 Return to LNP
This News Site:
Lanka Newspapers is the largest Sri Lanka News forum online. Thousands of Sri Lankans from around the world gather here daily to discuss current news events of Sri Lanka. Join Today!
|
|
|
A time to kill, a time to regret
Sunday, 2 July 2006 - 8:33 PM SL Time
|
|
|
ON JUNE 26, 2006, an LTTE suicide bomber on a motorcycle killed Major General Parami Kulatunge, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Sri Lankan Army, and two of his aides in a suburb of Colombo. The General`s car was burnt to cinders. Even as Sri Lanka`s President Mahinda Rajapakse paid homage to him the next day, LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham in an interview to an Indian TV channel was expressing half-hearted `regret` for another LTTE suicide killing ' Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination in May 1991. Describing it as `a great tragedy, a monumental, historical tragedy,` he asked India to forgive and forget to build a new relationship with the LTTE. The grotesque juxtaposition of the two events aptly illustrates the LTTE`s doublespeak. It always finds `a time to kill and a time to regret` at the same time.
Dr. Balasingham in his interview never said in clear terms that the LTTE regretted killing Rajiv Gandhi. His carefully couched statement made no firm commitments. He said, `I think we are prepared to build up a new understanding, a new relationship with the government of India provided she makes a positive gesture. It`s up to them because we have already pledged that we will never do anything or act anything inimical to the geopolitical interest of India, so there is a possibility of India playing a positive active role in bringing a resolution to this conflict.` Is there anything clear in this exercise'
Substantively Dr. Balasingham`s statement added nothing new because even as early as April 2002, LTTE chief Prabakaran described Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination as `a painful experience` (this would be a more accurate translation of his description in Tamil `thunbiyal anubhavam` than the widely used `tragic incident`). But there are other connotations to Dr. Balasingham`s statement.
On the same day, S.P. Tamilchelvan, political affairs head of the LTTE, in an interview to Singapore daily Tamil Murasu said, `If one looks at it from one`s individual interest, there will be no close relations between the LTTE and the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu. But looking at it from the point of view of the people`s welfare, we will surely extend a hand of friendship.` This was another muted appeal to the Tamil Nadu Government.
Is the LTTE prepared to turn over a new leaf with India`s help, to bring peace in the island now on the brink of war'
It does not seem so, if we see the context of the two statements. Last week, President Rajapakse is reported to have asked two Tamil journalists to persuade the LTTE leadership to talk directly with him rather than through the Norwegian mediators to prevent the outbreak of full-scale war. The Tigers did not accept the offer. `We have no trust at all in the Sri Lankan Government and will continue with the Norwegian channel,` head of the Tiger peace secretariat S. Puleedevan told the media. This was followed by the killing of Maj. Gen. Kulatunge. It is clear that the LTTE has hardly any thoughts of peace.
After the Geneva talks of February 2006, the LTTE has effectively scuttled the mediation effort. It has focussed on two issues ' reasserting its claim as a de facto state for parity status with the Government of Sri Lanka with rights over air and sea space, and disarming the paramilitary as it calls Karuna and his breakaway faction. Following the European Union ban on the LTTE in May 2006, it has been under tremendous international pressure.
It has practically neutralised the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission operations by objecting to the continued presence of monitors from three EU nations. It had succeeded in provoking the Government of Sri Lanka to retaliate following its large-scale attacks on the Sinhala population and high security targets such as the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka. Sri Lanka retaliated with air strikes and artillery bombardment on LTTE positions. This has driven hordes of Tamil refugees to the safety of Tamil Nadu. As a result, New Delhi has called upon Colombo to refrain from air and artillery bombardment of inhabited areas and work on reviving the peace process.
