a result of the defection of the Karuna wing to the government side.
A single line of command leading up to General Fonseka and the Defence Secretary and the non interference in the day to day running of the military.
The use of flexible maneuvers and attacks sustained on many fronts at the same time.
The ability of the Navy to arrest the flow of arms to the LTTE by better coordination and strikes at vessels carrying arms to the LTTE.
Better intelligence gathering and the use of deep penetration units to eliminate LTTE leaders.
Better coordination with Indian and U.S intelligence gathering and preventing the flow of weapons from the sea.
Developing an international alliance structure which includes China, Japan, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea and limited support to defeat LTTE terrorism by the USA and India.
The military strategy and doctrine of the LTTE
The LTTE by taking the decision to prevent Ranil Wickremesinghe from winning the 2005 presidential election thought that a Sinhala hard line President would be easy prey for the LTTE and that it could use its formidable propaganda machine to discredit the Government, by suggesting that it was not interested in finding a solution to the National question. Based on this assumption, the LTTE developed a military doctrine and strategy as follows.
The LTTE strategy has been to prolong the war in the belief that an extension of the war will cause enormous economic hardship and destabilization in the country.
The use of claymore attacks and suicide attacks on the armed forces and civilians in the cities to destabilize the government.
The LTTE strategy has been to concede territory and to conserve its forces to ensnare the GoSL troops into the Wanni. The withdrawal from the East was intended to conserve its forces in the Wanni, with the minimum of casualties to its combatants.
The elaboration of a defence strategy in the Wanni with three perimeters, an outer ring, a second ring and an inner ring. The outer ring is defended largely by recently recruited civilians and women cadres. The second ring is again defended by auxiliaries and a certain amount of commandos. The inner perimeter is defended by seasoned commandos. The entire strategy is based on inviting the troops to come deep into LTTE territory so that they could be outstretched where its defenses would be weakened. The LTTE has always used the monsoon as the time to inflict maximum damage on GoSL troops.
The Tamil Diaspora with its virtual networks spanning many countries has been developing an information war which is far superior to the Government. This sustained information war has been established to prove that the Government is not interested in resolving the Tamil National Question.
The shift of focus from a territorial focus to a virtual war, for a long term and protracted war. (More of this later)
Deadlines for finishing the war
It is always dangerous and hazardous to give deadlines in modern warfare. The US administration has learnt to its cost that deadlines in Iraq were completely flawed and they severely underestimated the capacity of forces within Iraq to resist the US led invasion. There have been many deadlines which have been given and forecasts as to the demise of the LTTE. Last year General Fonseka stated 'the LTTE could not prevent losing their remaining 3,000 cadres and there is no assurance that the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran would survive for the next six months as the Sri Lanka Air Force plans to attack all the LTTE bases . Thereafter he said we have weakened the LTTE by 50 percent or more and we are confident we can go that extra mile in the coming year.' However by June this year, he revised his opinion yet again while speaking to a group of foreign journalists and stated:
'Even if we finish the war, capture the whole of the north, still the LTTE might have some members joining them . There are people who believe in Tamil nationalism. The LTTE might survive another even two decades with about 1,000 cadres. But we will not be fighting in the same manner. It might continue as an insurgency forever' (BBC 30.6.2008).
In addition to this, General Sarath Fonseka made the following observation in response to questions on the assertion he made in December last year that the military would wipe out the LTTE by June 2008.
The LTTE
lost the capability to fight as a conventional force due to the relentless overall military strategy since August 2006 .When the current phase of war started in August 2006, the Tigers had a fighting force of 8,000. As per the intelligence reports, the current cadre of the LTTE in the worst-case scenario is 5,000. Most of the new recruits in the past two years are underage conscripts . The security forces are attacking Mullaitivu, Prabhakaran's hideout, from several directions.... The Army's aim is to capture Prabhakaran, who is holed up in a bunker, alive,'
I agree with General Fonseka in that even if the government inflicts a conclusive defeat on the LTTE, the war will continue as an insurgency amongst sections of the Tamil armed groups. These armed groups still will have the capacity to inflict heavy damage on lives and property.
