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Force level

He expanded and refurbished the army from an under-equipped and weak force into a 190,000-strong force by 2009. In order to provide adequate force levels the army went into a recruiting spree. When the war started in 2006 he had deployed 12 divisions and by the time the war ended in 2009, he had raised and inducted four more divisions. (Out of this about 150,000 troops were deployed against the LTTE which had a combatant strength of around 20,000 apart from other auxiliary forces.)

Exploiting the potential

The army had added 40,000 troops in 2008 to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, 4 task force contingents, and two divisions. By any yardstick this was a colossal task and the army managed to carry it out successfully. This showed the potential strategic strength and capability of Sri Lanka to raise large sized forces in times of war.

Training

He improved their training to address weaknesses in command and control. Understanding the need for numbers, he reduced the training duration of soldiers and put them on frontline as a military expediency. As the LTTE lacked rifle strength, overwhelming numbers proved a crucial factor. Similarly Special Forces units were well trained for optimising their use in operations.

Conduct war

The army s biggest weaknesses in the past were in higher direction of war, maintenance of momentum, coordination of operations on multiple axes, and use of air force and navy to support land operations. Operational planning was pedestrian and lacked innovation in execution. The LTTE exploited these weaknesses to capture Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi towns after driving out the army from vast areas in Vanni. However, when they went into Eelam War IV the armed forces, particularly the army, appear to have learnt from past mistakes and their performance was better in all these aspects.

Higher direction of war

During the war, General Fonseka dusted up his operational planning and used multiple offensive axes to split and weaken the LTTE force levels, already depleted due to the defection of its Batticaloa commander Karuna along with his followers. Fonseka captured the Mannar coastline early in the operation to cut off the supply chain of basic essentials from Tamil Nadu coast. With advances along converging axes, the army offensive gathered more strength and fire power as the LTTE ranks were weakened with the progress of operations. Special Forces were used innovatively and deep penetration squads of commandos successfully eliminated some the key LTTE leaders.

Holding the nerve

General Fonseka had initial failure in carrying out attacks on the Elephant Pass salient from the Jaffna peninsula side. However, he converted that an opportunity to soften up LTTE bunkers well before the final offensive to subdue the LTTE positions in the narrow strip between Muhamalai and Elephant Pass. In early stages the army was caught unaware by bombing sorties by of the fledgling Air Tiger force. However, Fonseka refused to be overawed by it. The air defence system was tightened and the air threat of the LTTE could cause no worthwhile damage.

Morale

The General s biggest contribution was in rebuilding the morale of army. When he retired as army chief he left a force with high morale. This was mainly achieved through deliberate planning of operations with adequate force levels and fire power which resulted in successful conclusion of operations.

On the negative side, his abrasive style of leadership particularly in handling officers has created bitterness in section of army just as it also created a group of personal loyalists. This had its fall out when the General had a face off with the President and probably divided the army.

Air force in war

The Eelam War IV saw the extensive use of air support for land and sea operations. The Air Force strengthened with acquisition of new MIG-29 fighters, supported ground operations effectively. Its bombing missions allowed no respite for the LTTE leadership. Relentless air strikes demoralised the Tamil Tigers and prevented their free movement. At sea, the air force helped the navy in operations against Sea Tiger boats. Thus air support was one of the key elements of Sri Lankan success. This is evident from the huge number of sorties the air force flew in the Eelam War IV. In the period from June 2006 onwards till January 2009, the air force carried out a total of 1345 missions flying 2582 sorties of jets and helicopters. Three jet squadrons namely Kfirs (No 10), MIGs (No 12) and F7s (No 5) undertook 1,116 missions while helicopter gun ships took part in 229 operations. However, ground defence of air bases continued to be its weakness.

Navy in war

The navy which was hemmed in the early stages along bases in Jaffna peninsula, Trincomalee Bay and Southern Sri Lanka coasts, managed to improve its performance as the operations progressed. It adopted an offensive posture up-gunned its patrol boats, coordinated its patrolling and surveillance with Indian navy and coast guard, and improved its electronic and other surveillance with inputs from the Indian and US intelligence agencies.

It managed to suppress the Sea Tiger movements. The navy s biggest success came when it destroyed most of the LTTE s captive logistic shipping network sinking eight to ten ships in well planned and executed operations in international waters in 2006-08. The destruction of ships were loaded with millions of rupees worth of military supplies including light aircraft parts, artillery weapons, rockets, small arms and ammunition destined for the LTTE, reduced its sustaining power in war.

Defence coordination

The defence ministry was also responsible for internal security. This enabled the armed forces to achieve a great deal of coordination in employing police and paramilitary forces to prevent the LTTE s notorious sabotage and suicide strikes from causing significant damage in the rear areas and cities. On the negative side, the concentration of forces law enforcement and national security under a single ministry can give rise to the emergence of yet another power centre in times of political uncertainty.

