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Tigers slow Sri Lanka advance on key jungle base
Wednesday, 11 July 2007 - 6:58 AM SL Time
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Tamil Tiger rebels in the east of Sri Lanka are showing stiff resistance and have slowed a military advance on a strategic jungle base, defence authorities here said
Government spokesman Keheliya Rambukwella told reporters that the Tiger rebels were still holed up in a small area known as Thoppigala, adding that they had buried mines and were slowing the military campaign.
`We have captured about 98 percent of the territory, but the balance two percent won`t be in a matter of days,` Rambukwella said, dismissing media reports that troops were about to take Thoppigala.
`It may even take two years,` he said.
He said the objective of the security forces was not limited to capturing Thoppigala, but was to take full control over the multi-ethnic eastern province by neutralising the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Military spokesman Prasad Samarasinghe said the army had taken up position about `five to six kilometres` away from Thoppigala. He too rejected media reports that the military had captured the area.
`We are at Narakamulla and this is about five to six kilometers away from Thoppigala,` Samarasinghe told reporters. `Media reports said that we captured a place nick-named `Tora Bora` yesterday. That is also not correct.`
Samarasinghe said the Tigers had a complex network of bases in the jungle area, which has been used by the rebels as a main command and control centre for their operations in the eastern region.
Security forces moved to take Thoppigala earlier this year, capturing several key bases from the Tigers in the districts of Batticaloa and Ampara.
Three weeks ago, the military estimated rebel forces at Thoppigala at 150, but military commanders in the area have estimated the current strength at over 200.
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Dewey Senior Member
Joined: Aug 2005 Posts: 5075 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:05:08 GMT Report for Abuse
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SLA has to be careful not to fall into booby traps etc. Slow advance is better to minimize casualities. In the meantime, arti can take care of remaining tigers.
At this point SLA should open another front.
Edited By - Dewey - 11 Jul 2007 00:06:03 GMT |
AnuD Senior Member
Joined: May 2005 Posts: 21195 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:12:53 GMT Report for Abuse
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Cut the supply routes.
I think, LTTE is in the process of withdrawing from thoppigala and tightening in Wanni.
SLA should try fights of American wild west in those days.
SLDFs should increase pressure in Wanni and more DPU visitings. |
kankun Senior Member
Joined: Apr 2007 Posts: 7316 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:13:20 GMT Report for Abuse
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We have captured about 98 percent of the territory, but the balance two percent won't be in a matter of days,' Rambukwella said, dismissing media reports that troops were about to take Thoppigala
Do the GOSL know what they are talking abt? I thought we had captured Thoppigala months ago.It is abt the time to stop spreading false propaganda and lies.
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Dewey Senior Member
Joined: Aug 2005 Posts: 5075 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:19:56 GMT Report for Abuse
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| Keheliya sitting in an air-conditioned office in colombo having hardtime with his math. :) |
RohanUS
Joined: Sep 2006 Posts: 297 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:22:04 GMT Report for Abuse
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OBJECTIVE CHANGED??????? hmmm just thinking how this end of this month capturing thopikala turned out to be 2 years now????? hmmm captured 98% but can't capture 2% need 2 years? well, i think they only captured 2% and need 2 years to capture 98% haa haa haa what a joke . Rambukala must be drunk or somthing.. well, Mr rambukala keep on drinking .. because your end is very near....*****
All the SINHALA MODIYA's Just think before you say somthing . |
Dewey Senior Member
Joined: Aug 2005 Posts: 5075 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:25:35 GMT Report for Abuse
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All the SINHALA MODIYA's Just think before you say somthing
He must be a very intelligent dude. LOL. |
RohanUS
Joined: Sep 2006 Posts: 297 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:25:58 GMT Report for Abuse
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:::AnuD::
SLDFs should increase pressure in Wanni and more DPU visitings.
REMEMBER: Tamil boys will also visit colombo and all the military and economic targets as well as all the ministers very frequently .. too Boom*&*%*%*% Baam*^&&%%$
Lets see Who will will the DPU or the Tamil boyz
Lets go tamil boys ... |
kankun Senior Member
Joined: Apr 2007 Posts: 7316 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:26:40 GMT Report for Abuse
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RohanUS
All the SINHALA MODIYA's Just think before you say somthing
What a smart fellow... |
kankun Senior Member
Joined: Apr 2007 Posts: 7316 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:27:53 GMT Report for Abuse
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REMEMBER: Tamil boys will also visit colombo and all the military and economic targets as well as all the ministers very frequently .. too Boom*&*%*%*% Baam*^&&%%$
Lets see Who will will the DPU or the Tamil boyz
Lets go tamil boys
Someone have very BIG DREAMS. |
SWRD
Joined: Apr 2006 Posts: 375 Member Profile
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11 Jul 2007 00:37:36 GMT Report for Abuse
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MINOR MATTERS
LTTE duplicity in the presidential stakes of 2005
By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
The presidential election of 2005 saw two candidates before the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. One was Mahendra Percival Rajapakse who had aligned with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), contesting on a Sinhala hardline platform.
