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Jolyroger
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 7 May 2010 17:41:57 GMT Report for Abuse
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The perception of the Sri Lankan foreign policy establishment can be better understood from the writings of two astute Sri Lankan diplomats, Bernard Tilakaratne, who was Sri Lankan High Commissioner in India for many years and who later became the Foreign Secretary of Sri Lankan Government and Nanda Godage, who has served Colombo with great distinction in several world capitals. Dealing with the inputs made by G Parthasarathy in the making of India s Sri Lanka policy during the Indira-Gandhi era, Bernard Tilakaratne wrote: Soon after Jayewardene became President, he was keen to cultivate closer relations with Indira Gandhi and particularly to update her on our ethnic problem. He sought my advice as High Commissioner, whether he should come himself or send an emissary and I proposed that Minister Athulathmudali be sent in the first instance and that I would try to arrange a closed meeting. I was particularly gratified that GP (G Parthasarathy) was away for a while, there were no other advisor other than myself accompanying the Minister. We had a fantastic meeting at which Mrs Gandhi was so very sympathetic and understanding until GP joined us during the tea break and whispered to her in Hindi, a language I well understand having spent so many years in India, and the rest of the meeting was a disaster. The Minister asked me in Sinhala what caused the abrupt change and I said the voice of South India has spoken (Emphasis added).
Indirectly making the point that enhanced relations with China will help Colombo in checkmating Tamil Nadu, Amb Godage in a recent article in The Island has written, We were able to end the LTTE insurrection because China threw its weight behind us and sent us the required arms. Chinese aid to Sri Lanka is very many times more than the aid of countries such as the US Why I flag these facts is to make the point that we are not without real friends and we do not need to be at the mercy of any group of countries which seek to destabilize this country to please their domestic constituencies (Emphasis added). It needs to be pointed out that the only Sri Lankan political leader who wanted to build bridges of understanding with South India, especially Tamil Nadu, was Ranil Wikramasinghe, when he became the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.
Edited By - Jolyroger - 7 May 2010 17:42:39 GMT |
Jolyroger
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7 May 2010 17:43:36 GMT Report for Abuse
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A synoptic view of Sri Lanka s foreign policy, with special reference to Sri Lanka-China relations, is attempted here before analyzing the current situation. The triangular relations among Colombo, New Delhi and Beijing were naturally influenced by the cross currents of international politics, the ideological orientation of the ruling classes and critical issues of ethnic politics. As a general proposition, it could be stated that during the initial years of independence the SLFP Governments pursued a more vigorous non-aligned foreign policy, while the UNP Governments were more inward looking and were more pro-West in their foreign policy orientation. But with the end of the Cold War the ideological differences between the UNP and the SLFP have blurred and there is certain amount of continuity in their foreign policy objectives.
From a chronological perspective, Sri Lanka China relations, during the last six decades, could be broadly divided into few periods.
First Phase
During the first period, which spanned from 1948 to 1956, when the right wing UNP was in power, Colombo was aligned to the West and was hostile to the communist countries. Kept out of the United Nations till the end of 1955 due to Cold War rivalry, Ceylon viewed the Commonwealth connection, especially the Defence Agreement with Britain as the best insurance against external threat. What is more, on several occasions, the UNP leaders spelt out that the external threat could emanate only from India. The only exception to the general policy of anti-communism was the Rubber-Rice Agreement of 1952 with the Peoples Republic of China, despite a US embargo on the sale of strategic materials to China. Economically it was a boon for Colombo, for it not only provided a ready market for surplus rubber, but also enabled it to import the much needed rice at prices below the world market prices. YD Gundevia, who was India s High Commissioner in Ceylon in the late 1950 s, has written: Practically all the rubber, raw rubber, was exported to China, and China, in return, supplied eighty per cent of the country s rice requirements . Whatever be the nature of the Government, the Agreement has been renewed every five years. |
Jolyroger
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7 May 2010 17:44:05 GMT Report for Abuse
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Second Phase
