Sri Lanka News Updates with Discussions

It was November 26, 2007. Two Fighter jets of the Sri Lanka Air Force were hovering the skies over Kilinochchi. Cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were gathering at a ground for a special celebration. Though the LTTE had units on standby for a sudden attack they were unaware of the two stealthy warriors in the skies right above them. Reliable intelligence information received by the Sri Lanka Air Force predicted that several LTTE leaders including Prabhakaran were to attend the annual celebrations held at a ground in Kilinochchi towards the east of the A9 road. They were also informed there would be a well fortified underground bunker as well.

Though the area didn't seem to be heavily populated the pilots were requested to swoop down to specifically aim at the target. The people observed on the land were carrying weapons and they were in uniform. The weather over Kilinochchi that day was quite unfavourable for a fighter pilot.

It was thickened with a cloud layer. After a thorough search one jet dived in closer to the target and the LTTE started heavy resistance. Yet the pilot managed to drop all four bombs and ascend. The bullets of the anti-aircraft guns exploded in the air after reaching a certain distance creating a scene of fire and smoke and the pilots got surrounded with this though they tried to keep a safe distance. The second pilot dived amidst the resistance to drop bombs on the target. Unfortunately only one bomb was released. He ascended.

The pilot wanted to dive in for another chance to drop the other bombs very well knowing the consequences of returning to the target when the LTTE have fully identified these two aircraft. Yet with their Commanding Officer's approval the second pilot swooped in while his colleague waited in the air. Even in that second only the two bombs on the right side were released leaving the two on the left intact. Amidst the fire and the smoke in the sky the worst thing happened to the pilot - even with full power from the engines the aircraft did not ascend. It was just 900m above ground level and was an easy target for the enemy. Fuel was in critical condition and an engine nozzle was problematic.

The pilot was unable to give full power as the craft started vibrating. The then Director Operations, their Commanding Officer and the respective senior officers were right behind the operation continuously directing the two pilots, guiding them during this entire mission. Slowly and steadily the two pilots reached Katunayake taking double the time they usually take. This was just a mere description of a day of a fighter pilot of the Sri Lanka Air Force.

For the hardcore fighters of the Sri Lanka Air Force a failed mission's ultimate consequence means nothing but death. Every mission was equally daring for them. Their operations were atypical. The outside world gets to know only the result - the damage to the enemy, for these hardcore fighters behind the scene and their stories of bravery hardly come into the limelight.

What matters to them is a job well done. Enjoying the peaceful country they saved. It's time for us to salute these true heroes for bringing in peace over their blood, toil and tears.

Sixty years ago, no one would have ever thought the then Royal Ceylon Air Force would ever be facing one of the world's most ruthless terrorist organisation - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

By then (during the Eelam War IV) the Sri Lanka Air Force was one of the most active of the world's Air Forces.

The round the clock job carried maritime strikes, close air support, CASEVAC, ground attacks, transport, air defence, surveillance.

Be it either a close air support, dropping bombs on targets causing maximum attrition to the enemy or evacuating injured Army personnel, obviously they were clear targets of the enemy.

During 2002-05 period the great deal of training carried out by the SLAF to master their equipment was a major contributor to their success. This involved more recce work with UAVs and Beechcraft 200s.

On November 2, 2007 it was a unique SLAF attack that resulted in a dramatic turning point in Eelam War IV. A Kfir and a MiG-27 aimed at a prime target of the LTTE, its Political Wing Leader S. P. Thamilselvan. This was a severe blow to the LTTE which became a turning point in their downfall. This crucial attack made history in the two fighter jet squadrons. The Kfir C7s that were purchased in 2000/2001 had better Weapons Delivery Navigation System which supported more accurate targeting.

Among the number of daring flights of the fighter aircraft the F7s created another turning point in war history by destroying a LTTE airfraft over Iranapalai in the North of Pudukudduyirippu on March 26, 2007. They had to fly like LTTE aircraft in pitch dark and as low as 500 metres above the ground.

It needed great expertise and fortunately the Air Force had pilots of that calibre.

The F7, on many occasions supported the Army as well as the Navy during their operations.

Penetrating enemy lines, hitting by 320, 80mm rockets by a formation of four helicopters the MI 24s caused utter devastation to the enemy and there were no doubts about the results. Yet for precise targeting they need to fly low thus making them an easy target. Everyday in the final battle the MI24s carried direct attacks in all the frontlines breaking positions of the entire enemy line.

