|
|
LTTE: Back to terrorism
Full News Article
sk63
Senior Member
Joined: Mar 2005
Posts: 1001
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 21:54:15 GMT Report for Abuse
|
There are some decent members from the Tamil community who have the courage at least not to rejoice. They can not openly condemn for reasons one would understand. They can not rejoice because they are too decent to do that.
Then of course, every now and then, we have mentally retarded members who consider this a heroic act. I disagree. If this is an act of heroism (which is not) killing other civilians such as Mr. Sivaram, Mr. Nirmalalingam, Kaushalyan and many unknown Tamils would also be acts of heroism. Guess what, they are not. If any one thinks this was done by a hero, they are unknowngly acknowledging the killers of Mr. Sivaram, Kaushalyan etc also as heros.
So the question to those who call this a heroic act, do you think killing Kaushalyan and Mr. Sivaram is also a heroic act?
If it is not, how come this is a heroic act?
Grow up boys! There is a huge difference between freedom fighting and down right terrorism.
Moderated - Sunday, 14 August 2005 - 4:56 AM |
Peraboy
Joined: Aug 2005
Posts: 68
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 21:59:23 GMT Report for Abuse
|
CHAMI!
Read the today's Sunday Times article by Aththas.
Who saved SL army from Tiger offensive from Jaffna?
But, Actually Tigers stopped capturing Jaffna, because The first time after Rajiv killing, Indian foreign ministry directly (otherwise it would be indirectly) contacted Tigers, asking to stop the offensive on the humanitarian basis. tigers decided to take that chance as a good chance to have the indian contact and ban removed. ( if you want eveidence, i can post it). That was the story Aththas wrote at that time , Now he says LTTE got waring from India.
see part of his article...
Tiger guerrillas in Sri Lanka had launched 'Oyatha Alaikal' (or Unceasing Waves). That was the offensive to evict the security forces from the vast swathe of land they were controlling in the Wanni and their planned push to seize control of the Jaffna peninsula.
I was back in Colombo to cover the war and he was still in New Delhi recuperating. We kept regular telephone contact, speaking sometimes six to seven times a day. He was keen to know developments in the battlefronts of the north. I was keen to know how the Government was going to cope with the guerrilla onslaught and avert a possible fall of the Jaffna peninsula. There were fears that 40,000 troops would be under siege.
The days and nights that followed were history in the making. President Kumaratunga was away in London. Hence the tasks of mustering foreign help fell on Mr Kadirgamar. He was in touch with her as well as then Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte in Colombo. Then he was formulating his own action plan to avert a serious crisis.
I briefed him periodically on the progress of the fighting. He first met with New Delhi based ambassadors of some important countries including the United States and United Kingdom to brief them on developments.
As the fighting intensified, fears grew of a siege of the Jaffna peninsula by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). There were only two choices left - fight it out to a finish, or make a tactical withdrawal. The latter option meant the surrender of the Jaffna peninsula to the guerrillas. To fight, defence supplies were woefully inadequate. Making a tactical withdrawal involved a logistics nightmare.
The Jaffna peninsula was separated from the south by guerrilla controlled Wanni. That meant only a coastal evacuation was possible, for which resources to move 40,000 troops, was not available.
The situation was quite desperate. This is when Mr. Kadirgamar held talks with Indian authorities at the highest level. India ruled out any form of military intervention. The memories of the ignominious withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) following their bloodied nose during the 1987-90 stay in North and East Sri Lanka, were very much alive. But a well kept secret then was India's willingness to offer humanitarian assistance if it became necessary. This was in the form of ships to evacuate troops should the situation deteriorate to a point that India equally did not want to see Jaffna fall back into LTTE hands.
New Delhi had also taken note of the serious concerns expressed by Mr. Kadirgamar if Jaffna was to fall into guerrilla hands. Here again, there was another well kept secret. Indian authorities had made known to the LTTE, through their own channels, the serious consequences that would follow if they were to seize Jaffna peninsula. The warning had paid off. The guerrillas captured Elephant Pass, and reached Navatkuli, the gateway to Jaffna, but made no foray into the peninsula. His silent diplomacy had paid off. |
sk63
Senior Member
Joined: Mar 2005
Posts: 1001
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 22:19:27 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Dear Peraboy,
An interesting article. One part you missed out was the fact that the fire power of the army was boosted by the availablility of more weapons half way through the battle. That changed the balance of power drastically. You also forgot to mention the rapid withdrawal of the LTTE (some members were very rapid) when the SLA actually started using them. |
Peraboy
Joined: Aug 2005
Posts: 68
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 22:31:55 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Dear SK63!
After indian request, Tigers stopped the offensive. You miss the wood. I can give you some article( even by aththas).
Okay For your happiness, i agree that tigers ran away for the new artillary, then, what happened when the army use the newly acquired artillary in the Akkinikala operation?
Only lost of nearly 700 army men in one day battle! Please read articles about the debacle of Akknikala.