Insurgency, Conventional war, guerilla war and terrorism
It is important that we have some analytical clarity about the concepts relating to modes of violent struggle that we use in discussing violent conflicts. There cannot be according to international and domestic laws, a conventional war, but only a guerrilla war combined with a terrorist arm. The moment you admit that there is a conventional army, you get into international and domestic legal quagmires. If we study the modes of violence adopted by the LTTE, they have used guerilla modes of war tactics usually with medium size military formations, a navy, a limited air power, terrorist tactics that include suicide missions, assassinations, vehicle bombings and propaganda based persuasive and violence based coercive modes and intensive propaganda war.. During the last twenty five years, they have been able to be flexible and innovative in the use of these methods. They have shown that they can quickly shift from one method to another.
Therefore, in spite of the overwhelming military power of the government forces in contrast to that of the LTTE and the recent successful military operations in the East and North, my argument is that even if the LTTE areas are captured, it may not be possible for the government to hold them for a long time, before the LTTE recaptures the territory as it has done before. Even if this is not possible, the LTTE would be in a position to engage in a decentralized virtual war, which means that it would concede all territory and engage in small cell formations and LTTE affiliated small groups in the jungles, in towns and cities and use hit and run tactics to inflict heavy damage on the infrastructure and the people of this country. This form of warfare is deadlier and more dangerous than war with an organisation with a central command and control fixed to limited territory. Experience in civil wars demonstrates that it is better to negotiate with a guerilla force with territory for they approach is more conservative than to negotiate with a decentralized network where the center of operations is a shifting one.
The government in its total war strategy is making some fundamental mistakes which I would now like to elaborate on. The government by destroying the headquarters and all other centers of the LTTE, would find that it has closed all its communications channels. The decision not to allow diplomats to travel to the North, the decision to ask all INGOs and NGOs to leave the North, the decision to request the UN agencies to leave mean that all links and communications channels will be lost to the government. In a future virtual and decentralized war, networks both in the Diaspora, India and in the country as a whole would operate without a central command and control and mainly through the power of the World Wide Web. If we study the tactics adopted by the Al Qaeda, they also conceded territory and built a virtual and decentralized network with affiliated groups which operate mainly through the World Wide Web and the Taliban in Afghanistan also was able to retreat under NATO incursions and disappear with no central command structure. They use limited guerrilla warfare and suicide terror tactics with deadly effect. This is the problem that the US is facing in Iraq and in Afghanistan as well.
Winning the psychological war
The question is whether winning the war in an insurgency is capturing territory or winning the hearts and minds of the Tamil people. In the propaganda war, the LTTE has gained by showing to the international community that the present government is not interested in a political solution. As a result of the security situation in the country, the Tamils have been made to feel stigmatized and racially profiled and faced with much insecurity in their everyday life. Many Tamils feel the present regime s words and actions to be a deep wound in their psyche. Tamil in general feel that the President s statements are purely to assuage the Sinhala constituency and consolidate his hold over them.
In a recent interview published by Ravi Velloor in the Strait Times India on 11/8/ 2008, where he interviews M K Narayan, the well known intelligence chief of India and now Defence Advisor to India, he states:
The (Sri Lankan army) has made a lot of progress in the last few weeks. But even if they win the battle, I am not sure they will win the war. I think they haven t got the Tamil population on their side. Do they want a situation like many countries have faced? Iraq is a good example. What we are telling them is, get the Tamils on your side by greater devolution of power. For them to be part of Sri Lankan state, they need the huge Tamil minority on their side. What the Sri Lankans are not factoring in is the great deal of sullenness in the Tamil man. There are accusations of profiling even in Colombo. Our argument is: unless you give Tamils a feeling they have the right to their own destiny in many matters, you will not succeed. LTTE s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks is not diminished.
In order to overcome this adverse situation, the government should start by providing assurances to Tamils that they have a home in Sri Lanka and that there will be constitutional provisions for the devolution of power. At the same time, confidence building measures need to be put in place to assure the Tamils that their rights are entrenched in the Constitution. There are many actions that the Government can take such as an accelerated effort to implement the language act, ensuring that all sign boards are in both languages at least, that significantly more Tamils are recruited to the Police than at present and ensuring that they are not discriminated against. It is only by doing so that it can win the hearts and minds of the people it claims to represent. In this attempt however, the present government has miserably failed. If the government doesn t address the needs of the Tamils, then there is always a question of separation. When declaring secession is not an option, the government has an additional political obligation to provide weighty evidence to prove the government s claim against secession.
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