The second phase, which commenced with the SLFP assuming power in 1956, continued till 1965. SWRD Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike brought about a definite shift in Colombo s foreign policy. Sri Lanka and China established full diplomatic relations on February 7, 1957 and exchanged resident embassies in each other s capitals. Politically Colombo supported the One China policy and lent its support to the seating of the PRC in the United Nations. As an assertion of genuine independence and non-alignment, the British bases in Katunayake and Trincomalee were closed down in 1957, though the Defence Agreement itself was not abrogated. It may be mentioned in this connection, that in 1984 President Jayewardene maintained that Britain could come to Sri Lanka s assistance, under the terms of the Agreement, in case its freedom and territorial integrity were threatened. Diplomatic relations with socialist countries, including China, were established and political, cultural and trade relations were expanded. Prime Minister Chou En Lai visited Sri Lanka in 1958 and 1964. When the Sino-Indian conflict took place in October-November 1962, Sirimavo Bandaranaike took the initiative to summon the Colombo Conference of a few non-aligned countries to mediate in the India-China dispute. The Sri Lankan Prime Minister visited Beijing in 1963 to explain the Colombo proposals. The opposition stance, especially that of the UNP, was definitely more pro-India, The UNP leaders criticized the Government for not branding China as the aggressor. Similarly the Maritime Agreement signed between the two countries in July 1963, which gave Most Favoured Nation Status (MFN) to the contracting parties, also became a serious issue in Sri Lankan domestic politics. The UNP cited it as evidence of the Government s pro-China tilt and since most of the China trade passed through Trincomalee, there were also accusations that Trincomalee had been handed over to China. |
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7 May 2010 17:44:56 GMT Report for Abuse
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Third Phase
When Dudley Senanayake became the Prime Minister in 1965, there was a slide back in Sri Lanka-China relations. In the preceding election campaign, foreign policy issues had figured prominently. The UNP Government, being pro-West, it was but natural that relations with China should take a nose dive. What is more, China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, and the domestic compulsions had their inevitable fall out on the foreign policy. Beijing expressed its displeasure with Colombo, by keeping the post of Ambassador vacant throughout Dudley Senanayake s five year term. In 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formed, Colombo seriously considered joining the new regional organization. The Vietnam War was escalating and the member states of ASEAN were in varying degrees aligned to the United States. All of them were anti-China and many observers considered the ASEAN as an instrument to stem the tide of Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia. The matter did not proceed further, one consideration of Colombo being it would have jeopardized the Rice-Rubber Agreement.
Fourth Phase
The SLFP s return to power in 1970 (as a major partner in the United Front Government) once again brought about a reversal in Sri Lanka s foreign policy. Sirimavo Bandaranaike began to play a leading role in the Non Aligned movement Colombo hosted the fifth non-aligned summit in 1976. A major Sri Lankan initiative during this period was the proposal to convert the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, so that the littoral states could be insulated from the adverse effects of cold war rivalry. Relations with China improved rapidly, except during the JVP insurrection during 1971, when Colombo suspected Chinese machinations behind the revolt. Beijing s failure to respond to Colombo s desperate appeal for military assistance and the presence of a Chinese ship in the Colombo harbour, carrying arms to Tanzania, lent credence to the suspicion of China s complicity. However, it turned out to be a storm in the tea cup. Sri Lanka-China relations began to expand in a big way. In 1972, Sirimavo Bandaraniake made a successful, highly publicized visit to China, when she had an audience with Mao Tse Tung. She characterized the relations between the two countries as a model of inter-state relations . |
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7 May 2010 17:45:42 GMT Report for Abuse
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By the end of 1976, China had become Sri Lanka s major trading partner. Colombo received from China an interest free loan of Rs 265 million to finance agro-based industries and a further interest free loan of Rs 48 million to finance an integrated textile mill. Beijing also gifted five high speed naval boats to Sri Lanka. In addition, China constructed the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, at an estimated cost of Rs. 35 million, a show piece of Chinese good will to Sri Lanka. Unfortunately despite New Delhi s sincere gestures of good will, India-Sri Lanka relations underwent stresses and strains. As mentioned earlier, New Delhi s timely assistance to Colombo enabled the Government to put down the JVP revolt however, during the Bangladesh crisis Colombo provided landing facilities to Pakistani Air Force planes and military personnel in civilian garb, on their way to East Pakistan. Sri Lanka also did not accord immediate diplomatic recognition to the newly independent Bangladesh. The recognition came only in 1972. Equally disconcerting for India was Colombo s changing stance on Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. With the Pokhran explosion in 1974, Colombo became concerned about India s intentions and capabilities. In addition to broad concerns about super power rivalry, the India factor began to loom large in Sri Lankan thinking. In November 1976, Shirley Amarasinghe remarked, We do not want any great power here. By the same token, we do not intend that we should drive out Satan by Beelzebub and allow some other powers within the group of littoral and hinterland states to take up the place of super powers . To the dismay of India, Colombo also extended its support to the Pakistani proposal for the establishment of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. A situation was slowly emerging when the neighbouring countries in South Asia were ganging up against New Delhi