Though the LTTE were able to temporarily dominate the ground the air space was always ours. Bell 212s accompanied by the MI24 helicopters carried risky evacuation missions (CASEVAC) when the Army troops got trapped inside enemy terrain.

This is the squadron which was involved in evacuating a Sri Lanka Army Special Forces Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol at any given time of need. For many months the Bell 212s were flying more hours than any other unit due primarily to their CASEVAC role, which led to them evacuating injured soldiers and civilians that were caught up in the battles. The Zlin143s owned by the LTTE terrorists faced their fate when confronted by a F7 and later by the attacks of the Air Defence System of the SLAF.

Two Zlin143s were shot down by air gunners positioned at Katunayake and SLAF headquarters Colombo on February 20, 2008. Both pilots were killed. This was believed to be the last plane LTTE was able to smuggle in to Sri Lanka.

Exceeding 5000 flying hours and lifting and transporting more than 71 tons of cargo and over 6,000 injured soldiers the MI 17s helicopters have done an outstanding job in their usual silent manner. Troop movements, casualty transportation and moving Army's Air Mobile brigades increased immensely during the recent operations and meeting the demand was crucial.

Their first mission in the Vanni Operation would give enough and more evidence of the gravity of their responsibilities.

In it the squadron had to move 500 officers and soldiers of the Army's Air Mobile Brigade using six MI 17s where one could only carry 30 fully equipped personnel. Professionalism of pilots along with the skillful technicians they performed their duties avoiding enemy threats.

The last but not the least giants of the Air Force fleet - the C130s and AN32s - carried the heaviest loads of war. From people to soldiers and vegetable to arms and ammunition they were the bloodline when the ground routes were blocked, destroyed and shut down by the terrorists. Flying a transport aircraft in Sri Lanka was a high-risk business. Facing the threats of the Surface to Air Missiles the giants roared the skies putting their lives second to service.

The SLAF had to ensure that civilians were not in their scene and avoid hospitals or any religious buildings while making sure that troops were not in their target area.

Having to pick through all these is like eating with chopsticks. Yet, the great warriors of the Sri Lanka Air Force were ready to face any enemy, challenge or threat to save their Motherland they were not ready to compromise the country's sovereignty.

Today the SLAF faces a greater challenge as protecting Sri Lankan waters is their duty today. They are the saviours of Sri Lankans at any disastrous situation. During the recent flash floods in the Eastern Province. Bell 212 helicopters rescued 54 persons trapped in the devastating flash floods from Batticaloa and Ampara in two days in early January 2011.

The chopper carried out three shuttles for the rescue mission where 32 individuals from Tampitiya, 14 from Bogamuyaya, seven from Rambakan Oya and one from Valaichenai were flown away for safety from the flood waters. The SLAF carried relief aid to victims of flash floods in the Eastern province by airlifting consignments of dry rations using MI-17 helicopters.

The operations which began on January 11 from SLAF China Bay, airlifted 5200 kilograms of dry rations including dhal, sugar, rice, milk powder in a Mi-17 heavy-lift helicopter bound for Somawathiya area in the Polonnaruwa District.

This was followed by another consignment carrying 9,700 kilograms of essential goods sent by a MI-17 from SLAF Base Hingurakgoda to the same location. Both consignments were dropped at the school grounds of Somawathi Devi Vidyalaya.

Later another consignment of wheat flour weighing 2,800 kilograms was airlifted to Somawathiya from Hingurakgoda. Within a week the MI-17s of the Air Force airlifted 30,000 kilograms of dry rations and essential items to Batticaloa, Sampur, Somawathiya, Ella, Kantale, Serunuwara and Vakarai areas. Surely their wings will protect the country and its people for ever.

The Eelam IV campaign was a remarkable achievement, with important lessons for other militaries facing capable irregular opponents. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces applied innovative tactics, combining guerilla and conventional tactics, joint operations, and constant organizational adaptation.

Most importantly, the SLA applied these tactics in the service of an effective strategic plan. This strategic plan took advantage of the Tiger s main weaknesses: their hierarchical and conventional structure, and their reliance on international support. Eelam IV was the last major campaign in a protracted war, and the Tigers had over time gained very significant conventional capability. This had important implications for strategy, since LTTE was more a conventional opponent than a guerrilla adversary during Eelam IV.