The other was Ranil Wickremesinghe supported by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), Up Country Peoples Front (UCPF), and Western Peoples Front (WPF), contesting on a moderate platform.
Rajapakse winning meant a victory for the chauvinist forces among the majority community. It also meant farewell to the fragile peace process and a return to war, this time in search of an 'honourable peace.'
A victory for Wickremesinghe too did not guarantee definite peace but it certainly held out the prospects of a negotiated settlement. But a defeat for Wickremesinghe guaranteed one thing. The Sinhala hawks would be on the ascendant which in turn would make the country descend into strife and chaos.
There was also another vital issue. All presidential elections in the past had seen an emphasis on the minority community vote.
Since the entire country formed one vast electorate and the Sinhala votes were more or less divided between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP), the votes of the minority communities were seen as crucial in determining the result.
The chief contenders therefore always reached out to them. All winners in the past had obtained the bulk of minority votes.
Rajapakse goes against wisdom
Now for the first time, a presidential stakes front runner was going against the grain of this proven wisdom. Rajapakse was appealing to the Sinhala community on a hawkish platform.
Of course he had minority hangers on like Douglas Devananda, A.H.M. Athaullah, Riyaz Badurdeen, Sathasivam, et al, supporting him for cosmetic purposes. But it was apparent that he was relying mainly on the Sinhala votes to win.
For this a thinly veiled racist campaign was conducted. The campaign hinged around the allegation that Wickremesinghe had sold the Sinhalese out by entering into a clandestine deal with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
With such clearly drawn battle- lines, the minority voters were faced with a virtual Hobson?s choice. With Sinhala hegemony and the probability of war on one side, and minority accommodation and prospects for peace on the other, was there ever a choice?
Besides, the minority communities also had to prove a point to Rajapakse and his cohorts that victory was impossible without minority support. As the campaign unfolded it became clear that the Tamils and Muslims were going to vote in large numbers for Wickremesinghe.
LTTE?s boycott call
It was then that the LTTE intervened on behalf of Rajapakse. It announced that the Tamils of Eelam had no role in the presidential polls of Sri Lanka. The Tigers equated Rajapakse and Wickremesinghe as enemies of the Tamil people.
Anton Balasingham called Wickremesinghe a 'cunning fox.' The LTTE wanted the Tamil people to boycott the presidential stakes. No purpose would be served by voting, declared the LTTE, loftily.
This writer was one of the few Tamils who criticised the LTTE?s announcement and argued strongly that the Tamils should be allowed to vote freely. Among those who called upon the LTTE to call off the boycott were the three Tamil Bishops of the Catholic Church.
It was obvious that the boycott would play havoc with the Presidential stakes. The absence of Tamil votes meant a reduction in Wickremesinghe?s votes and hence an advantage to Rajapakse.
This writer warned the LTTE that a Rajapakse victory would only result in agony, suffering and hardship for the Tamil people. This warning has now become a reality.
Wickremesinghe lesser of the two evils
Despite the boycott call the LTTE realised that the Tamil people would flock to the polling booths to vote for Ranil. This is because the average Tamil prudently knew that Wickremesinghe was the lesser of the two evils and that Rajapakse?s racist cabal had to be prevented from gaining power.
So the LTTE engaged in violence to frighten and intimidate the Tamils from voting. The bulk of the Tamils who refrained from voting did so unwillingly. They were terrorised into submission. The Tigers had not merely called for a boycott but had enforced it as well.
Rajapakse who garnered around 60% of the Sinhala votes won with a flimsy margin. If the northeast voters were allowed to vote en masse then Wickremesinghe could have won.
The up-country Tamils and Muslims voted in large numbers for Wickremesinghe. Wherever possible Sri Lankan Tamils also voted for the UNP. Still Rajapakse won but with very little minority support.
Rajapakse undermines minorities
The racists began crowing that Sri Lanka was the land of the Sinhalese and that Rajapakse had proved that minority support was unnecessary to win.
