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Fernando had delivered his bomb load at Thamilselvam s hideout seconds after Hendawitharane. They (Fernando and Hendawitharane) were among many officers and men, who contributed to Sri Lanka s triumph over the LTTE.

Jet squadrons and Mi 24 helicopter gunships carried out over 3,000 missions during Eelam War IV. Of them, some 1,900 targets were taken mostly in the Vanni theatre under difficult circumstances due to the presence of civilians. The SLAF also transported about a million personnel, airlifted about 10 million kgs and evacuated 21,000 casualties during this period.

First serving Air Chief Marshal Goonetileke said the Tigers could have been brought to their knees had the government ignored the civilian factor. The soft-spoken SLAF Chief said that President Mahinda Rajapaksa had been firm about his decision that civilians shouldn t be harmed even if the forces had to miss taking a positively identified enemy target.

The LTTE and a section of the media always targeted the SLAF. They alleged that the SLAF had cluster ammunition in its arsenal, targeted civilian infrastructure, including schools, and deployed Pakistani fighter pilots in its campaign.

Commenting on the political leadership given by the President, he said that his ability to win public support for the war effort was remarkable. Unlike his predecessors, he was able to realise his dream of defeating LTTE terrorism, he said. Recollecting the difficulties experienced by the Rajapaksa administration at the beginning of its military campaign, Goonetilike said the President had gradually won the backing of the people.

The President s political leadership and war veteran Gotabhaya Rajapaksa s role in the overall war effort had been of critical importance, he said.

The SLAF s strategy had been two-fold. The SLAF was responsible for conducting operations in support of the SLA and SLN and also providing required transport facilities and medical evacuations.

Secondly, the SLAF had directed an offensive targeting the enemy s fighting capacity as well as its leadership. The second part had been an essential component of the overall strategy.

The air campaign was conducted under trying conditions. One of the major problems had been a shortage of the required number of pilots to conduct an intensified campaign. At one point, there had been 16 pilots to fly Kfirs (6 aircraft), MIG 27s (5 aircraft) and F7 (5 aircraft). There had been 20 pilots for Mi 24 helicopter gunships. But the SLAF gradually improved the situation to meet the challenging task.

The LTTE had a range of anti-aircraft weapons in its arsenal including mobile anti-aircraft guns also known as peddle guns acquired from China and surface to air missiles. The LTTE had hit some of the Mi 24s engaged in operations but never managed to bring one down. Unfortunately the SLAF lost one Mi 24 months after the end of the war, flying over the South

The deployment of Israeli-built Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Beechcraft on surveillance missions facilitated the ground offensive. With a capacity to operate at any time of the day, the UAVs had provided the much needed intelligence to ground troops. The real time intelligence obtained by the SLAF had been simultaneously made available to security forces chiefs and the senior officers in charge of some of the fighting formations deployed on the war front.

During the CFA (Ceasefire Agreement) with the LTTE brokered by the Norwegians, the LTTE strongly objected to any form of air reconnaissance, particularly by UAVs. Once the SLAF spotted two fixed wing aircraft on the ground at Iranamadu, east of the A9 road but the CFA prevented the SLAF from bombing the place. Within three years after that the SLAF had succeeded in forming an air defence network. The LTTE mounted a series of sorties in the South and targets in the Northern and Eastern Provinces using Czechoslovakian built Zlin 143 fixed wing aircraft. Of them, the SLAF had shot down three in three separate confrontations. Once they almost succeeded in targeting the Katunayake-based jet squadrons. Had that happened, the war effort would have suffered a massive setback.

The SLAF had lost 38 pilots during the entire war. Among them were several commanding officers including Wing Commander Shirantha Goonetilike, Commanding Officer of the No 2 squadron. Shirantha, the elder brother of the SLAF Chief, had been one of the first victims of surface to air missile attacks. Their father Harry Goonetilike, a former SLAF Commander, was among the honest top brass, who didn t make money through fraudulent means.

The SLAF had lost about 25 per cent of pilots due to attacks and accidents. Although the loss of pilots and assets had been minimal during Eelam War IV, the SLAF had lost 62 aircraft during the entire war. The loss of several aircraft, particularly AN 32 transport aircraft during the Kumaratunga administration (95 and 96) was one of the worst periods in the war.