One key innovation was the application of Special Infantry Operations training throughout the Army, which increased the capabilities of the regular Sri Lankan soldier and his unit, enabling them to carry out complex operations in and behind enemy lines. SIO training also developed the soldier himself, nurturing professionalism in the Sri Lankan Army and revitalizing confidence in the skills of conventional units. Because of these developments in ability and professionalism, ground forces maintained a high and constant attrition rate against LTTE. Even though a large part of the conflict was fought in a conventional manner, this shift in operational emphasis and training allowed the SLA to wage an effective counter-guerilla war in combination with conventional operations.

The Tri-Services, national and local police, the Civil Security Service, and special-forces and commando units all conducted combined operations in partnership. Combined (partnered) operations are a vital aspect of counterinsurgency their successful application in Sri Lanka is an important lesson for other countries.

The adaptations of the Sri Lankan armed forces were not limited to tactics Sri Lanka s success also derived from the way it learned from, adapted to, and overcame operational obstacles as a learning organization. One of the hallmarks of Eelam IV was the attention given to nurturing tactical innovation from experienced soldiers. Training programs such as the Advanced Infantry Platoon Training (AIPT) devolved command from Platoon Commanders down to their soldiers in an open process of frank analysis and tactical discussion. By encouraging even the most junior soldier to think creatively about the conflict environment, AIPT had a force-wide effect, literally altering the organizational culture of the Sri Lankan Army. Unlike a traditional top-down command system, AIPT nurtured a sense of involvement and ownership, encouraging initiative and innovation throughout the ranks.

Though these tactical advances were important, their greatest advantage came from the strategy they supported. The government s strategy accurately assessed and attacked the Tigers operational weaknesses.

The Tigers claimed to represent the political goals of Sri Lanka s entire Tamil population. The schism within the LTTE and the split with Colonel Karuna in 2004 gave the lie to that claim, and led the Tigers to mistreat and alienate the population of Eastern Province. The Army was quick to exploit this divide, employing the local knowledge of Karuna s troops in combination with conventional operations control the entire Eastern Province by August 2007.

The Tigers also relied on international funding and support. The post 9-11 crackdown on international terrorist financing severely reduced this source of funding. The military, especially the Navy, exploited this weakness by targeting Tiger supply ships, confident that lost materiel could no longer be replaced.

Another key element of the strategy focused on the Tigers hierarchical structure and conventional warfare approach. With a leadership based on a cult of personality, as well as a definite chain of command and organizational structure, the Tigers were susceptible to military collapse following defeat on the battlefield or loss of key leaders. Recognizing this, the government was able to confront the Tigers on a strictly military basis, making this more of a conventional war than a traditional counterinsurgency campaign, and yet with a high chance of success.

The Tigers chose to confront the Army symmetrically in open warfare in response the Armed Forces fought and destroyed them through conventional operations that developed a tempo, mass, and operational capability they could not match. The Army s combination of conventional and counter-guerilla tactics denied the Tigers a competitive advantage, while the tempo of operations prevented the Tigers from regrouping. Finally, the size of the Sri Lankan Army, which was recruiting nearly 3,000 soldiers a month by the end of 2008, gave it a decisive mass advantage over the dwindling LTTE.

Finally, most controversially, the strategy gave the Tigers no opening to surrender. It is normal in Counterinsurgency to provide an open avenue for reconciliation and surrender, but Sri Lanka appears to have decided that the special circumstances of the conflict with the LTTE made this inadvisable. In the past, the Tigers had repeatedly exploited international concern and cease-fires, using the breathing space to regroup and rearm. Recognizing this, the government ignored international calls for restraint and focused on completely destroying the Tigers. The government displayed unshakeable political, opposing all external and internal pressure for a ceasefire. This political cover provided the time, space, and support necessary for the free execution of the highly attritional military strategy.

Thus the government accurately assessed the Tigers strategic weaknesses, and aggressively sought to exploit them. The government attacked the bases of the Tigers material and political support, using conventional tactics to destroy their fighting capability. Importantly, the Tigers contributed to their own downfall by exploiting and abusing the Tamil population, destroying whatever local credibility may have remained after 25 years of war. In essence, the Sri Lankan government exploited its advantages to out-adapt and out-compete the LTTE.

Eelam IV has led some to question the basic precepts of classical COIN theory. This theory, as laid out by David Galula, Robert Thompson and others, advocates protecting the population and political primacy as ways to win over the population, isolate the insurgent and forge a lasting peace. Sri Lanka chose a different path, in direct contradiction to these prescriptions, which seems to have produced quick and dramatic results. I d like to take a moment to address some of the issues this apparent contradiction raises.