An important factor that contributed to the improvement of Sino-Sri Lankan relations should be highlighted. By the mid-1970 s China no longer projected itself as the citadel of revolution . Support to revolutionary struggles was no longer an important facet of China s foreign policy. The left parties in Sri Lanka, which hitherto had played an important role in Sri Lankan politics, fell into disarray and could not wield much influence. Added to this was the strange spectacle, that in Sri Lanka the Trotskyist Party, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) was polling more votes than the traditional communist parties. The Sino-Soviet dispute had its inevitable fall out on the communist movement. While majority of the members remained with the parent organization, the pro-Moscow Communist Party led by Pieter Keuneman, a vocal minority led by Shanmugathsan formed the Communist Party of Ceylon, which supported China in the ideological struggle. The net result was the decline of the left movement in Sri Lanka. |
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7 May 2010 17:46:22 GMT Report for Abuse
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China successfully rallied from the temporary setback suffered during the first JVP struggle, when Beijing adopted an ambivalent stance. For few weeks, there was a studied silence on the part of Beijing. It was strange because CCP never missed an opportunity to involve itself in diatribes against Moscow and New Delhi. China naturally did not want to miss an important foothold in South Asia. This fact compelled Beijing to make amends. In a letter to Sirimavo Bandaranaike in May 1971, Chou En Lai condemned the self styled Che Guevarists . He added that China was opposed to both ultra leftism and right opportunism in revolutionary struggles. In his view, the JVP revolt was plotted by the reactionaries in Ceylon and abroad.
Fifth Phase
The decisive victory of the UNP and the virtual rout of the SLFP in the 1977 elections brought about a radical transformation in Sri Lankan political system. Despite pious commitment to the principles of Non-Alignment, there was a definite pro-American tilt in Sri Lanka s foreign policy. The economic policies of Colombo, modeled on the experience of Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea made it more and more dependent on Western bilateral and multilateral assistance. The dependency syndrome naturally resulted in major deviations in foreign policy. On the issue of Grenada, Sri Lanka voted with Britain in the United Nations in the 1983 Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi, President Jayewardene soft pedaled the issue of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace he also did not condemn the US Naval presence in Diego Garcia. On Afghanistan and Kampuchea, Colombo toed the line of the West, China and ASEAN. Sri Lanka vehemently criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and upheld the ASEAN point of view on the Cambodian question. Speaking on Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the Sri Lankan Minister for Foreign Affairs Shahul Hameed pointed that military intervention to bring about change in the political system of a neighbouring country was to invite a breakdown of orderly conduct in inter-state relations . During this period, Sri Lanka once again tried to become a member of ASEAN however, it could not make much headway in this direction. |
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7 May 2010 17:47:20 GMT Report for Abuse
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Sixth Phase
The sixth phase began in July 1983. With the escalation of the ethnic conflict, Sri Lanka was at war with itself. The internal security compulsions, the wider question of grappling with the external ramifications of the ethnic conflict and the problem of dealing with the critical India factor became matters of overriding concern for the Sri Lankan Foreign Office. The internationalization of the ethnic conflict in the post 1983 period resulted not only in Colombo moving closer to the West, but it had also adverse repercussions on India s geo-political and strategic environment. Colombo s enthusiastic attempts to cultivate Islamabad and Beijing, its shopping spree around the world capitals for building up armed strength, the induction of the notorious Israeli counter insurgency set up Mossad, the arrangements with British mercenaries to train the Sri Lankan armed forces - all these had serious bilateral and regional implications. The increasing US interest was evident from the Voice of America Deal. Under this agreement, a transmitter was supposed to have been installed ostensibly for the use of Voice of America. It was the most powerful transmitter outside the United States and Colombo was to have no editorial control over it. The Sri Lanka watchers in India felt that the whole arrangement was intended to be a communication relay facility between Diego Garcia and Pina Gap communication in Australia. It could also be used for jamming Indian communication systems. It should, however, be underlined that if President Jayewardene hoped that the West will bail him out of his domestic problem, he was sadly mistaken. On the contrary, the United States advised Colombo to use India s good offices to solve the ethnic imbroglio.