STRATEGIC STATUS OF ARMED FORCES

Sri Lanka armed forces appear to have graduated from a land bound army-dominated force to a strong multifaceted force capable of planning and executing complex operations utilising large sized forces on multiple axes. If the armed forces continue to hone their military skills in the coming years they are likely to become a first rate force supported by competent air and naval forces. Army s higher command and leadership at various levels have shown they are capable of bouncing back with right leadership. Army has also shown its ability to integrate the air force, navy and paramilitary forces to further overall objectives of operations.

The present strength of the armed forces is about 230,000 individual strength of the three services as gleaned from open sources is as follows:

Army

The army has 12 divisions and four newly raised divisions that are probably under trained and also under strength. Bulk of these forces is deployed in north and east after carrying out the Eelam War IV. Approximately 1000 troops (a battalion+) are with the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.

The army has seven regiments of armour (including one volunteer regiment), nine regiments of artillery (including two volunteer regiments), seven engineer regiments (including one volunteer regiment), ten regiments of signals (including one volunteer regiment), 97 infantry battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion, four commando regiments and three special forces regiments.

The divisions are slightly smaller than Indian infantry divisions. Both support arm strength and logistics would indicate the Sri Lanka army at present probably can put into operation a force of 10 to 11 fairly self contained divisions, with the rest of the troops being reserves and those under training.

Army as a potential power centre

Armed forces are conscious that their success in the war would not have been possible without Rajapaksa s leadership and the unprecedented support extended by the government machinery. Thus at the end of the war, a symbiotic relationship between the President and armed forces that came about during the war has now been strengthened. The significance of this relationship is evident when the President s handpicked officer Lt General Jagat Jayasuriya took over as army commander over looking the recommendation of the out going army chief General Fonseka.

Subsequently officers considered close to Fonseka were retired. The indebtedness of army to President Rajapaksa came to play in the run up to the presidential poll when the army commander and senior officers came out in his support both directly on TV and indirectly through seemingly routine actions.

Sri Lanka armed forces are a sizeable force with considerable military muscle. With subtle politicisation it is emerging as an extra political power centre in the country. Under ambitious commanders such a power centre outside the democratic sphere has the potential to dabble in politics and meddle with government actions, particularly in times of political instability. And the army could become the deciding factor in such uncertain times.

President Rajapaksa and the main political parties are probably conscious of such a possibility. The arrest and prosecution of a man of General Fonseka s popularity and national stature is probably a testimony to President Rajapaksa s determination to discourage such possibilities. The General s well orchestrated campaign brought major opposition parties under a single umbrella, opening up a number of options for anti-Rajapaksa forces. Fonseka had established a network of trusted retired army officers in every district. Evidently this had triggered the President s suspicion of Fonseka cooking up a military coup about which investigations are underway.

On the other hand, the General and many other officers considered close to him have been slandered and treated in an undignified and shabby way regardless of their loyal service and contribution to win the war. Serious allegations have been made against the retired General and he is being court-martialled. The Sinha Regiment, the parent regiment of the General had been singled out for loyalty checks. And soldiers on security duty were disarmed by police when Fonseka s office was raided.

Such acts hurting professional pride of soldiers usually have far reaching consequences, though the situation appears normal at present. Probably the army is divided in the cavalier way General Fonseka and his colleagues were handled even though they might not consider the ambitious General free of guilt.

A sizeable section of the population sees the government action against Fonseka as vindictive one. The Fonseka affair frittered away the strategic gains made by the President and distracts the nation from the task of rebuilding. So the impact of dynamics of changes in armed forces would very much depend upon how the President handles and employs them in his second term. The more they are involved to buttress his regime the greater would be the politicisation of the army.

But Rajapaksa is an experienced politician with an uncanny ability to time his actions so one can expect him to act with a lot of deliberation when it comes to the army.

Air Force

The air force has limited capability to keep Sri Lanka air space sanitized. It is probably capable of providing close air support both with fighters and gun ships to a divisional front. Its air lift capability is probably an infantry battalion minus. However, maintenance of the air force fleet is likely to pose a problem as it is an expensive proposition.

Navy

The navy is capable of detecting and engaging intruders along the coast line of Sri Lanka. A coast guard force is being raised. This would further enhance costal security of the country. In tandem with friendly forces its limited off shore capability can be enhanced.

STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

Three issues are of immediate interest in an overall study of dynamics of change in the Sri Lanka armed forces. These are national leadership, strategic role for armed forces and India related issues.