The SLN, too, received a tremendous support from the SLAF. The Sea Tigers received a heavy beating at the hands of the SLAF. According to SLAF headquarters, jet squadrons and Mi 24s destroyed 52 Sea Tiger craft, targeted enemy training facilities on 425 occasions and engaged 32 artillery points.

The MiG squadron engaged over 700 LTTE targets during the fourth stage of the Eelam War. The Opposition and a section of the media targeted the SLAF and the Defence Secretary over the acquisition of MiGs. They alleged it was influenced by financial benefits received by powers that be. The SLAF with available assets performed exceptionally well. During the entire war, the SLAF lost 38 pilots and 430 officers and other rankers. The number of wounded was estimated at around 350 during the entire war.

On a few occasions, the SLAF choppers landed in LTTE-held territory to evacuate LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols) operating deep inside enemy-held territory.

The Katunayake-based No 12 squadron comprises seven MiG 27s and one MiG 23 trainer acquired in two batches in 2000 and 2007. During Eelam War IV, No 12 squadron carried out 854 sorties. The squadron estimated the weight of ammunition used by MiGs during this period at 1,071 tons.

The SLAF used general purpose ammunition against targets, particularly buildings, while special ammunition (deep penetration bombs), were directed at runways. To target runways, the MiGs had dived and bombed at a height of about 100 metres flying at a speed of 1,000 kmph. Each bomb released at that height had been fitted with a parachute to ensure flying shrapnel wouldn t hit the bomber.

Although the SLAF targeted LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on several occasions, he and his family survived only to be shot on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon last May. Once jet squadrons deployed five MiG 27s, four Kfirs and three F7s to engage two targets in the Vanni believing Prabhakaran could be at one of the locations. Seven jets targeted an LTTE hideout at Jayanthinagar, and the remaining aircraft bombed Puththukudirippu.

The SLAF received the support and expertise from Pakistan, China, India, Russia and Israel to enhance jet operations.

In the final stages of the ground battles on the Vanni east front, Goonetileke had stationed two MiGs at China Bay base for about three weeks. Had the Sea Tigers made an attempt to rescue Prabhakaran and his chief lieutenants, the SLAF would have swung into action. Their presence at China Bay would have given the SLAF a shorter reaction time.

Due to failure on the part of successive governments as well as SLAF top brass, the SLAF never acquired jets nor UAVs which would have given the country a definite edge over the LTTE. But even after Kfirs and MiGs were acquired in 1996 and 2000 along with UAVs in 1996, the SLAF did not impress until Goonetilike stepped in.

Sri Lanka acquired Italian-built Siai Marchettis, a light attack aircraft in 1985. It was capable of carrying just two 50 kg bombs. Argentine-built Pucaras joined the fleet in 1993 but were grounded in 1995 following the introduction of shoulder-fired heat seeking missiles.

Since the acquisition of Kfirs in 1996, the multi role aircraft had played a pivotal role in the war against the LTTE. Although a computerised bombing programming system was available with Kfirs, bombs had to be released manually.

Had Sri Lanka retained a jet capability after phasing out Hunting Percival jet provost MK 3 A and MiG 15 UTI and MiG 17 instead of going for Siai Marchettis and Pucaras, the LTTE wouldn t have lasted over three decades. This shortcoming was similar to Sri Lanka s unpardonable failure to acquire off-shore patrolling capacity to engage LTTE ships on the high seas.

Sri Lanka acquired two pairs of Chinese F7s in 1991 and used them against the LTTE. In January 2008, the SLAF took delivery of four F7 GS, the most sophisticated jet in Sri Lanka s arsenal today with in-built air interception radar. It could also carry four heat seeking missiles and no other jet in service with the SLAF had this capability.

The SLAF formed No 5 squadron to meet the threat posed by the Air Tigers. The squadron comprises eight F7s (two types). No 5 squadron carried out about 400 missions in Eelam War IV.