This was incorrect because had the NE Tamils voted in bulk, the results would have been different. What the poll had demonstrated was that the minority communities could influence the verdict even by default.
A few days after the results this writer gathered bits and pieces of information about an underhand deal between Mahinda and the LTTE and that the boycott was enforced because of that. This was shocking but concrete details were unavailable then. The name of Tiran Alles transpired as the middleman who engineered the deal. Alles got a public bear hug and kisses on both cheeks from Mahinda when he went to congratulate the victor at Temple Trees.
Speculation on LTTE-Mahinda deal
Given the limited information I wrote what was a 'speculative' piece on whether the boycott was enforced due to a deal between the LTTE and Mahinda. I posted the piece on my weblog www.trancurrents.com to test the waters. The response was fantastic. No article of mine on the web received so many hits as that one.
At that time I did not have a comments section but my e-mail was available for feedback. There was an avalanche of e-mails from Sinhala supporters of Rajapakse and Tamil supporters of the LTTE. Both sides criticised me vehemently for even daring to suggest that such a deal could ever have been done.
Usually I update these articles posted on my web and send them for publication in either The Sunday Leader or The Morning Leader newspapers. Since this piece was speculative and I did not have concrete details I did not get it published in Colombo.
I also felt it was unfair to expose The Leader Publications to controversy over a speculative article lacking hard facts. It was also amusing to read comments in hawkish websites that D.B.S. Jeyaraj had lost credibility as a result of this piece.
Mahinda-Koti deal revealed
Another opportunity arose in February this year when Sripathi Sooriyaarachchi made allegations of a Mahinda-LTTE deal and also doling out further tidbits of information. Though Rajapakse?s 'catchers' denied it and attacked Sooriyaarachchi, there was no doubt that the seeds of doubt were being sown in the minds of many.
Once again to test the waters I re-produced the original article in my weblog. Once again it was widely read. But this time there was a difference. There were practically no e-mails criticising me. The die hard faithfuls were getting enlightened about the clay feet of their idols.
As events took their course and Tiran Alles was targeted it became apparent that there was after all a Mahinda-Koti deal. Basil Rajapakse?s involvement also became common knowledge. More and more details were uncovered.
Last weeks scoop by Sonali Samarasinghe in The Sunday Leader and the editorial have provided more insight into the 'Mahinda-Koti Givisuma.' People are getting a better perspective of what had been going on.
Puzzling
There were two matters that puzzled me regarding the LTTE?s conduct regarding the Rajapakse regime. One was the fate of the P-TOMS structure set up for tsunami reconstruction. The LTTE had for the first time cooperated with Colombo but the courts had stymied it.
The tsunami affected Tamil civilians were left in the lurch. The LTTE could have utilised the opportunity to engage in much propaganda against the state. But the Tigers did not do so. Why?
Rajapakse pragmatic says Pirapaharan
The second was Velupillai Pirapaharan?s great heroes day speech on Nov 27, 2005, just 10 days after the presidential elections. In that the Tiger supremo compliments Rajapakse as a pragmatic person and promises to give him time to take positive steps to resolve the problem.
Yet within days, the LTTE started attacking the security forces in the name of the 'Makkal Padai' or People?s Force. Why did this happen?
Answers are clear
The answers are now clear. The LTTE did not raise protests over the P-TOMS failure as they were promised more money through other projects like the housing scheme to Emil Kanthan.
Also Tiran Alles as chief of RADA indicated that many tsunami related projects could have been in the pipeline. Thus the silence over the P-TOMS.
On the question of resuming hostilities what happened seems to be this. The LTTE was promised much including the handing over of Karuna. Some promises were fulfilled.
For instance EPDP leader Douglas Devananda was not given a portfolio relating to the north-east or Tamils or Hindus. He was given Social Services. This was due to LTTE pressure.
Initially the tigers wanted Devananda out of the cabinet. Later they relented but laid out a condition that he should not be given portfolios like regional development or Hindu affairs.
Another promise implemented was the release of hard-core LTTE operatives in custody like Kennedy. He was involved in an attack on the Palaly military base.
But the Mahinda-Praba deal apparently collapsed due to the Karuna factor. Whether initially Colombo genuinly agreed to hand him over is a moot question. Karuna at that point of time was not in Sri Lanka.
Karuna essential for war
It also could have been a genuine promise with scant regard for the ramifications involved. But once Sarath Fonseka became army chief and Gotabhaya defence secretary, things changed. The Karuna factor became essential for war making. He was indispensable and could not be delivered to the Tigers.