Please spent some time and try to read some defence article.
This is the theory, as your foreign advisors told, ' The one who hold elephanpass can simply overrun jaffna'
then, what Pirabakaran has in his mind?
Whoever might be in jaffna, politically Tigers controls Jaffna. What i am trying to say is this, even the 4th eelam war starts, Tigers is not going to touch Jaffna anymore.
Their all offensive would be in Trinco in first. |
Peraboy
Joined: Aug 2005
Posts: 68
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 22:37:04 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Dear SK63!
After indian request, Tigers stopped the offensive. You miss the wood. I can give you some article( even by aththas).
Okay For your happiness, i agree that tigers ran away for the new artillary, then, what happened when the army use the newly acquired artillary in the Akkinikala operation?
Only lost of nearly 700 army men in one day battle! Please read articles about the debacle of Akknikala.
Please spent some time and try to read some defence article.
This is the theory, as your foreign advisors told, ' The one who hold elephanpass can simply overrun jaffna'
then, what Pirabakaran has in his mind?
Whoever might be in jaffna, politically Tigers controls Jaffna. What i am trying to say is this, even the 4th eelam war starts, Tigers is not going to touch Jaffna anymore.
Their all offensive would be in Trinco in first. |
sk63
Senior Member
Joined: Mar 2005
Posts: 1001
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 22:44:34 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Dear Peraboy,
I dont think LTTE would be that stupid to start another war. There are many reasons for that.
They are trying hard to get international recognition. Firing the first bullet in a war would take them that much further from that dream (not to mention the bad press they are receiving after Mr. Kadirgamar).
Once a good war machine, three years of cease fire has taken the spirits away from the grass root level militants. I know that part you would deny. any soldier who is not in the thick of the battle field loses that spirit and LTTE is no exception.
As much as the LTTE brought weapons, so did the SLA. LTTE knows that only too well.
Give credit to their political hierarchy, they know Ealam is as it has always been a dream. Apart from public forums (where they collect money), they do not even talk about an Ealam any more.
In all likelihood, Ealam war 4 is not going to happen. If it does, god help North East people. |
sk63
Senior Member
Joined: Mar 2005
Posts: 1001
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 22:49:59 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Peraboy,
I also forgot to mention the military set back LTTE had with Karuna. Now dont jump the gun because I am no fan of Karuna. But it is undeniable that Karuna played a vital role in the LTTE terror machine. His departure caused the LTTE Eastern operation to fall apart. Let us face it, however distasteful for both of us, Karuna is a capable fighter.
Apart from the loss of his command, his departure caused many Eastern LTTE fighters to leave. Somewere killed by the LTTE.
As well Karuna himself killed some seriously good LTTE fighters who did not join him. One such fighter was Neelan (Ariampathy, Batti).
Whether you like it or not, LTTE is not the same as you are used to any more. I dont doubt for a moment their ability to fight. But now it has transformed from an efficient terror machine to a split outfit with shades of its former glory. This is not to suggest that the govt. can militarily defeat them. This is to suggest that the LTTE is not in the same level as it used to be. |
Peraboy
Joined: Aug 2005
Posts: 68
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 22:53:43 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Dear SK63!
Nobody wants war now.
But, as you think, SLA cannot do anything hereafter.
The death of Kathirkamar has greater lost for India than SL. He acted against western policy towards India. |
Peraboy
Joined: Aug 2005
Posts: 68
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 23:06:01 GMT Report for Abuse
|
What is the larger picture in Pirapakaran's mind
Daily Mirror - 9 March 2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The violence in Batticaloa and its border with Polonnaruwa is taking a momentum of its own and looks set to spiral out of control. But ultimately whether all this would lead to war is in the hands of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. War is their decision. People are fast losing a sense of the larger picture.
Sinhala nationalists who felt immensely let down by Karuna'signominious flight from Batticaloa last year are cheering that the renegade is back with a vengeance. Many enthusiastic punters in Colombo's opinion making circles are 'knowledgeably' betting on the 'dark horse' again.
This column tries deliberately to be the 'other voice' in this scene, out of tune with the litany that saturates the political atmosphere on the southern side of this island's ethnic divide, so that people see a need to hedge their bets on the ethnic question. It is easy to jump on the bandwagon by saying 'Pirapakaran is losing' or 'down with the Tigers', if one wants to be feted and quoted. This is immoral - particularly when we see an increasingly collective compulsion in the Sinhala polity to hear only what people want to hear about the ethnic conflict.
It suits the LTTE's strategic purpose that 'Col. Karuna Amman' (as he is respectfully addressed by his southern admirers) is running a sideshow in the remote villages on the Batticaloa-Polonnaruwa border -- one that is firing up the enthusiasm of those who would rather see the LTTE finished than give Tamils a decent political settlement.
The singular inability in the south to grasp the strategic picture, to miss the wood for the trees is bewildering.
Why didn't Pirapakaran press the advantage in Jaffna?
