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THE SIN OF MAXIMALISM

(December, 25, Colombo, Sri Lana Guardian) The end as well as the beginning of the Second JVP Insurgency is shrouded in well constructed and maintained myths. Contrary to received wisdom the state did not want a military solution to the JVP problem. It was not intent on drowning the insurgency in blood. Both the Jayewardene and Premadasa governments endeavoured to effect a compromise solution to the JVP crisis. Jayewardene despite his tough talking, made at least two efforts to begin a dialogue with the JVP, once through his Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali and on another occasion through his Security Advisor and son Ravi Jayewardene.

In mid 1988, as the country teetered on the brink of anarchy, Athulathmudali signed an agreement with a person he thought was an official representative of the JVP. A press conference was held and a joyful Athulathmudali attended it together with a thin, dark, young man who was introduced to the exited media personnel ? and through them to the country ? as the representative of the JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera. The `historic agreement` was read out and the end of the insurgency proclaimed. The country, reeling under the violence of the JVP and the counter-violence of the state, probably heaved a collective sigh of relief. The relief, however, was short-lived. The dénouement, when it came, staggered the establishment and the general public alike. An angry JVP denounced the supposed representative of its leader as an impostor and the `ceasefire` as a charade. A few days later the country discovered what many immediate past students of the University of Colombo realised when they saw the picture of the `JVP representative` in the media ? that this person, K C Senanayake, was not even a member of the JVP! He was a student of Colombo campus, with no political involvements whatsoever, a loner, who was acting on an impulse. As the JVP stepped up its campaign, this bizarre incident was soon forgotten. But the fact that Athulathmudali, who prided himself on his Oxford degree, allowed himself to be duped by an academically far from successful alumnus of the University of Colombo is indicative of how desperately the Jayewardene administration wanted to restore normalcy to the country, through whatever means necessary?military victory or negotiated settlement. As Prins Gunasekara states:
?The President is running all over the place looking for a JVP man to talk to. His son and security Advisor is in correspondence with a top JVPer whom he had released, only a month ago? and offering to arrange a meeting with the Hon. Prime Minister? The clergy, the student movement, the trade unions, the intellectuals, the mercantile sector, in fact all who mattered in society were one-voicedly pleading with the JVP to accept what was being offered by the government. It was like a concerned parent beseeching a sulking, hungry child to drink the milk that was being offered, promising more if only he drank the first cup that was being offered. But the stupid, stubborn child would kick the cup of milk?and, crying his heart out for more, choked himself to death!? (A Lost Generation).
After his victory at the Presidential election of 1988 Premadasa too made a number of efforts to avoid the military option. The new president did not want a JVP victory. But he did not want to impose a bloody and humiliating defeat on the JVP either. The tragic failure to effect a non-violent closure to the Second Insurgency was due to the JVP`s determination not to settle for anything other than absolute power. Blinded by maximalism, it failed to see the difference between surrender and compromise. Premadasa was not willing to surrender to the JVP but he was more than willing to effect an honourable, mutually advantageous compromise. The JVP refused any compromise and demanded unconditional surrender from the regime and the democratic system. The military option was imposed on Premadasa by the JVP, because of this intransigence and maximalism. According to Prins Gunasekara,
?The readiness with which President Premadasa accepted the suggestion for peace talks was evident from the advanced publicity given by the state managed media? The President was more than willing to call for a cease fire to be reciprocated by the rebels?. President Premadasa`s first offer to negotiate peace in a troubled country was soon after his victory at the Presidential Polls on 20 December? This indeed was a bold step? Not only did he advance the date to end the emergency, he proceeded to free 1,400 detainees in the South from custody, having released another batch of 574 in the first week?.. As a gesture of good will towards the JVP+IUSF led campaign, the new Premadasa regime made an early decision to have the North Colombo Medical College (NCMC) vested in the state. The obvious intent of this take over was to mollify the JVP-led IUSF and the student movement that the Premadasa regime was serious about solving issues that concerned specially the youth? President Premadasa took great pains to convince the rebels?that he was genuinely interested in a dialogue with them and that his concern for their welfare was genuine? President Premadasa`s crusade for `CONSULTATION, CONSENSUS, COMPROMISE` was sustained at a very high profile throughout this period. His offer on the National Independence Day 4 February `to talk peace with anybody, any where, any time` was repeated at his Poverty Alleviation programme inaugural address on 25 February 1989? (this call was repeated in Mahiyangana in early April). ?One week after the Mahiyangana appeal for peace the state unilaterally declared a cease fire to coincide with the annual National festivities of the Sinhala and Tamil communities?? (ibid).
Premadasa`s appeals were echoed by the `hawkish` Deputy Minister of Defence Ranjan Wijeratne on numerous occasions he too begged the JVP to come to the negotiating table: ?No head of state would go that far to appease the rebels. No Executive President would offer so many attractive concessions to insurgents hell bent on over throwing his regime. Now with hind sight it may be observed that the JVP rejection was an irrevocable disaster to the Southern rebels? (ibid - emphasis mine).