National leadership

President Rajapaksa has demonstrated the importance of dynamic national leadership to prosecute successful war more importantly in achieving military victory against insurgents. He provided national leadership to fine tune government policies including external relations to ensure success of military operations. The President has shown his ability to leverage international environment to further his military objectives. Rajapaksa has shown clarity in preventing political interference in the conduct of military operations, allowing sufficient flexibility to the army commander in his execution.

With a massive popular mandate in parliament and second presidential term he has emerged as an unchallenged leader. His strength is augmented by a powerful army now. Such powerful leadership can enable smooth passage of the country through a difficult journey to normalcy in the post-war period. On the other hand his flaws in leadership style and governance can create divisions within the country and lead to political unrest.

He has failed to take strategic political action towards achieving ethnic amity. Despite repeated public affirmation, President Rajapaksa has not put a political package to resolve the question of devolution of powers to Tamils. Without a parallel political dispensation, military success against the Tamil Tigers in could be frittered away without consolidating the gains of war. Thus the President has left the country vulnerable to revival of such efforts in the future.

Rajapaksa government s conduct and accountability on issues like fundamental freedom of people, media freedom, human rights, transparency governance, and war crimes has failed to satisfy civil society both at home and abroad. The abrasive style of his ministers and officials particularly in handling international opinion has eroded the nation s image. Already this is having its effect in actions like the European Union s withdrawal of the GSP+ duty concessions extended after 2005 tsunami strike. International support is likely to dwindle further, unless he takes concrete measures to satisfy basic norms of international conduct. Absence of international support could also affect taking timely actions to discourage revival of Tamil insurgency with the support of Sri Lankan expatriates once again.

Historically in many countries, the making of national leaders of immense popularity goes through some of the negative aspects Sri Lanka has been facing. Usually in such set ups personalised politics becomes the leader s operational tool and they tend to use the armed forces at their command to enforce their will. In Sri Lanka there is potential for such a deadly combination. Political power combined with military power can erase the thin line bet between democrats and demagogues both of who may enjoy popularity. Normally, they end up creating life time presidents. But Rajapaksa may prove to be the exception as he has exhibited an uncanny sense of timing his moves to arrive at success during his first term. So his second term in office is going to be crucial for him as much as for the country. We can hope the country under his leadership will spend less time on rhetoric and paranoia and spend more on positive action to achieve political and economic stability sorely needed by the country.

Strategic role for armed forces:

The armed forces have the strength and potential to take a share of responsibility in regional security arrangements to prevent Sri Lanka from becoming the hunting ground for external powers. The introduction of Sri Lanka as a new military factor in the regional security spectrum has to be reckoned in future operational planning of all powers including India. It will be in the interest of both India and Sri Lanka to evolve greater strategic convergence between both countries to ensure better coordination of their security strategies to their mutual advantage. This would enable both nations to keep the Indian Ocean region sanitized from external forces.

The army has expanded too fast and the new recruits training had been short. As the new army commander Lt General Jagath Jayasuriya has emphasised the army needs to be trained with greater discipline and professionalism to make it fit a first rate fighting force for conventional operations. This is usually an ongoing process in the army and that should take priority.

The President and the armed forces have developed a symbiotic relationship. And this has introduced a subtle element of politicisation within the armed forces. And the Fonseka affair has introduced seeds of division within the army. This coupled with politicisation of armed forces could be used by unscrupulous commanders to act as a pressure group on the functioning of democratic governments. It would also affect the growth of the army as a disciplined conventional force to effectively take part in a regional security set up.

India

Although India had adopted a cautious policy of support to the President, he has not fulfilled his promises to India on taking action to devolve powers by implementing the 13th amendment. This has downgraded his credibility among the ruling coalition in India. Apparently for reasons of political expediency he has overlooked India s support as an essential element in Sri Lanka s strategic capabilities.

From Indian point of view, there are a few disturbing trends in Rajapaksa s foreign policy dispensations. One is the slow drift towards China and possibly Iran for reasons of economic support and assistance. While a slow increase in Chinese influence in Sri Lanka is inevitable, its potential to destabilise the power equation in Indian Ocean region and India s immediate neighbourhood (area of strategic influence in military parlance) cannot be denied. This is likely to come under close scrutiny of both India and the U.S.

A second aspect is Rajapaksa s continued casual attitude to public sentiments in India, particularly Tamil Nadu, on devolution of powers to Tamils. Though this is no more a major political issue in India, it could be leveraged by extreme Tamil elements to keep the flame of Tamil insurgency flickering in the minds of Sri Lanka Tamils. It can also be taken advantage of by pro-LTTE politicians of Tamil Nadu when the local political climate suits such a development. With coalition politics ruling the roost in New Delhi, India-Sri Lanka relations have the potential to sour.