Counterinsurgency is at heart an adaptation battle, a struggle to develop and apply new techniques in a fast-moving, high-threat environment. An effective counterinsurgency strategy depends on the nature of the counterinsurgent, the population, and the insurgency itself. COIN is not defined by any one set of techniques what might work against one insurgent group may fail against another, and what might be effective today will not be tomorrow. A counterinsurgency strategy is literally any combination of actions to counter an insurgency.

Sri Lanka s strategy embodied this principle. It recognized that the Tigers were operating in a conventional manner, were hierarchical and were actively alienating the Tamil population. Therefore, defeating them conventionally became possible.

The population-centric approach of classical COIN theory, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan, is a response to a different type of insurgent threat. The Taliban, for instance, are not trying to defeat the Afghan Government in a conventional battle. Instead, they are using asymmetric threats and competitive governance to undermine the government and the International Community. Against this type of group, conventional military operations would be ineffective and counterproductive. A population centric approach that seeks to provide sustainable security, improve community resiliency and create a responsive government stands a higher chance of success.

Dr. David Kilcullen is an Australian author and consultant on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism who is the founder and CEO of Caerus Associates, a Washington D.C. based consultancy firm. He is a former Australian Army Royal Australian Infantry Corps Lieutenant Colonel and Analyst with the Australian Office of National Assessments. Kilcullen was seconded to the United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism as Chief Counterterrorism Strategist and then was the Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In 2007 he served as the Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser to the Commander of the Multi-National Force - Iraq General David Petraeus as a civilian position on his personal staff responsible for planning and executing the 2007-08 Joint Campaign Plan which drove the Iraq War troop surge of 2007.

The government will open the tallest self supporting transmission tower in South East Asia - the Kokavil Transmission tower in Mullaitivu District on June 6, Sri Lanka Telecommunication Regulatory Commission s Director General Anusha Pelpita said.

The Telecommunication Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka has spent Rs. 330 million to construct the 174 metre multi purpose transmission tower. He said that the tower will provide the people of the North with better access to radio, TV and internet facilities after 30 years.

The project was jointly implemented by the Sri Lanka Telecommunication Regulatory Commission and the Media Ministry on the instructions of President Mahinda Rajapaksa with the close supervision of Economic Development Minister Basil Rajapaksa.

The tower will be administered by the TRC. It is Sri Lanka s first ever multi-channel broadcasting tower.

The tower will also be used to introduce digital radio and television transmission using the Digital Video Broadcasting s DVB-T2 digital terrestrial broadcasting standard through the Kokavil tower for the entire Northern Province.

This will help to provide high quality and clear television, radio and telecommunication coverage to the entire Northern Province.

He said the tower is to be utilized for TV, radio and telecommunications transmissions as well as military communication operations. Sri Lanka Army gave tremendous support to make the project success.

The Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation, Sri Lanka Rupawahini Corporation and the Independent Television Network commenced the test transmissions in April.

The TRC expects to provide space for several private media and telecommunication channels especially Tamil channels transmission space through this tower, he added.

We now have an opportunity to give a clear picture and provide information to the Northerns regarding the government s massive development drive and other social and political issues in the country, he added.

The elite Special Task Force (STF) yesterday (3) strongly denied allegations that its personnel had been involved in Monday s clashes between the police and a large group of unruly factory workers at the Katunayake Export Processing Zone (EPZ).

STF Commandant DIG R. W. M. C. Ranawana told The Island that there was no basis for the allegation. An irate STF Chief emphasized that police commandos hadn t been at the scene at the time clashes erupted following an unprovoked attack by workers on the police. DIG Ranawana said that he had moved commandos to the scene later to control the situation. 'We stopped a subsequent attempt by a section of workers to march towards the main road. The senior officers at the scene talked with workers and persuaded them not to cause trouble,' the official said.

The official was responding to an allegation made by German Ambassador Jens Plotner, who wrote to Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa seeking an inquiry into police excesses. The police regretted that the German Embassy went to the extent of raising an issue with the Defence Secretary Rajapaksa even without verifying facts.

Police headquarters spokesman SP Prishantha Jayakody told The Island that it had been the worst peace time mob attack on law enforcement personnel, which led to what he called an unfortunate situation.

The Defence Secretary told The Island that the government had initiated an inquiry immediately after the incident and there was absolutely no delay on the part of the administration in investigating the unfortunate incident. He expressed concern over unsubstantiated allegations made by various interested parties hell-bent on undermining post-war development in the country.