Two aspects could affect the LTTE`s war capabilities ' logistic support and Indian military intervention. The ban on the LTTE in the EU and most of the Western countries has made logistic support from Tamil Nadu crucial. Similarly, overt or covert Indian armed intervention in support of Sri Lanka would affect the fortunes of the LTTE. Thus Tamil Nadu has a pivotal role to play in the LTTE`s scheme of things. As the refugee inflow increased, almost all political parties in Tamil Nadu have called for Indian action to protect the Tamils.
However, the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), a junior partner in the coalition at the Centre, the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) led by the LTTE`s old favourite Vaiko, and the Dalit Panthers of India (DPI) have tried to paint Sri Lanka`s operations against the LTTE as a war against Tamils. They have also strongly objected to any supply of military equipment to Sri Lanka at this juncture.
These developments must have encouraged the LTTE to take a fresh look at the India card. With the DMK in power in Tamil Nadu as well as at the Centre, presumably the LTTE has hopes of moulding any Indian initiative on Sri Lanka to its advantage.
But the DMK leader and Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, M. Karunanidhi, has taken a mature stand on the problem. He has made it clear that his policy was the same as that of the Government of India.
Dr. Balasingham`s statement was made perhaps to boost the sagging morale of the Tamil public, both at home and abroad, as another round of Eelam war appears imminent. It could also be targeted at the audience in Tamil Nadu. The LTTE`s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi killed any sympathy for it in the State. Even the few Tamil Nadu leaders supporting the LTTE are aware of this. Dr. Balasingham`s apology was probably aimed at helping them to vindicate their support for the LTTE. However, it is doubtful whether it would make any headway among the people. All the major parties, including the DMK and its archrival the AIADMK, are unlikely to bail out the LTTE.
There is an urgent need for India to look at its future course of action vis-à-vis Sri Lanka carefully. Any eruption of full-scale war will be against not only Sri Lanka`s interest, but India`s as well. Political and strategic considerations induced India to intervene in 1987 in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately for the Tamils in whose support India intervened, its involvement ended in a messy conflict with the LTTE. Since then, the international strategic equations as well as capabilities in the Indian Ocean region have changed. So India`s military intervention directly in the current phase of confrontation is not warranted.
India`s role
But there are other strong reasons for India to play a more active role. Firstly, India has a moral responsibility to ensure that the Tamils get their just rights. Commitment to the Tamil cause had been one of the pillars of India`s Sri Lanka policy. Any outbreak of war in Sri Lanka would further vitiate the relations between the two ethnic communities, making life more difficult for everyone.
Over the years, among Sinhalas there has been a growing awareness of the Tamil issue and of the need for finding a peaceful solution. Eruption of full-scale war would not only snuff out this constituency but also encourage the rise of Sinhala chauvinism waiting in the wings. Moreover, there has been a huge growth in India`s economic interests in Sri Lanka. Its two-way trade with the country has flourished particularly after the signing of a free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. Large-scale Indian investments have been made there particularly in the petroleum and plantation industries. This relationship has to be protected and nurtured.
India articulated its support for the Tamil cause through the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987. Though Sri Lanka accepted it, even the limited devolution of powers to the Tamils under the Accord has not been implemented so far. This could be a starting point for unilateral action by Sri Lanka, which could be provided all the help needed to enable it to issue a time-bound plan for further devolution of powers.
Short of direct military intervention, India can take a number of actions. These could be boosting exchange of intelligence and information, providing spares, equipment, arms, ammunition supply, and technical support to the Sri Lankan armed forces, service facilities and radar support for the air force, active naval patrolling to spot and apprehend LTTE ships transporting supplies and prevent infiltration, radio, satellite and aerial surveillance of suspected areas, etc. This would send a clear warning to the LTTE. Perhaps for political reasons, there had been a lack of clarity on India`s stand on Sri Lanka.
In order to discourage fringe parties supporting the LTTE and to inform the public, it is time India came out with a white paper on its stand on Sri Lanka. It could reaffirm India`s continued commitment to the cause of Tamils rights and the support for a united Sri Lanka.
|
|
|
|
