Sri Lanka News Updates with Discussions

3. (S/NF) This is not the first time Sri Lanka has attempted to purchase LME from countries under UN Security Council sanctions. In August 2006, the USG demarched the GOSL regarding its interest in acquiring pyrotechnic and armament spare parts for training aircraft, as well as hundreds of weapons from Iran (Ref A).

4. (S/NF) As part of our ongoing dialogue on
nonproliferation, we would like once again to express our
concern over Sri Lanka s potential procurement of lethal
military equipment from Iran and North Korea. We also want
to remind the GOSL of possible sanctions under the Iran,
North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). The
INKSNA requires regular reports to Congress identifying
individuals and entities who have transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria certain items related to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic or cruise missiles or advanced conventional weapons.

5. (S//REL SRI LANKA) Post is requested to draw upon the
talking points in paragraph 6 with appropriate host
government officials. Post should pursue the following
objectives:

-- Remind the GOSL that any arms purchase contracts entered into by Sri Lankan entities with North Korea or Iran, if implemented, could trigger sanctions against the entities involved under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).

-- Recall that paragraph 8(b) of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1718 requires member states to prohibit
the procurement of certain military-related items, including LME such as combat aircraft, battle tanks, large caliber artillery systems, or missile systems, or related materiel including spare parts, and that any import of such items by Sri Lanka would constitute a violation of UNSCR 1718. In addition, paragraph 8(c) of UNSCR 1718 requires UN Member States to prevent transfer from North Korea of any technical training, advice, services or assistance related to these items. The full list of items prohibited by UNSCR 1718 can be found on the UN s web site(wwwDOTunDOTorg/sc/committees/1718/xport. Items on
these lists (identified in Security Council documents
S/2006/814, S/2006/815, and S/2006/853) are also prohibited for transfer regardless of their intended use.

-- Emphasize our concern that Lanka Logistics and
Technologies Ltd may attempt to circumvent export controls on transfers with North Korea.

-- Request the GOSL to investigate Lanka Logistics and
Technologies Ltd and provide the United States with the
results of its investigation as soon as possible.

-- Request the GOSL to provide information on whether its
Navy is negotiating with MODLEX $11.4 million for rockets and rocket launchers that can be installed on naval equipment.

-- Request the GOSL to provide clarification on negotiations with Iran on procurement of weapons and defense equipment for the Sri Lankan Army in the amount of $40 million.

-- Note that under 1747, Iran is prohibited from exporting
arms and states are to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals.

-- Urge GOSL authorities to stop any military negotiations
with North Korea or Iran involving LME or sensitive
technology.

6. (SECRET//REL SIR LANKA) Note that the first four bullets
in the Talking Points are derived from intelligence and must
be used verbatim. These points are bracketed and flagged as
'VERBATIM POINTS.'

Begin Talking Points.

(BEGIN VERBATIM POINTS:

-- We have information that Lanka Logistics and Technologies
Ltd has been negotiating the purchase of RPG-7 Rocket
Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPGs) and Multiple Rocket
Launchers (MRLs) from the Korea Mining Development Company
(KOMID), North Korea s primary weapons trading firm.

-- Our information indicates that this sale has not been
completed.

-- We also have information that Iran s Ministry of Defense
Logistics Export Center (MODLEX), in December 2007, provided
the Sri Lankan Navy a quote of $11.4 million for rockets and
rocket launchers that could be installed on Sri Lankan naval
equipment. The offer did not include the cost of installation
and training, which could be provided at an additional cost.

-- We also understand that an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps Qods Force element located in Sri Lanka, in
February 2008, provided details to an Iranian shipping
company for the procurement of weapons to the Sri Lanka Army.
The total cost of the weapons and defense equipment totaled
approximately $40 million. END VERBATIM POINTS.)

-- Lanka Logistics and Technologies Ltd., according to your
own press, handles the acquisition of equipment and services
for the Sri Lankan military.

-- Any arms purchase contracts with North Korea or Iran, if
implemented, could trigger sanctions against the entities
involved under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).

-- Under INKSNA, the United States is required to report to
Congress persons and companies who have transferred to or
acquired from North Korea, Iran, or Syria goods, services or
technology controlled by multilateral nonproliferation export
control regimes, specifically the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the Australia Group, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

-- MRLS, RPGs, and other weapons and munitions are controlled
under the Wassenaar Arrangement and are therefore reportable
under the INKSNA.