Before the deployment of F7 GS, the Air Tigers had carried out five strikes. Wing Commander Sampath Wickremeratne, the then Commanding officer of the No 5 squadron is credited with the shooting down of the first LTTE aircraft over Iranapalai with a Chinese heat seeking missile as the enemy plane was returning to its base following the attack on Vavuniya. Following the end of the war, a part of the No 5 squadron had been moved to China Bay.

The SLAF bases are located at Katunayake, China Bay, Ratmalana, Anuradhapura, Vavuniya and Hingurakgoda. There are three Special Operations Groups based at Vanni, Trincomalee and Peraru. It maintains stations in Colombo, Diyatalawa, Ekala, Palaly, Ampara, Sigiriya and Palavi. There are units at Morawewa, Batticaloa, Weerawila, Koggala, Katukurunda, Meerigama and Bandaranaike International Airport.

Today, the SLAF is over 30,000 strong with a sizeable ground deployment in different sectors. During the war, the SLAF took over some areas to allow the Army to move troops elsewhere. The SLAF Regiment, now a force to be reckoned with, is responsible for security at all bases, stations and units. The Regiment includes Special Forces and is responsible for turning out a range of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) and training security forces personnel in bomb disposal.

The Hingurakgoda-based Mi 24 helicopter gunship squadron, too, played a vital role with nearly 400 missions in the Northern and Eastern theatres. Known as the No 09 squadron, it had caused devastating losses in coordinated attacks directed at fortified LTTE positions situated close to forward location of own troops. Mi 24s had been hit on many occasions, maybe about 35 instances, during the entire offensive. Some times, damaged choppers had to touch down in areas where fighting was raging, but its engineering section had always responded swiftly and decisively to any emergency.

The Mi-24 squadron engaged targets right across the Vanni theatre from the north-western coast to the north-eastern coast. A range of powerful armaments, enhanced technology, technical support and most importantly, freedom to coordinate missions with field commanders paved the way for the squadron s success.

The squadron mounted four missions to evacuate LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols) teams sent on daring missions into LTTE-held territory. The LRRP teams took on high profile targets deep inside enemy held territory both east and west of the A9. On four occasions, the army called for swift evacuation of LRRP teams and the No 09 squadron met the challenging task.

LRRP teams played a played a pivotal role in then army chief General Sarath Fonseka s overall strategy to destroy the LTTE.

The No 9 squadron established on November 23, 1995 with three choppers acquired on a wet lease basis from Ukraine subsequently grew to 14 machines over the years.

During Eelam War IV, the squadron, had fired 19,762 80 mm rockets. Among the weapons available to the squadron were 23 mm twin barrel system and 12.7 mm Gatlin and 30 mm cannon. They also had 250 kg bombs. The squadron also caused considerable damage to the Sea Tigers.

He said that the 80 mm rockets with a three km range had a devastating effect on the LTTE. A Mi 24 crew comprises a Captain, co-pilot and two door gunners.

The electronics specialists of the squadron, had kept the avionics systems in shape in the midst of logistical maintenance challenges.

The SLAF s objectives could not have been realised without light and heavy transport squadrons (No 8 and No 2), No 6 Mi 17 squadron and No 7 comprising Bell 212s and Bell Jet Ranger meeting their tasks. The pilot training wings, too, played a significant role to meet a challenging task. Despite severe constrains, primarily due to lack of assets, the transport squadrons helped the war effort. Perhaps their task was far more difficult than various attack squadrons. In the absence of an overland route to Jaffna since June 1990 after the LTTE smashed Army bases north of Vavuniya, the SLAF and the Navy had maintained supply routes.

The SLAF established No 32 Land based Air Defence Wing in 2006 in response to the threat posed by Air Tigers. This came in the wake of deployment of Indian-built radar to help detect Air Tigers under an accelerated plan to neutralise the threat. The SLAF subsequently acquired state-of-the-art Chinese radar to further enhance its capability. Among the weapons in its arsenal were costly shoulder fired heat seeking missiles, though it may never get an opportunity to fire one again.

To the SLAF s credit, contingents are accommodated in Sri Lankan military missions deployed in Haiti under UN Command.

I would like to end this piece thanking Group Captain Janaka Nanayakkara, who handled the media exceptionally well during the war after succeeding Group Captain Ajantha Silva. Both officers met a challenging task.

