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Probable LTTE Strtegies After Hero`s Day
Monday, 27 November 2006 - 1:56 AM SL Time | | |
In the decade long war in Sri Lanka, curbing LTTE influence in the East would be of paramount importance. In this perspective, prevailing situation in Batticaloa is advantageous to SL armed forces - a situation which could be turned in to a desired / decisive victory especially since a considerable segment of Trinco-Batti A9 route stretches through cleared areas. However, delays occurring due to bureaucratic, admin and operational constraints may weaken this advantageous state. Only ?dark? segment of about 20km stretching from Mahindhapura to Mankerny presently controlled by LTTE need to be retaken which could be used as a launching pad, not only Military but several Political strategies.
Destroying the artillery guns which were brought to the east by the LTTE will be the decisive step if not the first stage of taking full control over the un-cleared area. Losing that fire-power amounts to LTTE losing their ability to respond or to retaliate military in an effective manner. The second step should be the opening of the route stretching from Kokkuthudai in the eastern costal area till Panama. This route would be comparatively easier to defend since, the possibility of co-existence between Army on landside and Navy in seaside is greater.
Thirdly, with the opening of the route mentioned above, range of stabilizing measures need to be undertaken which eventually would facilitate holding of the election for the Eastern Provincial council. In a more stable / Government controlled atmosphere, TNA will have a much lesser or no chance of securing significant number of seats as earlier. Obviously, involvement of Karuna fraction would be a decisive factor, and the freedom expression / voting to Sinhalese and Muslim civilians would further undermine LTTE`s calculated political maneuvers.
However, it`s worthy to note that any military operation to take Vakaraya and to destroy operational & logistic bases would definitely induce LTTE to intensify their activities in the road sector stretching from Chenkalady to Mahaoya.
Breakaway of the Karuna faction from LTTE and the legislative de-merger of East from North were previously unthinkable possibilities but now a plain reality. With this positive environment, other difficulties do appear to be manageable and if the government manages to establish effective Provincial Councils with majority members from none LTTE fronts, it would amount to collapse of Elam concept in East. It`s worthy to note that the majority of the eastern population is non-Tamils. Establishment of Eastern Provincial Councils and the connected processes enumerated above would not only wrap up military setbacks to LTTE but also prove that they are not the ?sole representatives of the Tamils in Sri Lanka? anymore. Further, this would offer anther positive factor of limiting the bargaining strength of LTTE to only Vanni area. These observations expressed by ICSD are in par with the views which former Generals such as General A M U Seneviratne, General Kobbekaduwa and General. Wimalarathne proposed to brake up the back born of Ethno Tamil state called Elam.
It would be expected that even with the spread of the rumor on this perspective, LTTE will commence launching of a series of small counter operations from the Vakaraya area [As what they are doing with daily Artillery and Mortar Fire].
Further, ICSD perceives the possibility of LTTE attacking Jaffna city and its suburbs in near future. According to our sources, LTTE is planning offensive operations in Kilali, Nagarkovil, Mannar and Vavuniya simultaneously. Accordingly certain infantry brigades are currently undergoing training with the aim of occupying Chavakachcheri via Kilali-lagoon, so that they could block the all supplies to Muhamalai, this was the operational strategy used by the LTTE in successful takeover of Elephant Pass (EPS), where they cut of the ground supply route from Kilali up to Iyyakachchi by separating 54 Brigade. If the supply line to Muhammala FDL ceases, there`s a possibility of losing the supply from Point-Pedro with simultaneous collapse of Nagarkovil FDL. These conditions would amount to LTTE separating the areas of Vallikamam and Vadamarachchi from Thennamarachchi.
Along with the above mentioned strategic plan, it could be expected that LTTE would use their Makkal Paddey force to de stabilize the security in Jaffna, wile the LTTE move their offences towards Chavakachcheri. (Makkal Paddey = civil defense force, which was foamed to carry out small scale distraction and destabilizing attacks on security forces, ICSD would soon publish a report on the making & unmaking of Makkal Paddey)
A conducive environment for the Makkal Paddey was created by the Government by closing the entry point of Muhamali, which resulted a considerable shortage of essential items for civilians in Jaffna peninsula. Attempts made by the Government to remedy the situation did not reach acceptable levels due to lack of facilities required for such massive logistical operations and also due to ineffective bureaucracies in some Government departments. Whilst Government failed to publicize it`s genuine efforts and progress in this regard, LTTE made maximum use of the situation internationally and locally. Benefits of international propaganda campaign were of two folds to LTTE.
1. Pinning a bad name on the Government by saying Government is using Tamil civilians as a shield to pressurize the LTTE.
2. Fresh & emotionally felt issue to address the Tamil Diaspora which enables LTTE to collect money for above planned military campaign with the disguise of Liberating Tamils in the peninsula from starvation.
Local benefits come in three ways:
1. Create hatred towards Army and the Government in the minds of Tamil People in Jaffna
2. Use above mindset to recruit / mobilize more Makkal Paddey for many future attacks (usually Claymore and Hand Grenade attacks)
3. Environment for Local and International NGOs and Human rights watch-dogs to criticize government
Our sources reveal that the capability of Makkal Paddey in Jaffna suburbs is increasing and a possibility for an series of small attacks is real. If LTTE succeeds in doing so, it would affect the moral among security forces and specially creating a sense of insecurity in the built-up area.
ICSD predicts, after the Hero`s days speech, probable offensive towards Chavakachcheri could commence on 1st week of December and last till 2nd week of Jan. LTTE would anyway limit the duration of offensive to around 8 weeks due to international constraints and to bad whether conditions.
ICSD predictions with regard to Mannar coastal belt holds true. Last month Navy destroyed 2 large sea trollers carrying heavy weaponry in the Talei-mannar- and Kadireveli seas. Subsequently, Navy divers found 27 ammunitions of 120mm artillery. LTTE seems to have senesced the possibility of Governments` opening an alternative Main supply route (MSR) to Jaffna via Manar-Pooneryn road. Launching of attacks in Mannar area would thwart any move by the government to open the Mannar-Poonarine MSR.
ICSD also predicts the possibility of an LTTE attack on a Sinhalese village either in Trincomalee or Ampara. Amount 25-40 LTTE carders have been deployed in the ethno Tamil village of Ammbapali in order to launch an attack on Mihindhupura village which is situated in Trincomalee Horrow-pathana Road. In Ampara 11 villages are under this threat. They are, Waddagala, Lahugala, Panama, Pannalagama, Bakmitiyewa, Ekgaloya, Thottama, Bakkiella, Hulannuge, Wadinagala, and Govindupura. An unconfirmed report says that three 03 of LTTE consisting 30 each have been relocated from the LTTE Kanchikudichchi Aru camp to launch an attack.
Summery:
LTTE may launch an offensive via Kilali-lagoon to overrun Chavakachcheri by cutting off the supply to Muhamalai. They will launch simultaneous attacks on Mannar, Vavuniya, and Nagar Kovil which are small scale and diversionary.
LTTE will make good use the current food scarcity situation in Jaffna internationally & locally, coupled with series of initial attacks through Makkal Paddey in destabilizing Jaffna.
LTTE will possibly launch an attack to a Sinhala Village in the eastern province. If this fails, they will target home guards in a concentrated series of attacks not only in East but especially in Vauniya.
International Center for Strategic Defense (ICSD)
Colombo
26th November 2006. |
Source(s)
RapaSource/Sinhala.net |
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