-- Given North Korea,s continued destabilizing activities,
and the international reaction to those activities, now is
not the time for business as usual with North Korea.

-- We ask that you halt the purchase of all military
equipment from Iran. Paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747 provides that
Iran 'shall not supply, sell or transfer...any arms or
related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the
procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals...'

-- Moreover, DIO is an entity subject to the asset freeze
provisions in paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737, so any goods
received from the DIO or any payments made to the DIO must be
frozen under the provisions of the resolution.

-- We urge you to investigate the above activities and share
with us at your earliest convenience the results of your
investigation.

-- Beyond these cases, we urge Sri Lanka to cease all
cooperation with North Korea, Iran, and Syria on goods and
technologies controlled under the nonproliferation export
control regimes and United Nations Security Council
Resolutions we have cited.

-- We look forward to our continued cooperation on this and
other related matters.
(If Asked)

-- Sanctions that could be imposed under INKSNA include:

a. No department or agency of the United States Government
or U.S. company may procure, or enter into any contract for
the procurement of any goods, technology, or services from
them

b. No department or agency of the United States Government
or U.S. company may provide any assistance to them, and they
shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance
program of the United States Government

c. No sales to them of any item on the United States
Munitions List are permitted and all sales to them of any
defense articles, defense services, or design and
construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are
terminated and,

d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items controlled under the Export
Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration
Regulations, and existing such licenses are suspended.
End Talking Points.

7. (U) Washington appreciates Post s assistance on this
matter. Department Point of Contact is xxxx. Please slug all replies to ISN/CATR, EAP/K and SCA/INS.

aftenposten no nyheter uriks wikileaks article3963358.ece

Armed forces commanders both from India and Pakistan will visit Sri Lanka this month. Expected first is the Chief of Staff of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Vasant Naik. He is due to arrive in Colombo on a five-day visit beginning January 16.

His visit co-incides with the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) celebrating its 60th anniversary. Last month, the Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy, Admiral Nimal Kumar Varma, visited Colombo to take part in the Sri Lanka Navy's 60th anniversary celebrations.

The Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Ashfaq Kayani will arrive in Colombo on January 19 on a three-day visit. His visit comes in the wake of the official visit to Colombo in late November by Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari.

Both visitors are expected to call on President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

The recent increase in top level Indian delegation visits to Colombo indicates that India has entered a new and more comprehensive phase of bilateral relations with Sri Lanka. However, a highest level political visit from India is yet to materialize, while Sri Lankan counterparts have already visited Delhi twice in the recent past. What underlies these frequent diplomatic visits? The global power configuration is changing in favour of Asia, particularly China and India. The United States, and the West in general, are losing the pre-eminent position that they have had for centuries. Moreover, smaller regional countries are also emerging with strong identities. In this setting, India finds its rivals making inroads into Sri Lanka.

The most recent visit to Sri Lanka was the three day trip by Indian Defence Secretary Mr. Pradeep Kumar in late December 2010. The establishment of a bilateral defence dialogue and joint naval exercises, strengthening of coast guard services, extension of more military training and assistance for military infrastructure construction were all topics of discussion, affirming that India will work with Sri Lanka to cater for the latter s defence. The decision to empower the Sri Lankan Naval Commander to deal directly on urgent matters with Indian naval authorities on issues in the maritime domain is a step in the right direction, as the misbehaviour of a single fisherman on either side could create a bilateral issue. There is hope that this new approach in particular will be an effective mechanism to tackle human smuggling and the illegal entry of arms and drugs. As the narrow sea stretch is hardly an obstacle to smugglers it could be worthwhile to similarly empower ground military commanders along the same lines. India s recognition of Sri Lankan Security Forces Commander Jaffna as an honorary General in India and his Tamil Nadu equivalent vice versa in Sri Lanka would be an important confidence-building measure as well.

Some analysts believe that India s defence assistance is an attempt to balance growing Chinese inroads in Sri Lanka. However, media reports say that the offer to deliver shoulder-fired missiles and radars during the visit was part of the defence equipment that had been already provided to Sri Lanka during the civil war. Indian assistance to the Sri Lankan armed forces during the war against the Tamil Tigers is no longer a secret. India s stance was one of neutral benevolence and even a Sri Lankan on the street understands this. Supporting its neighbour was an effort to help, not harm, the Tamil population in Sri Lanka, given that the LTTE was an enemy of India, Sri Lanka and of the Tamils.