In support of the police, the government had deployed a sizeable army contingent in the Katunayake and Minuwangoda areas to thwart a possible attempt to launch violent protects today at the funeral of garment factory worker Sampath Shanaka, who succumbed to his injuries at the Colombo North Hospital at Ragama, where he was in a critical condition since Monday after being shot by police.

The international seminar - Defeating terrorism - the Sri Lankan experience- organised by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) was a genuine effort and a fine platform to give an overall picture to the entire world how the mighty lions of the Sri Lankan Security Forces defeated the world's ruthless Tigers - LTTE - two years ago.

It is a complete package for one to understand the vital components - committed and firm political leadership, adaptation of correct military strategy in attacking terrorists, the correct selection of the military officials to lead the military, rescuing displaced people used as a human shield by the LTTE and implementation of three Rs - resettlement, rehabilitation and reconciliation - wiping out the scourge of terrorism in Sri Lanka.

As the Army Chief Lt. General Jagath Jayasuriya said Sri Lanka and its military don't have anything to hide about how they fought to defeat terrorism. The three day seminar proved there is 'nothing to hide' but there is a success story, which was achieved through sheer dedication, commitment and genuine efforts to usher in a peaceful era, to teach the whole world.

'It is a saga to be shared with the world. It is our story of courage, valour and glory of compassion, humanity and joy of peace, freedom and democracy. Above all it is the story of epic political resolve and the will to deliver a nation from the grip of terrorism, wherein strong political will and national support was key to victory. Victory for Sri Lanka came with many sacrifices', Lt. Gen. Jayasuriya said in his welcome address.

He said Sri Lankan approach to counter terrorism has been unique and a paradigm shift from the traditional approach to counter terrorism. ' Most importantly I hope it will bring out the intricacies of dealing with humanitarian issues which is sine-qua-non and the complexities of fighting non-state actors within the obligations of the Geneva Conventions, all of which we were able to overcome with much sacrifices', he said.

Over 80 top military officials, representing 41 countries, including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Ukraine and Bangladesh took part in the sessions, where they were given freedom to throw any question to clarify doubts with Sri Lankan military and counter terrorism experts as well as those who are involved in resettlement, rehabilitation and humanitarian de-mining in the North and East.

Speaking on 'Challenges and Prospects of Counter Terrorism', External Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris said the SLA not only defeated LTTE terrorism, but also assisted the Tamil civilians to restart their lives.' The victory against the LTTE was not by conventional war and it was different from an orthodox military approach. Sri Lanka had to fight for a different cause to save lives of thousands of besieged Tamil civilians, for whom the LTTE claimed it was fighting for. It was a war of strategy, perceptions, humanitarian concerns, survival and psychological orientations. The extent of psychological penetration into civilians by LTTE for years as well as the fear-psychosis that gripped the northern society were evident in all sectors, including little children in the area', he said.

The counter terrorism experts Rohan Gunaratne, Lt. Col. Suresh Sallay and Dr. Ahmed S. Hashim explained the future challenges in countering LTTE activities internationally.

Lt. Col. Sallay speaking on the evolution of LTTE and international network said that today the same Front Organisations together with pro LTTE activists and less than 15% of the radicalised segments of Diaspora population who were largely responsible for destabilising the island nation and helped sustain the LTTE terrorist campaign over many years, are still engaged in carrying out the same activities as they did in the past in the pretext of safeguarding the rights of Tamils and using the human rights banner.

'These international developments has not only created a negative impact on ongoing reconciliation, rehabilitation and development work in the North and East but also may affect the relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities in the country,' he said.

According to Lt. Col. Sallay the sophistication of the LTTE and its impact on Sri Lanka and the outside world should serve as a lesson to all Governments facing terrorism today including the countries those who are wittingly or unwittingly permitting their soil to be used to nurture or condone terrorism thus leaving us a fearful challenge for tomorrow.

The field commanders - Maj. Generals Jagath Dias, Nandana Udawatta. Prasanna Silva, Shavendra Silva and Chagie Gallage shared their experience in vanquishing the LTTE domination from the East to North by explaining the tactical approaches adopted in their operations.

They said that after fighting one of the world's most ruthless and dangerous terrorist organisations for over three decades, the SLA has acquired immense knowledge, experience and skills in combating terrorism and insurgency. The final and decisive years of the conflict saw the Army develop into an adaptive, flexible and professional fighting outfit, capable of executing innovative counter insurgency operations and counter terrorists warfare concepts. The most effective method was the adaptation of the small group concept in military operations.