This attitude on the part of the UNP was in marked contrast to the attitudes adopted by regimes of most third world countries facing armed rebellions?particularly in Latin America. Take for instance Peru`s attempts to deal with the Sendero rebellion. President Alberto Fujimori suspended both the Congress and the Constitution in his battle against the Senderistas. Premadasa called for an All Parties Conference and invited the JVP to participate. The parliament and the opposition parties continued to function freely?as freely as the JVP allowed them. Any restrictions on political/social activism were imposed not by the regime but by the JVP. For example, the regime did not impose a press censorship the JVP did so and the editor of a leading non government Sinhala language daily stopped coming to his office because of JVP threats.

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`This completely unexpected development obviously took the JVP by surprise and presented it with a dilemma. If it refused the government`s offer to negotiate in the new conjuncture, it would be exposing the hollowness of its anti-Indianism if it accepted the offer to negotiate it will have to give up its goal of absolute political power which at that moment seemed (and indeed was) so tantalisingly within reach.`
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Obviously the JVP was not dealing with some uncompromising and bloodthirsty despotic regime (of the Latin American variety) which did not want to make any concessions and demanded unconditional surrender from the insurgents. Far from it. As Prins Gunasekara points out:
?Did not President Premadasa release thousands of young rebels held without charge, without trial within two or three weeks of assumption of office?? Did he not concede the highly-charged IUSF demand that the Private Medical College be taken over by the state? Did he not terminate five years of emergency and vow not to re-impose it releasing many rebels even before the emergency ended? How many peace overtures did he make to the rebels?unconditionally? Did he not offer to dissolve the parliament to enable the rebels to contest and enter Parliament? Did he not invite them through All Parties Conference to come out sit and talk to them? Did he not seek to negotiate through independent organisations like the Quaker Peace Services (QPS) to meet the JVP leaders, if necessary outside the country? I`m personally aware of several meetings the QPS representatives had with the JVP representatives in London? I`m aware of the direct talks these foreign reps had with President Premadasa with a view to arranging a meeting, in or out of the country with the JVP leaders.? (ibid).
In other words the JVP (perhaps more than any other rebel movement in the Third World) had the option of an honourable settlement which was advantageous to it and would have given it a significant degree of power at the centre. Unfortunately the JVP regarded Premadasa`s willingness to come to a compromise solution as a sign of weakness. It contemptuously turned down every offer by the Premadasa regime, as it previously rejected the peace overtures of the Jayewardene administration. In fact with every concession made by the government the tempo of the JVP`s violence increased. The more the government showed itself willing to compromise with the JVP, the more intransigent the JVP became. As the year 1989 wended its way the JVP stepped up its violent efforts to terrorise the country and cripple the economy with their indiscriminate killings, wild cat strikes, unofficial curfews and acts of sabotage. The opposition SLFP, its honeymoon with the JVP firmly in the past, became very vocal in criticising the Premadasa ...