After the war, China building Hambanthota port has been a hot topic of discussion for strategic analysts and the media. Any Sri Lankan port has strategic value given the island s location on the Indian Ocean. This has been the case throughout history. The Japanese Air Force pounded Colombo harbour in the west of the Island during the Second World War. Nothern Kankasanthurai Port was the lifeline for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in the late 1980s. The US eyed Eastern Trincomalee port during the Cold War. Hambanthota port is farther away from India than all of these but it is the closest to major international commercial shipping routes. In fact, the preliminary offer to assist in building the port was made to India. An offer was also made to the United States before China made the final bid.

Southern Hambanthota, the birth place of President Mahinda Rajapakse, was also the breeding ground for two armed insurgencies in the Island, one in the 1970s and the other in the 1980s, both triggered by poverty and adverse conditions. The modern port hopes to bring prosperity to this region. Sri Lanka today is not what it was yesterday. It is smart and able enough to handle international relations without destabilizing its only neighbour India. Sri Lanka is the most stable country next to India in a rather troubled region. However, it is worth noting that Hambanthota port has not been an issue in the bilateral relationship. The Indian External Affairs Minister Mr. S. M. Krishna s statement during his visit to Sri Lanka in November 2010 that The relationship between India and Sri Lanka need not to be at the cost of other countries, our ultimate objective is to see a prosperous, stable Sri Lanka, is a testament to this.

Mr. Krishna s visit was also significant for a number of trade and financial deals he signed and the two Indian consulates he opened. One consulate is in the former LTTE stronghold of northern Jaffna and the other in southern Hambanthota. The aid package also included funding for post war construction, electricity power projects, north-south railway development and the resumption of a ferry service between India and Sri Lanka. These projects will help heal differences between two domestic communities separated by war while enhancing people-to-people contact between Sri Lankans and Indians through the new ferry service. Moreover, Krishna s remarks as to the need for a political solution to the Tamil ethnic question varied little from the official Sri Lankan government s standpoint there is merely disagreement on how to get there. India urges devolution of powers based specifically on the 13th amendment while the Sri Lankan government favours a home-grown solution. This is a matter to be handled with great care since the outcome of any ill-conceived design would impact on bilateral relations.

Today, only 15 per cent of Sri Lanka s population resides in the North and East. The case in the East is different from that in the north Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims harmoniously live in the East in equal proportions. A majority of Tamils live along with the Sinhalese in all other provinces. In Colombo, Tamils are the majority, not the Sinhalese. Therefore, any merger of two provinces on ethnic lines would not solve the question. There is also a need for a more enlightened Tamil leadership from those war torn provinces to consolidate peace. Power should be shared, however, and it should be to the satisfaction of all Sri Lankans. Any solution should encourage Tamil leaders to engage in the political system on a national basis while discouraging ethnic affiliations among political parties. Diaspora politics should not be imposed on the innocent Tamils of Sri Lanka who live peacefully. The situation is complex but it is a good sign that the majority of Tamil politicians agree with the political leadership on many facets of governance. Therefore, a home grown solution is ideal provided India generously supports its implementation.

When it comes to Sri Lankan relations, there is an important factor that India should realize. Sri Lanka will always ask India first for assistance. Sri Lanka will only turn to others when denied assistance by India. For example, Sri Lanka had to depend on China and Pakistan for lethal arms to fight against the LTTE. This, however, does not mean that India s security will be compromised. Therefore, there is a need for temperance when dealing with Sri Lanka. The nature of Chinese and Pakistani relations with Sri Lanka is economic though there is an attached strategic sub-text. The classic example is Sri Lanka s recent refusal to sign a defence pact offered by the Pakistani president, just a few weeks ago. India has to take a holistic perspective on Sri Lanka s foreign relations.

Last but not the least, Indian Foreign Secretary Ms. Nirupama Rao s recent visit is worth mentioning. She has been a very popular figure among Sri Lankans. She received a warm reception everywhere in the country from Sinhalese in the south and Tamils in the North. Her remarks on Indian assistance to develop 50,000 housing projects in the war- torn areas has brought new hopes to many displaced peoples.

In a nutshell, the Indo-Sri Lanka relationship is deep and continues to grow after the war. The island is strategically harmonizing its ties with its neighbour and with the region. It is mindful of India s interests and supports India s emergence as a key power. Therefore, any observers fear regarding other countries involvements in Sri Lanka as endangering Indian Security is false. India has already stamped a sizable presence from top to bottom in the Island. Sri Lanka is always receptive to her big sister while smart in her own balancing act .