In view of this New Delhi will have to take a re-look at its Sri Lanka policy and approach it afresh to achieve a win-win situation for both countries.

The threat to internal stability in Sri Lanka is mainly from unresolved ethnic confrontation. For historical and geographic reasons it is closely related to the strategic relationship between India and Sri Lanka. This will involve helping Sri Lanka maintain its unity while resolving the ethnic issue to the satisfaction of all communities. As Sri Lanka now has a strong armed force, it is essential that India and Sri Lanka closely coordinate the long term strategies for security of the two countries and Indian Ocean Region. Thus it is essential India builds a meaningful relationship with President Rajapaksa s government which is likely to rule for another seven years. This cannot come about unless the ethnic issue is resolved to create a win-win situation within a reasonable time frame.

The time for implementation of 13th amendment even with additional palliatives is well past and it is unlikely to satisfy all parties. It is essential for India to take two initiatives to bring ethnic amity and normalcy. It can use its good offices with Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora to open a positive dialogue with Sri Lanka government while prevailing upon President Rajapaksa to come up with a political agenda for implementation without any more delay. Secondly, extend large scale aid and credit for the reconstruction and development of war ravaged north and east to enable speedy return to normal life in these provinces. This would create a positive stake for Tamils in political participation to ease ethnic tensions to carry out development of northern and eastern provinces.

Although this analysis has not considered the trade and economic aspects, these are key issues that could affect future strategic relations of the country. The Sri Lankan proposal for a road bridge between Sri Lanka and India made by the late Lakshman Kadirgamar is worthy of consideration. This could help the development of backward areas of Tamil Nadu as well as Sri Lanka north.

SriLankan Airlines has evoked much admiration and a sense of national pride amongst the public. It had much to do with the media publicity about the achievements of the all female flying crew at SriLankan Airlines . Women are proud of Captain Anusha Siriratne, UL 4 Senior First Officer Roshani Jinasena, Senior First Officer Chamika Rupasinghe and Junior First Officer Madini Chandradasa. Why did such exciting news not reach us earlier?

News about the female crew invading a male dominated profession by sheer perseverance training and pursuit of merit is indeed a historical achievement in Sri Lanka by any means. As Sri Lanka understands cadet pilot training, for quite a long period, had been strictly the career abode of males. Or was it that there were no female takers in this field?

Having commended these young achievers let us dive into memory and the new aspirations in the 20th and the 21st Century. Several Airlines round the world do have large numbers of Stewardesses. They are images of fashionable attraction to passengers and distinguish themselves in the traditional role of caring, serving, and nursing (on call) for flight passengers.

In most Asian countries including Sri Lanka, pursuing careers such as Pilots Training is a daring move for the average young woman. Therefore pioneer efforts of this nature shall emerge as role models in Sri Lanka to attract young women not only to make them pursue air careers in the future but also to create a wave of enthusiasm and bring science and technology closer to their career pursuits. Several career guidance workshops conducted in schools in a variety of career fields have brought unbelievable results.

Asia is well-known for its patriarchal structures and patriarchal leanings both within the family and outside, in place of employment, hierarchical institutions and even in media programs Women s capacities are often devalued. In job seeking women resist science and technical related jobs due to lack of confidence.

In recent times however we see a positive change. Long-term research in technology and other sciences that seemed impossible or almost a dream for women is changing the picture. The main factor for this condition is lack of access to equal opportunities.

The UN Women s Day theme Equal Rights Equal opportunities and progress for all in the Sri Lanka scenario very less attention is paid to this issue.

Patriarchy, patriarchal mindset and domination is a lens that keeps opportunity and achievement out of focus. It defines men as the standard of humanity. And woman is often something slightly less than that. Male is the centre of attention and women occupy margins - like it or not.

This if at all would not be so for a small minority. However within the administration, hierarchical institutions, media and political decision making level marginalization towards women give rise to unequal treatment and injustice. In such a context women s potential cannot be mobilized.

It is worthy to note that the National Women s Commission in UK took note of this situation two decades ago and appointed committees to design guidelines and strategies to encourage schools and young women to help discover their talents and potentials directed towards the world of science and technology.

This paid dividends when the NCW Report was sent to the Manpower Services Commission. Catch them young for new roles was the theme. Equal opportunities should be available to young people of both sexes and that they should be educated together on courses within each project. Care should be taken to avoid sex stereotyping.

The aim of equal opportunities and the criteria for doing so was welcomed under Technical and Vocational Training Initiatives .

We invite the SriLankan Airlines women achievers / role models to initiate a career guidance program at regular intervals annually for the youth and make such pioneer careers attractive to our women.

Such effective programs will convince both the youth and career teachers, that achieving modern engineering science and technology positions is quite different from the picture normally held by the public.