India s policy towards Sri Lanka during this period was full of contradictions. The mediatory-militant supportive policy did not earn for India the good will of either the government or the militants. But one thing was clear. India was determined not to allow Colombo to have a military solution to a domestic problem finally Colombo had to sign an agreement with New Delhi to resolve the problem peacefully. The India Sri Lanka Accord, July 1987 not only represented a commitment on the part of New Delhi to the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, it also accommodated New Delhi s security concerns vis- -vis the island. In sum the relevant provisions implied an adherence to the policy of Non-Alignment from which Colombo had made fatal and costly deviations. It must, however, be mentioned that the provisions in the Exchange of Letters represented statements of intentions as opposed to binding legal obligations. |
Jolyroger
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7 May 2010 17:48:31 GMT Report for Abuse
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While the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka s ethnic conflict provides ample testimony to the pangs of proximity, the long distance which separates China from Sri Lanka has not provided any enchantment either. India s mediatory role and the IPKF operations are pointers to the inherently limited role that an external power can play in resolving a domestic conflict in a neighbouring country. At the same time, attempts made by Sri Lanka to internationalise the ethnic conflict and encourage the involvement of external powers is an example of cutting one s nose to spite one s face. Finally when the moment of reckoning came in June-July 1987, no external power even lifted a finger against India.
An analysis of Beijing s reactions to the ethnic conflict makes it clear that China s support to Sri Lanka was on a low key. There was a pragmatic realization that a high profile policy would adversely affect the ongoing process of normalization of Sino-Indian relations. When Harry Jayewardene, the special envoy of President Jayewardene, visited China towards the end of 1983, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian extended China s support to Sri Lanka s efforts to safeguard its sovereignty and oppose foreign interference in its internal affairs. The same position was reiterated by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Gong Dafei in November 1984 in Colombo he stated big should not bully the small . In November 1985, a 3000 ton Guided Missile Destroyer and supply ship made a friendly visit to Colombo after a similar visit to Karachi. This was the first goodwill visit of a Chinese naval ship since the founding of the PRC in 1949. In March 1986, President Li visited Colombo as part of a five nation tour and reaffirmed the traditional friendship between the two countries. However, in private Li advised Colombo to seek a political solution to the ethnic problem. When India-Sri Lanka confrontation escalated in the summer of 1987, Ranil Wikramsinghe visited Beijing to mobilize Chinese support. Beijing again preferred a political solution to the problem. However, it continued to pump arms to Sri Lanka. In one official statement, without naming India, China expressed its disapproval of the bullying actions of the big powers and interference in internal affairs of other nations President Jayewardene summed China s attitude towards Sri Lanka as follows: They were good friends and gave us military equipments, guns etc, at reasonable terms. But what could they do? I could not ask them to start a border war in the north to keep the Indians busy. Even if I had, I doubt, if they would have done it .