Realising this perhaps the LTTE may have lost faith in Rajapakse. Also the finances promised were getting delayed in spite of the pre-election advance payment.
So the LTTE may have exerted pressure through the People?s Force attacks but as time went on these events gathered momentum.
The shadow war too commenced in earnest. Still the LTTE was willing to 'deal' with Mahinda again to obtain lucrative financial hand-outs.
Rajapakse and Pirapaharan reach nadir
These disclosures reveal that Rajapakse and Pirapaharan have reached the nadir as far as political duplicity is concerned. Rajapakse accuses Wickremesinghe of a secret deal with the LTTE whereas it was he who seems to have struck a deal beforehand. The deal was not to promote peace or a negotiated settlement but to ensure his electoral victory.
President funds LTTE. Tamils suffer
Rajapakse while publicly maligning the LTTE has been privately wheeler dealing with them. Even after the original deal fell through and hostilities resumed Rajapakse has attempted to do a deal by allocating Rs. 700 million to a LTTE front organisation. Meanwhile, Tamil civilians suffer immensely while a war rages.
The LTTE too has shown that it is a master in the politics of duplicity. Whatever his faults Wickremesinghe had tried sincerely to accommodate the LTTE in a peace process. This gave the beleaguered Tamil civilians a much needed respite. For this Wickremesinghe was attacked as having appeased the tigers and betraying the country.
Ranil refuses assurance on ISGA
Under these circumstances the LTTE should have backed Wickremesinghe or at least not laid obstacles in his path. Instead the Tigers tried to get the UNP leader to give an assurance in writing that he would give the LTTE an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). Wickremesinghe, to his credit, refused.
Now the LTTE cuts a deal with Rajapakse. For an organisation claiming to fight for the liberation of the Tamil people a man like Rajapakse should have been anathema. But these liberators are very business like - literally and metaphorically. So they bargain with his representatives and strike a deal.
In return the LTTE enforces a boycott and ensures Rajapakse?s victory. Later the deal sours. So the LTTE begins a people?s war. Even then the Tigers are prepared to do a sordid deal and get money. But things worsen and an undeclared yet full-scale war continues. The Tamil people have suffered in a way never experienced before.
Pirapaharan can be bought
Rajapakse and his cohorts are being criticised for their role in this underhand deal. But curiously, the LTTE remains a sacred cow. It maintains a deafening silence. Prabakharan is praised as a man who cannot be bought. But that is not true.
The reality is that the LTTE has entered into a deal with the likes of Rajapakse in which monetary considerations have played an important part.
If the LTTE deal was only to extract political or military concessions then the Tigers could have tried to downplay the implications of this deal. But by accepting filthy lucre the Tigers have demeaned themselves. There is no redemption.
Pirapaharan got money from Rajiv Gandhi to help work the Indo-Lanka accord. He got assistance from Ranasinghe Premadasa to fight the Indian army. But now money seems to have been obtained to enforce a boycott and help a hardliner like Rajapakse win.
The depth of duplicity
The Tamil people were asked to boycott on a matter of political principle but in reality the LTTE had done a deal with the man portrayed by them as a Sinhala hawk. This is the depth of duplicity.
With the opposition raising the issue the government is hard pressed to present a defence. Jeyaraj Fernandopulle counters by asking whether the LTTE will issue a statement admitting the existence of a deal and the acceptance of money?
Fernandopulle knows the LTTE would not do so because the Tigers too are 'partners in crime.' Pirapaharan is equally guilty as Rajapakse in this miserable exercise.
As a democratically elected President, Rajapakse?s role may be more reprehensible but the self-imposed 'national leader' of the Tamils also has much to answer for.
Rajapakse-Pirapaharan ? partners in crime
Here are two men who entered into a 'commercial yet clandestine' deal through their agents. They did so while attacking each other as enemies of their respective nations. Despite these public stances they were not averse to a deal between themselves.
Rajapakse accuses his opponent of doing a deal with the LTTE while entering into one with the Tigers secretly. Pirapaharan enforces a boycott saying the Tamils have nothing to do with the Sinhala presidency after striking a deal to ensure Rajapakses victory.
The deal sours and both betray each other. That does not matter. What matters is that both persons have plunged the country into an unnecessary war.
The LTTE leader deserves greater condemnation because the Tamil people ? whose cause he claims to represent ? are suffering the most in this war.
This then is the tragic result of the LTTE?s politics of duplicity in the presidential stakes of 2005.
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