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The LTTE believed SLSF were weak and felt it was opportune to improve their ground and bargaining positions by having a crack at two strategic targets: Trincomalee Harbour and Jaffna, both under Government control.
Clearly the LTTE made a grave miscalculation. Its grand offensive, ranging from Muttur to Jaffna was far too ambitious and it seriously underestimated the SLA. If Maavil Aru was the feint for Muttur, were operations in the South around Trincomalee a diversion for the main attack against Jaffna? One will not know the military sense of the war anytime soon.What the LTTE is relearning is that it does not have the wherewithal to capture Jaffna. After an epic victory at Elephant Pass, it was almost there in 2000. Even as the SLA panicked, Karuna in command of the reserve brigade was inexplicably never launched!
Despite a four and a half year lull of a CFA, six years on the Tigers could not gain even a foothold in Jaffna, leave alone cause an uprising, a feared threat. Gone are the 1990s when the LTTE could wipe out SLA garrisons like those at Mullaithivu, Pooneryn and Elephant Pass and capture their tanks and guns. The defeat in Muttur reflected the division of assets, caused by the split of the key Karuna faction in the east. The mystery will remain about LTTE non-use of missiles and the Air Force. The new crop of fighters in the Tigers Army are proving less proficient and motivated than their forbears especially in conventional battles. Yet, there is still no one to match their prowess in improvising Claymore mines and suicide bombings. So, for the moment, LTTE ought to stick to guerrilla fighting.
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