The din of fire crackers that greeted the capture of Jaffna drowned a lone voice that urged the south to consider the fact that the LTTE had withdrawn from Jaffna with all its military assets and that there is no victory in war unless one breaks the enemy's will to fight and/or destroy a significant part off his/her military assets.
Again, during Operation Jaya Sikurui, the larger picture was lost sight of, amidst the grandiose claims of General Anuruddha Ratwatte.
Speaking about his days as the overall commander of the LTTE troops that were facing Op. Jaya Sikurui in the latter part of 2001, at Thenaham in Karadiyanaaru, Karuna told a group of Batticaloa journalists whom he had invited for lunch that he had often urged Pirapaharan that the Tigers should unleash their recently enhanced artillery and heavy mortar firepower to stop the advance of the Sri Lanka army.
'Every time I asked him he told me to wait, that he would tell me when and where to strike with the big guns. Let them spread out, he would say. But we were worried that the army was getting too close to Puthukudiyiruppu and Mullaithivu. Then one day he called me to headquarters and showed me a point on the map. He gave me a time frame and asked me to make preparations for a concentrated attack there. He also instructed me to prepare regular units and auxiliary forces to hold and consolidate large areas in the Vanni. When we overran that point, the gains of Op. Jaya Sikurui started falling like nine pins. But again when we were on the verge of sweeping over all of Manal Aaru (Weli Oya) we got orders from headquarters to stop.
The Jeyanthan Regiment boys were a bit disappointed at this. He and the fellows at the military science division were always studying the larger picture,' said Karuna, proudly recounting his work with Pirapaharan during Op. Jaya Sikurui.
Karuna repeated the same story when he addressed a cheering audience in Oslo where he went to take part in peace talks in the Norwegian capital in December 2002.
Today, it is taken for granted that the LTTE did not walk into Jaffna because it was driven back by the army with the Multi-barrel Rocket Launchers it got from Pakistan. This is a fallacy. LTTE forces were at the gates of Jaffna months before the multi-barrels arrived. The order to stop came from the LTTE headquarters in Vanni. Why didn't Pirapakaran press the advantage in Jaffna? That the LTTE had reachedthe end of its tether militarily is not the whole explanation if one were to consider the manner in which the Tigers counterattacked the massive Op. Agni Khiela in April 2001.
What was the larger picture in Pirapakaran's mind that made him forego Jaffna or at least a large chunk of it? We don't know. But it is obvious that he had a political aim in mind. After all, in the larger picture, war is politics by other means.
So what is the greater strategic perspective in which the LTTE locates the current incidents in the east? What is it from which this sideshow is distracting the south?
We do not know exactly. But we may have a hunch from certain recent developments which are of concern to the army.
Balraj, the LTTE's most senior military commander, has been moved to the Vakarai region. Sri Lanka military intelligence thought he was killed by the tsunami after his personal communications went silent for five days from December 26, 2004.
But he was there in Vakarai to greet Thamilchelvan and show him around when the LTTE's political division leader visited the area last month.
Balraj has been in Vakarai for three months. What is the LTTE's most experienced and senior commander who taught war tactics and strategy to Karuna doing in a remote part of Batticaloa? The army's Psychological Operations Directorate might come up with the fantastic explanation that he had been sent to the area because of differences with Pirapakaran - like the puerile fabrication about Soosai. But wise men in the Sri Lanka army who are not swayed by the oft shifting winds of media moods in the south are quietly looking at the strategic possibilities arising from Balraj's stay in the Vakarai - particularly because it is a key sector of the soft underbelly of the port of Trincomalee.
That Pirapakaran has sent three of his most important commanders to the north and south of Trincomalee is of greater concern to the military than the sideshow on the Polonnaruwa-Batticaloa border. A fourth senior commander has been moved to a strategic point in the east with his command and control systems and troops.
The military has taken precautions by sending more artillery to Minneriya. Troops are now undergoing special combat training there.
What is the larger picture that Pirapakaran has in mind while the south is entertained by Karuna?
But the drama in Batticaloa-Polonnaruwa is so gripping that no one wants to be distracted by such 'academic' questions. |
sk63
Senior Member
Joined: Mar 2005
Posts: 1001
Member Profile
|
13 Aug 2005 23:06:18 GMT Report for Abuse
|
Dear Peraboy,
I fully agree nobody wants another war. Both sides had enough economic woes and then the Tsunami.
As for SLA military capability one would wait and see. Hopefully only waiting would happen, because seeing wont be pleasant.
Peraboy, you appear to be a rational man and I enjoy some of your posts. How come you do not condemn this killing. As you know I have attracted criticism from my own community when I condemned Mr. Sivaram killing. I also attracted lot of abuse from the Tamil community every time I defended Neelan Thiru. But I stood by my views. If the killing of Mr. Sivaram and Kaushalyan and many others is not justified, how is this Mr. Kadirgamar killing justified? |
|