An important fallout of the escalation of the ethnic conflict had been the rapid expansion and modernization of the Sri Lankan armed forces. In the fifties and the sixties, the Sri Lankan army was a ceremonial one, providing guard of honour to the visiting dignitaries and holding march pasts on independence days. |
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7 May 2010 17:51:49 GMT Report for Abuse
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In 1978 Sri Lanka allocated only 3.1 per cent of its national income to defence, by 1992 it was spending as much as 12.0 per cent on defence. After 1983, thanks mainly to the US, Israel, Pakistan and China, the Sri Lankan army had developed as a professional group, vastly more in numbers and equipped with sophisticated weapons. China has emerged as a major arms supplier to Sri Lanka in terms of value, quantity and quality. The military equipment supplied by China for use against the Tigers include Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns and JY-11 3 D air surveillance radars. China s military assistance to Sri Lanka is estimated to be around US Dollars 100 million per year.
The odds were completely against the Tigers when the Fourth Eelam War commenced in 2006. The LTTE s attempts to procure arms were thwarted by the Sri Lankan Government. With inputs from Indian Intelligence agencies, the Sri Lankan armed forces successfully destroyed LTTE ships bringing arms into the island. With the supply lines cut and Sea Tigers destroyed the Tigers were like fish out of water. The armed forces were not only enlarged, they became also highly professional, especially at the officers level. President Mahinda Rjapakshe gave complete freedom to the Chiefs of the Armed Forces to determine the war strategy. Unlike the Third Eelam War, there was absolutely no political interference. As President Mahinda Rajapakshe stated in an interview with N Ram, editor-in-chief of the Hindu group of publications, From the beginning I had the feeling that if you gave the forces (the Sri Lankan armed forces) proper instructions and whatever they wanted, our people could defeat them . The most efficient wing was the Air Force, which resorted to savage bombing of the Tamil areas. And the attempts made by the LTTE emissaries to acquire the much needed anti-aircraft missiles from the United States was nipped in the bud by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the words of an Indian scholar, the Sri Lankan security forces were better equipped and trained than ever before They were using superior artillery, recently inducted Kifirs, MIG 27, MIG 29 and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, a newly acquired US Beechcraft and advanced radars. The ascendancy of the Sri Lankan Air Forces led to the initiative slipping out of the hands of the Tigers. Kilinochi, Elephant Pass, Mullaithivu and finally Nandi Kadal a series of dismal defeats culminated in the decimation of the entire Tiger leadership, including Prabhakaran.
Given the nature of coalition politics in India, especially the role played by the alliance partners from Tamil Nadu, New Delhi s maneuverability in strategic co-operation was limited. The suggestion made by Prime Minister Ranil Wikramasinghe that India and Sri Lanka should enter into a Defence Co-operation Agreement could not make much headway. |
Jolyroger
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7 May 2010 17:53:21 GMT Report for Abuse
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However, India continued to provide non-lethal weapons like radars, stepped up training of the Sri Lankan armed forces, especially the Sri Lankan Navy, modernized the Palaly Airport, kept vigil in the Palk Bay, and above all did not succumb to the demands made by the political forces in Tamil Nadu to follow an activist policy in support of the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. A Sri Lankan academic informed the author that the greatest contribution of New Delhi during the Fourth Eelam War was to keep Karunanidhi in check so that the war could continue till the final goal was accomplished. The astute Sri Lankan defence and foreign policy establishment knew the constraints on the Central Government in New Delhi to gain maximum leverage from such a situation, they first approached New Delhi with the list of defence equipment they required, knowing fully well that New Delhi will give a negative answer, then they approached Pakistan and China for the same weapons and perhaps more. The careful management of relations with India was left to Basil Rajapakshe, Gotabhaya Rajapakshe and Lalith Weeratunga. In characteristic understatement, Amb Godage has written that this policy resulted in the Indian Government playing a quiet but effective role to enable us to finish of the war . For China, its ties with Colombo gave it a foothold near the critical sea lanes and also entry into what India considers to be its backyard.
Colombo was also extremely happy that when the issue of human rights violations figured in the UN organizations, China and Russia extended their whole hearted support to Sri Lanka. In a recent article in The Island, reference to which has been made earlier, Amb Godage highlights this point. After describing the munificent armed assistance received by Sri Lanka from several international quarters, Godage added, This is not to forget the military assistance we received from Russia and the tremendous help Russia extended, along with China, in the Security Council to counter the hostile West which was determined to save the LTTE . |
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