Sri Lanka has decided to lift restrictions on private flying and open up her skies for recreational aviation to lure tourists after the end of a 30-year war, a senior official said.

Director-general of civil aviation Parakrama Dissanayake said the decision was taken at a meeting between civil aviation authorities and the air force last week.

Dissanayake said the authorities had been getting inquiries from tourists keen on bringing their own equipment for use in the island.

'Tourists have been asking whether they can bring hot air balloons and hang gliders,' he said. 'Till now the answer has been 'No'. But now we want to allow it.' The country needs to promote recreational aviation activities, Dissanayake told.

'With the end of the war we need to come in line with other countries and let people use the air space for recreational activities.'

These include hot-air ballooning, use of hang-gliders and powered-gliders, and flying micro-light aircraft and model aircraft.

Hot-air ballooning was allowed a few years ago but restricted to certain parts of the island. Dissanayake said they want to revive an 'open skies' scheme started in November 2006 in the island's south and extend it to the entire island, although some airspaces over certain areas like defence installations and ports would still be restricted.

Restrictions on recreational aviation were imposed as the threat posed by Tamil Tiger rebels as war intensified.

Private flying was banned and even commercial pilot training suspended for some years after the Tigers acquired their own light aircraft which were used for bombing on a few occasions.

The Tigers were decimated by government forces in May 2009, ending the 30-year war, and leading to a marked revival in tourist arrivals.

'The relaxation should happen very soon - in the next couple of months,' Dissanayake said.

Crowned as a non military operation, Sri Lanka s first Coast Guard has was formally established on March 4, 2010 following Parliament s approval of the Coast Guard Act. The Coast Guard will be considered a non military enterprise, committed to enforcing law and ensuring safety, security, and cleanliness in Sri Lanka s waters

Prior to its inauguration, the Sri Lankan Navy had been the chief government apparatus functioning on the country s seas. With the multitude of issues facing ocean security, the Coast Guard will be an important entity to ease the undertakings of the Navy. Since the conclusion of the war in May of 2009, it appears the government is increasing its funding towards non military departments.

Sri Lanka has a sea area 21 times the land area, 'which inherits high potentials', says the Rear Admiral Daya Darmapriya. The Coast Guard will protect the coastal belt around the country and maritime zone in the extent of 21,700 square kilometres and maritime economic zone of 465,800 square kilometres within the country s territorial water.

Sri Lanka is located in a unique geographical centre of shipping routes and nautical traffic. Unfortunately, its central location also make the waters in its vicinity a hub for illegal maritime activities and it will be that task of the Coast Guard to maintain order in such situations. The department will work to assist in counter smuggling operations, impede illegal fishing, identify piracy, and curb human trafficking efforts, he explained.

Human trafficking issues have been particularly straining on Sri Lanka s relations with countries such as Italy, Indonesia, and Australia as migrants attempt to enter their soil illegally. The Coast Guard will have the ability to stop, check, search, arrest, and prosecute individuals found conducting illegally within Sri Lanka s nautical boundaries, he said.

In addition to its work suppressing illegal pursuits, the Coast Guard will respond to calls of lost ships by conducting search and rescue efforts. They have also recognised the importance of maintaining a clean sea by limiting pollution and reacting to environmental crises such as oil spills, Rear Admiral Darmapriya noted.

The Coast Guard operation commences with 200 members and four vessels, which have been borrowed from the Sri Lankan Navy. Rear Admiral Darmapriya recognised that these numbers are a mere starting point and will not be sufficient to their overall operations. He expects that over the next few months they will add 900 sailors, 100 officers, and several more vessels. Currently, there are bases in Colombo and Mirissa but is planning additional bases within the next two years. The Coast Guard is hoping to receive international assistance in to help fund these undertakings, possibly from Australia or Germany.

Pakistan and the U.S. should change the thrust of their anti-Taliban campaign, broadening the fight to defeat terrorism completely, they said. Pakistan should wage war against militants in the same way that Sri Lanka pursued a total victory against the Tamil Tigers last year, Associated Press quoted tribal leader Syed Alam Khan Mehsud as saying